


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MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No. 9, September 1988

Operations in Battles

00010002a Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press
29 Aug 88) pp 3-8

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Military Art" by Maj Gen V.V. Gurkin and Lt Gen (Ret) M.I. Golovnin: "Operations in Battles"; the article is written on the question of the strategic and front operations conducted in the course of the battles of the Great Patriotic War]

[Text] As is known, in the wars of the 18th and 19th Centuries, the concept of a "battle" ["bitva"] meant a major (general) engagement which often determined the outcome of the war. In the wars of the 20th Century, a somewhat different sense has been invested into this and namely the aggregate of simultaneous and successive offensive and defensive operations on a strategic scale and carried out on the most important axes or theaters of operations in the interests of achieving decisive military-political goals in a certain stage of the war.¹

In the course of the Great Patriotic War there were numerous major engagements (military clashes) by the sides and these were carried out over vast expanses and had a protracted, stubborn and fierce nature. Each of these which was named a "battle" played an important role in the achieving of a Soviet victory over Nazi

Germany and led to the defeat of large strategic enemy groupings and the achieving of military-political results. Among them are the "Battle of Moscow," "Battle of Leningrad," "Battle of Stalingrad," "Battle of the Caucasus," "Kursk Battle" and the "Battle for the Dnieper."

In each of these battles which lasted from 1 to 6 months, while the Battle of Leningrad lasted around 3 years, the Soviet troops conducted several strategic as well as front-level operations within the strategic operations as well as outside them. Unfortunately, these operations have been reflected in far from all our military history literature devoted to battles. Moreover, the articles do not always indicate what forces were involved in them, what were their military-political and strategic results and the characteristic traits of military art. As a result, it is impossible to obtain a complete understanding of the scope and intensity of the armed struggle of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the next few years, there will be a reissuing of the 8-volume "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] and the publishing of the 10-volume "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People]. In these it is essential to avoid those shortcomings and oversights in the description of the battles and which occurred in previous military history works.

We have attempted to show the strategic and front operations conducted by the Soviet troops in the course of the designated battles.

**Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations
Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War**

Strategic Operations and Front Operations Carried Out Within Strategic Ones	Front Operations Conducted Outside Strategic Ones
1	2

L. Battle of Moscow (30 Sep 41 - 20 Apr 42)

**1. Moscow Strategic Defensive Operation
(30 Sep - 5 Dec 41)**

Involving troops of Western, Kalinin, Reserve, Bryansk and portion of forces of the Southwestern Fronts.

Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:

- Orel-Bryansk Defensive Operation of the Bryansk Front (30 Sep - 23 Oct 41);
- Vyazma Defensive Operation of Western and Reserve Fronts (2-13 Oct 42);
- Kalinin Defensive Operation by right wing of Western Front, from 17 Oct the Kalinin Front (10 Oct - 4 Dec 41);
- Mozhaysk-Maloyaroslavets Defensive Operation of Western Front (13-30 Oct 41);
- Tula Defensive Operation of Bryansk Front, from 11 Nov the left wing of the Western Front (24 Oct - 5 Dec 41);
- Klin-Solnechnogorsk Defensive Operation by right wing of Western Front (15 Nov - 5 Dec 41);
- Naro-Fominsk Defensive Operation of Western Front (16 Nov - 5 Dec 41).

**2. Moscow Strategic Offensive (Moscow Counteroffensive)
Operation (5 Dec 41 - 7 Jan 42)**

Involving Western, Kalinin, Bryansk (from 24 Dec 41), the right wing of the Southwestern (to 20 Dec 41) Front.

Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:

- Kalinin Offensive Operation by Kalinin Front (5 Dec 41 - 7 Jan 42);
- Klin-Solnechnogorsk Offensive Operation by right wing of Western Front (6-25 Dec 41);
- Tula Offensive Operation by left wing of Western Front (6-16 Dec 41);
- Yelets Offensive Operation by right wing of Southwestern Front (6-16 Dec 41);

Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War—Continued

1	2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Naro-Fominsk--Borovaya Offensive Operation of Western Front (13-25 Dec 41); - Kaluga Offensive Operation by left wing of Western Front (17 Dec 41 - 5 Jan 42). From 24 Dec 41, the operation involved the Bryansk Front. <p>3. Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation (8 Jan - 20 Apr 42)</p> <p>Involving Western and Kalinin Fronts.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sychev-Vyazma Offensive Operation by the Kalinin Front (8 Jan - 20 Apr 42); - Vyazma Offensive Operation of Western Front (10 Jan - 20 Apr 42). 	<p>Bolkhov Offensive Operation by Bryansk Front (8 Jan - 20 Apr 42)</p>
II. Battle of Leningrad (10 Jul 41 - 9 Aug 44)	
<p>1. Leningrad Strategic Defensive Operation (10 Jul - 30 Sep 41)</p> <p>Involving troops of Northern, Leningrad (from 23 Aug 41), Northwestern Fronts, Baltic Fleet and Ladoga Naval Flotilla.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pskov-Novgorod Defensive Operation of Northwestern Front (10 Jul - 23 Aug 41); - Luga-Narva Defensive Operation by left wing of Northern Front (from 23 Aug, the Leningrad) (10 Aug - 8 Sep 41); - The defensive operation of the Leningrad Front on the near approaches to Leningrad (8-30 Sep 41). <p>2. Tikhvin Strategic Offensive Operation (10 Nov - 30 Dec 41)</p> <p>Involving 54th Army of Leningrad Front, 4th and 2d Separate Armies combined from 17 Dec 41 into the Volkhov Front, the Novgorod Army Group of the Northwestern Front.</p>	<p>1. Vyborg-Keksgolm Defensive Operation by portion of forces of Northern (from 23 Aug 41, the Leningrad) Front (10 Jul - 23 Sep 41)</p> <p>2. Tikhvin Defensive Operation of 4th and 52d Separate Armies and portion of forces of Leningrad Front (16 Oct - 10 Nov 41)</p> <p>3. Lyuban Offensive Operation of Volkhov and partially the Leningrad Fronts (7 Jan - 30 Apr 42)</p> <p>4. Sinyavino Offensive Operation of Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts (19 Aug - 10 Oct 42)</p> <p>5. Mga Offensive Operation of Leningrad Front (22 Jul - 22 Aug 43)</p>

Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War—Continued

1	2
<p>3. Strategic offensive operation to breach Leningrad blockade (12 Jan - 30 Jan 43) Involving troops of Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts, portion of forces of the Baltic Fleet.</p> <p>4. Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Offensive Operation (14 Jan - 1 Mar 44) Involving troops of Leningrad, Volkhov and Second Baltic Fronts, part of forces of Baltic Fleet. Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Krasnoye-Selo--Gdov Offensive Operation of Leningrad Front and forces of the Baltic Fleet (14 Jan - 1 Mar 44); - Novgorod-Luga Offensive Operation of Volkhov Front (14 Jan - 13 Feb 44); - Staraya Russa-Novorzhev Offensive Operation of Second Baltic Front (18 Feb - 1 Mar 44). <p>5. Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Strategic Offensive Operation (10 Jun - 9 Aug 44) Involving troops of Leningrad and Karelian Fronts, Baltic Fleet, Ladoga and Onegin Naval Flotillas. Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vyborg Offensive Operation of Leningrad Front with support of Baltic Fleet (10-20 Jun 44); - Svir-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation of Karelian Front (21 Jun - 9 Aug 44). 	<p>6. Narva Offensive Operation of Leningrad Front (24-30 Jul 44)</p>

III. Battle of Stalingrad (17 Jul 42 - 2 Feb 43)

1. **Stalingrad Strategic Defensive Operation (17 Jul - 18 Nov 42)**
Involving troops of Stalingrad (Don), Southeastern (Stalingrad) Fronts, Volga Naval Flotilla.
Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:
- Defensive Operation of Stalingrad and Southeastern Fronts on distant approaches to Stalingrad (17 Jul - 17 Aug 42);
 - Defensive Operation of Stalingrad and Southeastern Fronts on near approaches to Stalingrad (18 Aug - 18 Nov 42);
 - Counterstrikes by Don Front against enemy assault group advancing against Stalingrad (30 Sep - 18 Nov 42).

Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War—Continued

1	2
<p>2. Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation (19 Nov 42 - 2 Feb 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don Fronts.</p> <p>In the course of the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive Operation by Southwestern Front to encircle enemy troop grouping in Stalingrad area (19-30 Nov 42); - Offensive Operation by Stalingrad Front to encircle enemy troop grouping in Stalingrad area (20-30 Nov 42); - Offensive Operation by Don Front to encircle enemy grouping in Stalingrad area (19-30 Nov 42); - The Kotelnikovo Operation by the left wing of the Stalingrad Front to repel enemy counterstrike and defeat its grouping endeavoring to break through to Stalingrad (12-30 Dec 42); - Middle Don Offensive Operation of Southwestern Front (16-30 Dec 42); - Offensive Operation of Don Front to eliminate encircled enemy troops in Stalingrad (10 Jan - 2 Feb 43). 	
<p style="text-align: center;">IV. Battle of the Caucasus (25 Jul 42 - 9 Oct 43)</p> <p>1. Northern Caucasus Strategic Defensive Operation (25 Jul - 31 Dec 42)</p> <p>Involving troops of Southern (to 28 Jul 42), Northern Caucasus Fronts, Northern and Black Sea Groups of Transcaucasus Front, Black Sea Fleet and Azov Naval Flotilla.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive Operation of Southern (to 28 Jul 42) and Northern Caucasus Fronts on the Stavropol and Krasnodar axes (25 Jul - 5 Aug 42); - Armavir-Maykop Defensive Operation of Northern Caucasus Front (6-17 Aug 42); - Novorossiysk Defensive Operation of Northern Caucasus Front, from 1 Sep 42, the Black Sea Troop Group of the Transcaucasian Front (19 Aug - 26 Sep 42); - The Mozdok-Malgobek Defensive Operation of the Northern Troop Group of the Transcaucasus Front (1-28 Sep 42); 	

Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War—Continued

1	2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tuapsi Defensive Operation of Black Sea Troop Group of Transcaucasus Front (25 Sep - 20 Dec 42); - Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze Defensive Operation of Northern Troop Group of Transcaucasus Front (25 Oct - 12 Nov 42). <p>2. Northern Caucasus Strategic Offensive Operation (1 Jan - 4 Feb 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Transcaucasus, Northern Caucasus Fronts, a portion of forces of the Southern Front*, the Black Sea Fleet.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mozdok-Stavropol Offensive Operation of Northern Troop Group of Transcaucasus Front (1-24 Jan 43); - Novorossiysk-Mykop Offensive Operation of Black Sea Troop Group of Transcaucasus Front (11 Jan - 4 Feb 43); - Tikhoretsk Offensive Operation of Northern Caucasus Front (24 Jan - 4 Feb 43). <p>3. Novorossiysk-Taman Strategic Offensive Operation (10 Sep - 9 Oct 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Northern Caucasus Front, forces of the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Naval Flotilla.</p>	<p>Krasnodar Offensive Operation of Northern Caucasus Front (5 Feb - 24 May 43)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">V. Kursk Battle (5 Jul - 23 Aug 43)</p> <p>1. Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation (5-23 Jul 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive Operation of Central Front on Orel-Kursk Axis (5-11 Jul 43); - Defensive Operation of Voronezh Front and portion of forces of the Steppe Front on the Belgorod-Kursk Axis (5-23 Jul 43). <p>2. Orel Strategic Offensive Operation (12 Jul - 18 Aug 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Bryansk, Central and portion of forces of the Western Front.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Volkhov-Orel Offensive Operation of Bryansk Front (17 Jul - 18 Aug 43); 	

Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War—Continued

1	2
<p>- Kromy-Orel Offensive Operation of Central Front (12 Jul - 18 Aug 43).</p> <p>3. Belgorod-Kharkov Strategic Offensive Operation (3-23 Aug 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <p>- Offensive Operation of Voronezh Front on Belgorod-Bogodukhov Axis (3-23 Aug 43);</p> <p>- Offensive Operation of Steppe Front on Belgorod-Kharkov Axis (3-23 Aug 43).</p>	
<p>VI. The Battle for the Dnieper (Aug - Dec 43)</p>	
<p>1. Chernigov-Poltava Strategic Offensive Operation (26 Aug - 30 Sep 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <p>- Chernigov-Pripyat Offensive Operation of Central Front (26 Aug - 30 Sep 43);</p> <p>- Sumi-Priluki Offensive Operation of Voronezh Front (24 Aug - 30 Sep 43);</p> <p>- Poltava Offensive Operation of Steppe Front (24 Aug - 30 Sep 43).</p> <p>2. Donbass Strategic Offensive Operation (13 Aug - 22 Sep 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Southwestern and Southern Fronts.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p> <p>- Barvenkovo-Pavlograd Offensive Operation of Southwestern Front (13 Aug - 22 Sep 43);</p> <p>- Mius-Mariupol Offensive Operation of Southern Front (18 Aug - 22 Sep 43).</p> <p>3. Lower Dnieper Strategic Offensive Operation (26 Sep - 20 Dec 43)</p> <p>Involving troops of Steppe (from 20 Oct 43, Second Ukrainian), Southwestern (from 20 Oct 43, Third Ukrainian) and Southern (from 20 Oct 43, Fourth Ukrainian) Fronts.</p> <p>Within the operation, the following front operations were carried out:</p>	<p>Gomel-Rechitsa Offensive Operation of Belorussian Front (10-30 Nov 43)</p>

Soviet Troop Strategic and Front Operations Carried Out in Battles of the Great Patriotic War—Continued

1	2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Kremenchug-Pyatikhatki Offensive Operation of Second Ukrainian (to 20 Oct 43, Steppe) Front (15 Oct - 20 Dec 43); - Zaporozhye Offensive Operation of Southwestern Front (10-14 Oct 43); - Dnepropetrovsk Offensive Operation of Third Ukrainian Front (23 Oct - 20 Dec 43); - Melitopol Offensive Operation of Southern (from 20 Oct 43, Fourth Ukrainian) Front (26 Sep - 5 Nov 43). <p>4. Kiev Strategic Offensive Operation (3-13 Nov 43) Involving troops of First Ukrainian Front.</p>	<p>Kiev Defensive Operation of First Ukrainian Front (13 Nov - 22 Dec 43)</p>

* The main forces of the Southern Front at this time were carrying out the Rostov Offensive Operation.

Footnotes

1. Author's definition of the concept of a "battle." The "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" (Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 1, 1976, p 479) defines this as "a series of simultaneous and successive offensive and defensive operations by large troop groupings and conducted on important axes or theaters of operations in the aim of achieving strategic results in a war (military campaign)."

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Great Patriotic...

00010002b Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
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29 Aug 88) pp 9-17

[Conference report, published under the heading "Debates and Discussions," prepared by Col B.G. Krokhmalyuk and Capt 1st Rank V.G. Oppokov: "The Great Patriotic..."]

[Text] The Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense held a discussion of the reworked outline of the first volume of the future 10-volume publication "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People]. Participating in its discussion were representatives of numerous organizations. Among them were leading scholars from the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, from the Academy of Social Sciences and the military academies, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the

CPSU Central Committee and the Institute of International Relations, Moscow State University, workers from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, prominent military historians as well as co-workers from the editorial staffs of certain journals and newspapers.

In opening the conference, the chief of the Military History Institute, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col Gen D.A. Volkogonov emphasized that it is essential to assess critically, thoroughly and profoundly both the content and structural aspect of the 10-volume edition. From the very outset it is also essential to clearly define to whom it is addressed: for whom the work is designed? Of course, possibly some of those present would like to see it as a strictly scientific work kept within the traditional specific framework. But if it is considered that the proposed publication run is 300,000 copies and we officially have 30-fold fewer historians, it is clear that it is targeted for the broadest reader audience. As this is the case, the exposition of the material should be vivid and attractive.

The authors and editors will encounter many complexities and problems which are not completely clear. For instance, how should one reliably depict the acute and contradictory situation which developed in the prewar years: the atmosphere under the conditions of the monopoly of power, the process of military organizational development on the eve of the war, the international position of the Soviet Union and particularly its

relations with Germany? But the main subject of the work is naturally people at war. The subject is seemingly familiar but it requires a new analysis. We must show the Soviet worker people, the soldier people and thoroughly disclose its true phenomenon. For this reason we must as widely as possible present the composition of the war's participants.

It is also important to consider other fundamental questions, for example, the class, national and international balance. Certainly, the class views which in one way or another developed in the awareness of our people during the prewar years were romantically revolutionary and indelible.

In a word, at the current meeting I would like to hear terse and constructive ideas and views relating to the first volume of the publication. The main criterion of our judgments is undoubtedly to be the truth. The truth which has been in acute scarcity in numerous current sources.

Then the floor was given over to the conference participants.

Col A.M. Noskov, Editor-in-Chief of the first volume, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor. The first volume of "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" encompasses very important military-political events of the interwar period and the first period of World War II, when virtually all capitalist Europe collapsed in the West under the blows of Nazi Germany while in the East, the Japanese militarists captured over one-half China's territory. Having incorporated the military-economic might of the captured nations, the armies of the Nazi coalition prepared to launch a decisive attack on the Soviet Union.

The first volume should provide an analysis of the dramatic events occurring in the 1930s in the USSR and to a large degree influencing the preparedness of the Armed Forces and the nation as a whole to repel aggression. The editorial personnel has been confronted with the crucial task of considering the demands of today, that is, a further broadening of glasnost and democracy, to provide a profoundly scientific, just and interesting work on the Great Patriotic War in which the Soviet people are the main hero. Thus, the chapters "The Preparations of the Army and Navy to Repel Aggression," "Before the Invasion" and others are to be written from new positions and with the broad drawing on previously unused documents.

A key and rather difficult problem is the preparing of materials concerning the role of the Communist Party and its Central Committee in the military organizational development of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s. It is essential to carefully analyze and objectively assess each measure and its significance during this difficult period for our nation and at the same time in a just and objective manner disclose the criminal actions

of I.V. Stalin and his immediate circle who destroyed the best military, scientific and economic cadres, as well as show the influence of Stalin's cult on the various aspects in the organizational development and level of combat readiness in the Soviet Armed Forces.

A new, creative approach is required for the treatment of these questions. Here we are relying not only on our own forces but also on the aid of an author aktiv, co-workers from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the academy institutes, the military academies and other organizations.

A major problem in creating the new work has been the treatment of the prewar period. Major obstacles in this have been the very heavy burden of old stereotypes, the fear of thinking independently and the habit of relying on worn out phrases. There is only one way out of this situation: a scientific, creative approach, innovativeness and boldness.

What materials did the editorial collective of the first volume have available? This included the extensive new Soviet and foreign literature on the examined problems as well as interesting documents from the archives of Great Britain, West Germany, the United States, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. During last year and this year the co-workers from our institute have thoroughly worked through the documents of 1941 in the military archives. The search for new ones is continuing.

From what has been stated above the conclusion can be drawn that we presently possess a minimum of materials with which we can commence the work but for a thorough investigation of events we must have broad access to the main and not the secondary holdings of the archives and we are counting on this.

V.M. Falin, Doctor of Historical Sciences (APN) [Academy of Pedagogical Sciences]. Before the volume can assume real contours, we, I feel, must meet repeatedly to exchange opinions. Certainly the first book is the most difficult, the most responsible and the most problematic.

What are the key elements in the work at the given stage? It is essential to find the most effective balance in the component parts, as well as argue out and elucidate what should be written about and in what sequence so that all the details are analyzed in a new manner. Only then will the newly created history of the Great Patriotic War be truly new.

Having not yet set to work, we are encountering a number of difficulties. For example, at present we do not have the opportunity to use essential documents. Moreover, some of these, very important ones (in particular, on 1939), have not only been destroyed but have not even left any traces. This can lead to consequent inaccuracies and flaws. A maximum of meticulousness, responsibility and endeavor on the part of each executor will help avoid these or at least reduce them.

There is also the acute question of the preconditions of World War II as the Great Patriotic War is an inseparable component part of this. It is impossible to reduce everything to Europe and Asia. In my view, it is essential to clarify the date for the start of the second major armed clash. For instance, for Albania, Czechoslovakia, Spain and certain African countries, this began somewhat earlier than is usually considered on the general scale. This will make it possible to look at World War II from a different, nontraditional viewpoint. Why? In order to consider under what conditions certain, so to speak, contradictory decisions were taken in the USSR: under peacetime or wartime. Certainly in this instance their assessment will also be different, more objective and just.... Moreover, virtually no research has been done on the question of alternatives to international relations in the prewar years.

The creation of a new, truthful work is impeded by the traditional nature of many views concerning individual personalities and events. Take Churchill's speech of 24 June 1941. According to the quotes published in our country, it is seen as a manifesto of a friendly attitude toward the Soviet nation. But this is far from the case. If one reads the speech as a whole, a different impression arises. There are documents which are still unpublished which in a different manner shed light on the attitude toward the USSR during the period of German aggression, not only on the part of Great Britain, but also the United States as well as Franklin Roosevelt personally. Or there has been the constant repetition of the statement by Hitler: "Russia is a colossus with clay feet." But this is not only a fragmentary but also a distorted phrase used by the Fuhrer. The precise sense of what was said by him on this question is completely different. He said that the Soviet Armed Forces after the elimination of the military personnel by Stalin was a colossus with clay feet. There is no need to explain who found this misinterpretation advantageous.

I also feel that we should not link the preparation of such a vast, important and crucial work to a rigid date or all the more to a precise date.

G.G. Morekhina, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor (MGU) [Moscow State University]. It was with great interest that I became acquainted with the outline of the first volume. Having listened to the comments of Comrade Falin, I am convinced that on many points our opinions coincide and because the work under discussion is unusual. It should be completely new both in terms of the methodology of the factual aspects, in terms of structure and in terms of the approach to the various phenomena on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and the start of World War II. In the structure and outline of the volume, certain, in my view, fundamental aspects have been pointed up and these must be examined. But in none of the chapters of the work, particularly in its initial part, is the question raised of the underlying principles or of our roots, the victories of the Great October Socialist Revolution. And precisely

this created the prerequisites employed by our party and people to organize national defense and then for decisive fighting against the Nazi aggressors and the achieving of victory in the clash with them.

October 1917, V.I. Lenin and his role in establishing and strengthening the socialist state and our Armed Forces—these are the initial points which must be taken up in the volume without fail.

I, as a historian, am interested in the question of the maturing of Nazism and its aggression. I would also very much like for this to be taken up.

I also consider it important to have a more thorough elucidation, drawing on the historical truth, of the negative role played in our state by the arising administrative-command system of party and state leadership of the nation, by bureaucracy, the cult of personality, the violating of legality, the arbitrary rule and repression in the 1930s.

As a whole, I have the impression that the editorial collective has carried out extensive work and it is on the right path.

Maj Gen A.G. Khorkhov, Doctor of Historical Sciences (Military History Institute). The given meeting is not the start but rather a regular stage in the work which would anticipate all sorts of errors and making it possible to correct those which were made in previous editions.

The first volume, the outline of which we are discussing, in structure is similar to the analogous book of the previous 12-volume edition. But in content this is a new work. What, in my view, has not been shown in the outline?

In the first place, why the peoples of the world were unable to prevent World War II?

Secondly, in the introduction it is essential to say what is new in the 10-volume edition and what has caused its appearance.

Thirdly, the outline is oversaturated with details, with minor questions at times portrayed as crucial ones while the real, acute problems are not always clearly set out.

Fourthly, in the first two sections of the tenth chapter, the authors are not completely accurate in their formulations. There is a separation of individual chapters, they are not consistent and there is also unevenness in disclosing different questions which vary in importance.

Fifthly, there has been an arbitrary interpretation of certain terms, and errors and contradictions are encountered. For example, the very fact of aggression during the night of 22 June 1941 is considered a diplomatic about-face by Germany, vis-a-vis the USSR. But certainly the Nazi leaders had stated the possibility of capturing our

lands significantly earlier and rather definitely. Hitler, even in 1925, when he wrote "Mein Kampf," envisaged aggression primarily against the USSR. He voiced this same idea in a speech in 1936.

V.M. Kulish, Doctor of Historical Sciences. I have read the outline of volume one closely. My first impression is that everything is there, everything has been covered. I am beginning to wonder if something has been left out. All that is found, upon careful analysis, seemingly does not hold together and becomes diffuse. There is no single idea, no single over-all concept (incidentally, these are lacking in the entire edition). Without such an underlying core it is impossible to speak with certainty about a distinction of the future publication from the previous one. In a word, I feel that we must show more broadly, profoundly and inclusively precisely the Great Patriotic War of the entire Soviet people and not focus attention just on military history problems.

Where should one begin? As they say, from Great October. Such haziness is unforgivable. We must limit ourselves to a precise time framework relating to just the given theme. It seems as though we are still not clear on what we are striving for. I do not agree that we are lacking material. There is more than enough. They say that new documents will change things. But this is not quite the case. This is an extreme view. It is essential to rethink all that has been written on the given question. Certainly new documents can be put into the "service" of obsolete views.

In the outline much is said about fascism and militarism. But also imperialism existed and this, regardless of its internal contradictions, was united against us. So it is important to show how the contradictions between the imperialist states were taken into account or not taken into account as well as explain that precisely their lack of consideration was a major mistake. Certainly, up to now, there has been the opinion that Stalin, having concluded the treaty with Nazi Germany, was acting wisely, cleverly and farsightedly, having done a good deed for the nation. But it is time to say that it was not Stalin who wrapped Hitler around his finger, but vice versa.

Col Gen G.M. Mikhaylov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Directorate. It seems to me that the deeper one goes into the problem which confronts the author collective, the more complicated it seems. It is difficult primarily because a new history of our party has not been written and a new history of the Soviet state has not been prepared; in other words, I have the impression that the author collective which has assembled today is playing the role of a trailblazer. Whether we want this or not, it must sum up a whole series of new opinions and judgments which no one as yet has truly investigated and analyzed but has merely proposed in the form of individual premises in the most diverse areas.

Specifically in terms of the first volume. In the aim of maintaining consistency and logic, running through all the chapters should be the notion of the role of our party in repelling the aggressor and a reflection of the concept of a clash of two ideologies—imperialist and communist. For this purpose in the structure of the first chapter, in its beginning it is essential to incorporate a section entitled: "Anticommunism as a Weapon of Aggression."

I would like to emphasize that the first section of the chapter where it deals with the socialist transformations in the USSR during the first five-year plans must provide realistic data on the achievements in the nation and explain by what methods and how the plans of the first and subsequent five-year plans were carried out.

There is the important problem of the readiness of the nation and the Armed Forces to repel aggression. Was the attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR such a surprise? Where, for instance, was our intelligence? Here it is essential to pose precise questions and provide thoughtful answers to them. For instance, we certainly must not overlook the fact that during the prewar years the central intelligence apparatus was in fact completely repressed or replaced. As for clandestine intelligence, many of the agents who were working at that time were not trusted and their reports doubted.

In previous publications it was often mentioned that intelligence was carried out by the Chekists. At the same time, the facts indicate that a majority of the intelligence agents in the enemy rear and particularly on the front were Red Army servicemen. They carefully followed the development of the situation on the eve of the war.

Contrary to certain persistent notions, the Center regularly received reliable information on the preparations of Nazi Germany to attack the Soviet Union. The effective strength, number and enemy troop groupings were forwarded with great accuracy. Hitler's decision to attack the USSR was made known and information received on the initial dates of the attack and the subsequent changes in them. Research on captured documents has shown that the Soviet intelligence data on the enemy were very close to the actual. In other words, the information was there. It is another matter of how this was used. And here Stalin's personality cult had a most immediate influence.

We must also not forget the questions of counterpropaganda. We must objectively and thoughtfully assess a whole series of concepts, theories, and versions which have appeared in the West. The falsifiers of history must be given a worthy rebuff.

As a whole, if we speak about the proposed structure for the first volume, although here there are various views, I feel that it is completely acceptable.

G.A. Kumanev, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor (USSR History Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences).

The first thing I want to say is that co-workers from the institute which I represent were not involved in drawing up the discussed outline plan. I consider this a lamentable misunderstanding. The editor-in-chief of the first volume, A.M. Noskov, has stated that certain authors are already at work. At the same time, the structure of the book has not yet been approved. How can this be? What are they working on and what are they providing? As yet, there is no coordination between the co-executors.

Here it has been correctly said and I support the opinion that the dates for creating the work are unrealistic. How can they be made concrete if many documents essential for the work are closed or there is no access to them. In this context I am not satisfied by the "upbeat" tone struck by the volume's editor-in-chief. He asserts that a minimum base has already been established which allows the start to the work. But I say that this base is a very low minimum. Only 15 percent of the important documents are known. But without access to the remainder it is an absurd and silly thing to write a history of the Great Patriotic War that is new, let alone just and honest. Recently, we conducted a reconnaissance tour: we went to several archives all without result. For example, the Kremlin Archives, I know, have very interesting and unique documents. But there, as they say, we were given the go-around under the pretext that there is nothing of interest. Or go to the Marxism-Leninism Institute. There the answer is analogous.

The outline of the volume, in comparison with the version proposed previously, has been improved but does not cause any particular excitement. The compilers have not abandoned the customary subjects and have used the first three volumes of "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny..." [History of World War II...] as the basis. The chronological framework of the foreword are very indefinite as there is a little about everything instead of the strict selection of specific problems determined by the general subject and a clearly designated period (the prewar). The title of the volume itself "On the Eve" is ambiguous. A precise chronology and a concrete posing of problems will make it possible to evenly distribute the pages and with the space assigned to certain important subjects, we can neither fill in the "blank spots" or shed light on the "black holes."

In the proposed version, the role of the party and other social organizations has been eroded while socialist development and the cult of Stalin have not been sufficiently treated. Since the edition is planned for a broad range of readers, the volume should not be pseudoscientific. At the same time, the names of the individual chapters and sections are strewn with specific terms.

V.P. Smirnov, Doctor of Historical Sciences (MGU). I would say frankly that the previously published works on the history of World War II and the Great Patriotic War are not satisfying. I approve the outline of the next publication. The outline has been drawn up in a spirit of

the times. It has much that is new: treating the role of Stalin and the cult engendered by him, a more accurate and complete depiction of German-Soviet relations, the problems of international ties have been set out and so forth.

What are the shortcomings? Sometimes the formulations are of a general nature and it is not completely clear how the posed problems will be realized, for example, the question of the "hurried" treaty with Nazi Germany. Or for the first time mention is made of a variation of Stalin's decision on Finland but we do not know how this subject will be brought out.

It is essential to clarify the balance of forces of the opposing sides. For instance, previously figures on German tanks were given in a general manner and for hours, only those of relatively new design. We must give up such comparisons.

There must be a more profound disclosure and analysis of the nature of World War II as without this it is impossible to completely think through all the questions related to the Great Patriotic War.

I feel that it is correct that the problems of Western Europe are examined cursorily but, at the same time, we must not skip over the occupation and other regimes and the position of the communist parties.

In a word, the working out of the outline is going on in the required direction. I agree that it needs correction but not reworking.

V.A. Anfilov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor (Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Basically, the outline is satisfactory. And while it has been proposed that many additions be made, let me say that we cannot encompass the unencompassable. We must proceed from advisability and our capabilities. The main thing is that the work actually be new, timely, objective and not pseudoscientific.

I consider it reasonable to reposition certain chapters in order to maintain the sequence of problems and events. Individual questions must be excluded completely as they have "skipped" here from the second volume.

Now about the problems. In the comments of certain comrades, the idea has been voiced that the USSR is in part to blame for the outbreak of World War II (as well as the Patriotic War), and that this war supposedly was to some degree the consequence of the incorrect foreign policy activities of Stalin and so forth. This is historically wrong. The aggressor initiates aggression. On it rests all responsibility to the peoples. Stalin, with all his sins and negative actions, naturally could not embody an aggressive policy as he was the leader of the most peace-loving state.

O.A. Rzheshhevskiy, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor (Institute of General History under the USSR Academy of Sciences). It has been correctly said here that without a clearly designated core problem it is hard to make headway. But this concerns not only, or rather not so much, the first volume as the entire edition. This must be sought out.

An optimum version has been found in the elaborated outline of the discussed volume. At the same time, it is essential to alter the designated proportions in the treatment of domestic and international problems with preference given to the domestic. In the first place, we are writing a history of the Patriotic War. Secondly, the people are expecting primarily an accurate depiction of just what our nation was prior to and during the years of the war.

The principle of historical truth should be observed. This is often abandoned in being diverted to topical assessments.

In order to successfully solve the designated and other problems, it is essential to more closely unite the efforts of all who are involved in preparing the work.

M.I. Semiryaga, Doctor of Historical Sciences (Institute of the International Worker Movement under the USSR Academy of Sciences). A basis for discussion has been provided. Using the given version it would be possible to make a good outline.

I would like to accentuate the organizational side. It is essential to employ the experience and the knowledge of the editors who prepared the previous editions, in particular, the 12-volume one. I mean myself as well. We know a great deal and at one time were admitted to the archives to which at present there is no access. And while the previous editions are criticized, believe me, we were not to blame for the errors inherent to them. We were not permitted to do everything that we were thinking, wanting or able to do. Moreover, due to the desire for a correct exposition of the material, we were rebuked, dressed down, warned and threatened. But for example, I have material (unused) that is sharp and interesting.

Now about the current work. The authors have titled it "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda." Why have they abandoned the previous title where instead of the people there was "the Soviet Union." Certainly such an interpretation involves definite discrepancies. For example, when it is a question of the international position and state of the Armed Forces, the unity of the army and the people, the role of the party and so forth.

We are amazed by the position of certain speakers. In describing the domestic situation in the country during the prewar years and our foreign policy, they explain many difficulties by particular issues: the starvation, the shortage of machine tools and the threat of a war on two

fronts. But the same starvation in 1932-1933 was not across-the-board and was not always caused by natural factors. For example, at that time the Ukraine had a record harvest. Or, for instance, the ill-fated treaty with Germany. This was the most negative treaty which one could imagine. Certainly as a result of its conclusion it was not we who gained but rather the Nazis. I have in my possession the verbatim notes of a talk with Pavlov, Stalin's translator, where amazing details are given related to this document. I would call the given treaty the "fifth Munich," or a breathing spell for Germany, a breathing spell after the capture of Poland. Would it not have been wiser (before concluding this treaty) to have a more sober and wise assessment of the existing situation? Yes, we were not in friendly surroundings. But not all of the neighboring and non-neighboring countries were following an aggressive policy. Why then was tenacity shown in establishing a mutual understanding not with them but with the declared aggressor? We unleashed his arm against us. And relations with Finland? Where should the armed clash against it be put? In the Great Patriotic War? No. Why was it fought? To strengthen our positions? Absurd. We weakened them.

The outline states that in 1939-1941 it was a time of strengthening our international positions and rising prestige for the USSR. Here again we must clarify everything and place the accents correctly.

A.P. Antonov, L.S. Gaponenko, N.G. Pavlanko, A.V. Usikov and others also voiced their opinion on the outline plan of the first volume.

The results of the conference were summed up by **Col Gen D.A. Volkogonov**. In concluding our discussion, he said, it is wise to ask does a historian have the right to make the proposal: if this had been the case, then what?... I am sure that he does. Deprived of this right, he would be turned from a historian into a photographer. But, in large historical works as the future edition, such an approach to an analysis of problems and facts is essential. Here it has been stated that we must strictly follow the principle of historical truth. But we must not limit ourselves to solely this. We must rely on all the methods of dialectical materialism, including on logic.

From this rostrum there has been a valid criticism over the question: why do some books, in this instance historical ones, live for centuries while others "die," if it can be so put, in an hour? Obviously much here is explained not only by the talent of the authors but also by the ability to think independently and to look critically at the times, events and personalities. We, as it happened, were forced to be careful and to follow the instructions and each "superior" document and decision was to be taken as dogma. Moreover the value of any work rests in the truth and utility residing in them. Not every modern scientific book has enough of these qualities.

We should see before us a multimillion audience and not the specialists who could be seated on a sofa in a narrow circle for an official discussion.

On the question of access to the archives. I would like to let it be known that a letter has been prepared and forwarded to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee over the signature of the minister of defense. Well, there is the useless information already dug up in the archives by those who published the previous works and this should not be allowed to repeat itself. A decision has been taken to compile similar records (both those which will be part of the 10-volume edition and those which will not be used) for our own institute archives.

Here it was quite correctly pointed out that we must raise the role of the people in the war as well as provide a more valid depiction of the real situation, particularly on the eve and in the initial period of aggression. Something has already been done. Thus, the outline of Volume 2 in its first version did not even contain the words "retreat," "drama," "encirclement" or "catastrophe." Everything was shown if not in a rosy light, still in a traditional, streamlined and shadowed one. We still have not gotten free of stereotypes, particularly in our judgments. The truth, the truth and only the truth—this is our basic guide. But, of course, there must also be competence and professionalism.

It is essential, the comrades are right, to provide an accurate assessment of "Stalinism" as a distorted, subjectivist concept of socialism.

I support the general opinion that the dates are unrealistic.

On the question of proportions. I feel that it is valid if the military aspect prevails over the civil as we are writing precisely a history of the war.

I agree perfectly that in the future we must not become involved in such a broad and representative discussion. A discussion in a "narrow" circle would be more constructive, that is, consisting of the editors and the author aktiv of one or another volume. But still we cannot deny that the current meeting has brought undoubted benefit.

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Predictions of M.N. Tukhachevskiy

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29 Aug 88) pp 18-22

[Article, published under the heading "Military Science: People and Problems" by Col (Ret) Ya.M. Gorelik, candidate of military sciences: "The Predictions of M.N. Tukhachevskiy"]

[Text] Inherent to the generalship art of M.N. Tukhachevskiy was a profound understanding of the unique conditions and specific features of the situation in which

the military operations were conducted and the skillful employment of forms and methods of armed struggle corresponding to the nature of the Civil War and to the combat and moral capabilities of the Red Army. In those years, when our military art had just arisen, M.N. Tukhachevskiy made a worthy contribution to working out its principles making it possible to deal a crushing defeat to the crack formations of the White Guards and interventionists. In directing the actions of the troop, he showed tenacity in achieving the set goal. His activities clearly show the ability to quickly size up a situation, to correctly foresee the development of events on the battlefield, to provide decisive superiority in forces on the main sector, to employ decisive forms of maneuver in the course of the operation, to act boldly and rapidly, and promptly shift the main efforts of the troops from one axis to another.

In selecting the axis of the main thrust, M.N. Tukhachevskiy always saw to it that as a result of launching this there would be a fundamental change in the operational-strategic situation in favor of our troops. Thus, in the Zlatoust Offensive Operation in the summer of 1919, the launching of the main thrust against the right flank of Kolchak's Western Army along the Birska Post Road and Yuryuzan with the simultaneous tying down of it at the center made it possible for the 5th Army to defeat two crack White corps, to quickly come out on the Ufa Plateau and liberate Zlatoust. The successful outcome of the operation created good conditions for exploiting the offensive against Chelyabinsk.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy is known not only as a remarkable Soviet general, but also as a talented military scientist. Under the direct leadership of M.V. Frunze, he took an active part in generalizing the experience of the Civil War, in carrying out the military reform of 1924-1925 and in working out the manuals and regulations for the Red Army. He wrote over 125 works, articles and reports¹ containing an entire system of views on modern warfare and the methods of waging it and these were to have a significant impact on the development of military thought and the actual organizational development of the Armed Forces.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy gave great attention to studying and generalizing the experience of the Civil War. For this purpose he brought together all the articles and comments written by him during these years in a book entitled "Voyna klassov" [Class Warfare]. In the foreword to this book he emphasized that the goal of the collection was to evoke interest in the questions of the Civil War and point up the necessity of investigating them.² The publishing of a collection of articles at a time when virtually nothing had been written on the history of the Civil War was a major event. With good reason the critics had high regard for its importance. One of the reviews stated that, on the one hand, the author has set out the highlights in the theory of the Civil War and this lay the foundation for its further study and investigation and, on the other, valuable practical conclusions could

be drawn from the work.³ "The articles devoted to purely military questions," commented another review, "contain a number of extremely valuable thoughts and instructions which merit there being the most widespread. We must welcome the appearance of this book which is a serious incentive to work out the questions over which Marxist thought has still not done sufficient work."⁴

The collection "Voyna klassov," like the other work of M.N. Tukhachevskiy "Strategiya natsionalnaya i klassovaya" [National and Class Strategy], attracted the attention of V.I. Lenin. One copy of each of these books with comments by Vladimir Ilich was kept in his personal library in the Kremlin.⁵

The work of M.N. Tukhachevskiy "Strategiya natsionalnaya i klassovaya," on the basis of a scientific analysis of the combat experience of the Red Army on the Civil War fronts, provided valuable generalizations on the nature of proletarian military art, the forms and methods of strategic actions and the principles for preparing and conducting operations and combat. It was highly praised in the works and a number of critical articles. N.B. Kakurin, the commander of the 3d Army and subsequently a prominent military historian, wrote that this small work is very interesting, it opens up new horizons and is the only one of its sort in attempting to establish and introduce a number of new concepts into such a vital and essentially applied science as strategy should be.⁶ A positive review of the work is also found in the review by the prominent military specialist and pedagogue, F.Ye. Ogorodnikov.⁷

M.N. Tukhachevskiy, like M.V. Frunze, B.M. Shaposhnikov and others became one of the initiators of military scientific work in the Red Army. Even in 1918, he made it a rule to hold analyses of the conducted operations with the commanders and staff workers. Upon his initiative, in the 5th Army and later on the staff of the Western Front, they began to publish special collections which generalized everything new that had arisen out of the combat experience of our troops. Over a number of years M.N. Tukhachevskiy was a member of the editorial board of the central military scientific journal VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA, the pages of which trace all the main debates over the generalization and study of combat experience during the years of the Civil War. Together with S.S. Kamenev, R.P. Eydemann and A.S. Bubnov, he took an active part in publishing the 3-volume monograph "Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921 gg." [The Civil War of 1918-1921] and was also one of the initiators of establishing and then was also the editor of the first edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy made a significant contribution to the development of military art: strategy, operational art and tactics. His thoughts and statements in this area as well as on the questions of the organizational development of the Armed Forces were largely ahead of the practices of that period and contributed to the all-round

development of military science. M.N. Tukhachevskiy possessed the ability, on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist methodology, to thoroughly disclose and analyze the main trends in the development of military affairs making it possible to foresee the possible nature of a future war and in accord with this adopt the necessary measures to raise the nation's defense capability. "It is essential not only to study the experience of the past," he pointed out, "but also find new scientific methods which would serve to strengthen the Red Army."⁸ In his works "War as a Problem of Armed Combat," "The Questions of Modern Strategy," "The Questions of Higher Command," "New Questions of Warfare" and others, he pointed out that one of the main tasks of military strategy is to investigate the patterns of armed combat on the basis of a thorough analysis of the experience of previous wars and the prospects for the development of military affairs.

In studying the nature and essence of war, M.N. Tukhachevskiy developed Lenin's thesis that modern warfare is conducted by states and peoples and that the determining role in the wars is played by the economic factor. "The waging of war in the modern age," he wrote, "has ceased to be a matter of just one military strategist and has shifted into the hands of the government,"⁹ which, in his opinion, brings together all of the economic and social resources to achieve the aims of a war. Here the armed forces both in size and technical equipping should correspond to these goals and be fully supported by the nation's economic base. In his understanding "the plan of a war should correlate the development of the armed forces with the goals of the war as well as with the development of industry, in particular, the defense industry."¹⁰

M.N. Tukhachevskiy considered the main feature of modern wars to be their "great scope as well as those economic means which are employed in the war and the human resources which feed it, the space occupied by the belligerents and, finally, the duration of the war."¹¹

He devoted significant space in his scientific works to the initial period of a modern war, considering that "the first period of a war should be correctly anticipated even in peacetime, it must be correctly assessed even in peacetime and it is essential to prepare correctly for it."¹² M.N. Tukhachevskiy set out his views on this question most completely in his work "The Nature of Border Operations" published in a limited edition for the district staffs. In it the author proposed a new scheme for mobilization in the border zone, new methods for concentrating mass multimillion armies on the frontiers as well as principles for organizing and conducting a border engagement. This same subject was the topic of another work by M.N. Tukhachevskiy "Operational Destruction of Aviation." In this, using a sound line of argument, he showed the need to combat enemy aviation at airfields on the very first day of the war. In analyzing many other questions of the equipment and tactics of air combat, he raised a number of demands on the development of military aviation.

In considering the questions of the preparation for and conduct of operations to be a most important component part of military art and in assigning them the role of the main connecting link between strategy and tactics, M.N. Tukhachevskiy emphasized that under present-day conditions there cannot be engagements "which would not involve a single strike to destroy the entire enemy operational army."¹³ Proceeding from this, he proposed that on the question of the development of military theoretical thought in the 1920s it was very important to separate out operational art and make it into an independent area of military theory and practice.

In working out the main principles for the conduct of offensive operations with decisive aims, M.N. Tukhachevskiy along with the other theorists of our nation took an active part in establishing the theory of an operation and combat in depth. He reached the conclusion that it was essential to abandon the previous attritional struggle for each enemy position separately and to switch over to more effective methods of fighting. In his opinion, the essence of these was the massed employment of troops and equipment for a simultaneous action to the entire depth of the enemy defenses in the aim of their rapid breaching.

In his military theory works, M.N. Tukhachevskiy devoted a great deal of attention to the questions of troop command and control, considering that the activities of the commanders and staffs in preparation for and during an operation should be marked by great flexibility, by the ability to correctly select the axis of the main thrust, boldly employ decisive forms of operational maneuver and quickly realize favorable situational conditions. Careful preparation for an operation in his mind was the basis of its success. It was essential, he said, to learn to plan an operation to the maximum possible depth. For this the staffs should organize well and conduct reconnaissance. "No operational skill," he wrote, "can compensate for those severe consequences which may arise out of the negligence or shortcomings of the intelligence service."¹⁴

In analyzing the presently known works of M.N. Tukhachevskiy "Tactics and Training," "Our Tactical Training Tasks" and others, his activities in the position of commander of the Western and then the Leningrad Military District as well as the tactical assemblies conducted by him and one of which the author of the current article happened to attend, one is inevitably amazed by what attention he devoted to tactical questions and how much energy and strength he applied so that the junior and middle command personnel would correctly understand and assimilate the provisions of the field manuals, particularly the Infantry Field Manual (BUP-27) and regulations and where the relationship of maneuver, fire and assault was clearly shown for the subunits and units engaged in combat.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy was one of the first prominent Soviet military leaders who clearly understood the need for a fundamental reconstruction of the Soviet Armed

Forces and arming them with modern military equipment. He considered a strengthening of the technical might of the troops to be the important and decisive task. As a military theorist, he realized well that the improving of military equipment would inevitably bring about changes in the methods and forms of conducting combat. For this reason he always demanded of the members of the manual commissions which he headed that they boldly carry out our operational and tactical views in accord with that level of organizational and technical development which our army had reached.

M.N. Tukhachevskiy carried out extensive work as the chief of RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] armament. His activities in this post helped the technical arming of the Armed Forces with more advanced combat aircraft and various modifications of tanks, conventional and rocket artillery, communications equipment and military engineer equipment. He was the initiator of developing rocket equipment, mortar armament and the modernizing of small arms.

During the interwar period, in holding leading posts in the Red Army, M.N. Tukhachevskiy made a great effort to strengthen USSR defenses, to increase the level of technical equipping and combat readiness of the Armed Forces as well as in developing Soviet military theory and training military personnel. The military scientific works show that he correctly foresaw the development prospects of military affairs, he skillfully analyzed the state of equipment and methods of armed combat and on this basis put forward progressive ideas on many of the most important problems of military art and combat training of the troops. These works undoubtedly are a major contribution to developing the theory of Soviet military art. A careful study of them makes it possible to understand and analyze the processes occurring in military affairs presently and to arm the military personnel with knowledge on how the teachings of Marxism-Leninism must be employed for disclosing the laws of military science and how to approach a definition of the scientific bases for the organizational development of the Armed Forces.

Footnotes

1. The list of published works by M.N. Tukhachevskiy as shown in the second volume of his "Selected Works" runs to 122 works. However, this list is not complete. In particular, it does not include the works "Higher Troop Command in Wartime. Techniques in Carrying Out Operations," "Against Reactionary Theories on the Military Scientific Front," as well as for forewords to the works of A.M. Zayonchkovskiy "The Preparation of Russia for the Imperialist War," S.N. Nikitin-Zubrovskiy "Methods of Works in Zoning and Manning Units" and certain others.

2. M.N. Tukhachevskiy, "Voyna klassov: Stati 1919-1920 gg." [Class Warfare: Articles of 1919-1920], Smolensk, Gosizdat, 1921, p 4.

3. "Voyennaya kniga posle mirovoy voyny" [The Military Book After the World War], Moscow, Izd. TsS VNO, 1925, p 68.

4. VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, No 6, 1921, pp 22-23.

5. "Biblioteka V.I. Lenina v Kremlle: Katalog" [The Library of V.I. Lenin in the Kremlin: A Catalog], Moscow, Izd. Vsesoyuznoy Knizhnoy Palaty, 1961, p 393.

6. N.Ye. Kakurin, "Strategiya proletarskogo gosudarstva" [The Strategy of the Proletarian State], Izd. Zapadnogo Fronta, 1921, p 8.

7. "Revolutsiya i voyna" [Revolution and War], Smolensk, Collection 1, pp 104-105.

8. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 March 1930.

9. M.N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1964, p 4.

10. Ibid., p 5.

11. M.N. Tukhachevskiy, "Voprosy sovremennoy strategii" [Questions of Modern Strategy], Moscow, Voyennyy Vestnik, 1926, p 5.

12. Ibid., p 20.

13. M.N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya," Vol 2, p 23.

14. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 25896, inv. 9, file 461, sheet 77.

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Orders From World War II Archives

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[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials."

[Text]

Background of Order No. 270

The Order No. 270 of the Headquarters of the Red Army Supreme High Command published in this issue, like Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense published in the August issue of our journal has gone down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as one of its remarkable pages. It must be said that both orders were written at a moment when our party and government and the command of the fronts were making the most desperate efforts to bring about a decisive turn in

the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German Front. They were harsh orders. But they were forced measures dictated by the tragic conditions of 1941-1942.

Undoubtedly, as has now already been reliably established, the main reasons for our setbacks in 1941-1942 were the major errors and mistakes of our political leadership headed by Stalin and the criminal persecution and destruction of many thousands of commanders and political workers on the eve of the war which significantly weakened the Red Army and Navy. Our press has justly said much about this.

But it is also completely obvious that, regardless of what conditions the commanders, staffs, the political bodies and their subordinate troops were under, they were obliged to completely carry out their military duty. No special proof is required for the circumstance that it is always harder and, most importantly, more essential for the fate of a state to fight to the end than it is to surrender or lay down one's arms.

Recently articles have appeared in the press where attempts have been made to lift any responsibility, let us say, from D.G. Pavlov and other commanders, for the defeats in 1941. Of course, they were not, as they say, evil criminals and they, like citizens of our country, like the Soviet people, have been justly rehabilitated today. But it is impossible to remove from them completely responsibility for the poor troop command and the defeats. In actuality, Stalin prohibited a rise in the combat readiness of the troops and their operational deployment, the taking up of the defenses along the frontier and thereby put our army in an extremely difficult position. However, a commander who correctly understands the situation and carries out his assignment could, for example, ahead of time in exercises work on troop command, the procedure for their operational deployment at the start of a war and he might not allow, for instance, that at the Brest Fortress (in immediate proximity to the enemy) several divisions were positioned all together but assigned to fight on different axes.

Much could have been prevented. Various commanders and staffs commanded the troops differently at the outset of the war. Some, like Gen Boldin, behaved courageously and did everything to resist the enemy and thwart its plans. Others, like Vlasov, preferred to avoid the hardships which befell them and escape from responsibility. It is not difficult to imagine what the fate of our motherland would have been if not individual but rather a majority of our commanders and political workers, junior commanders and Red Army men followed Vlasov's path and that of the other traitors.

The war was won, the honor and independence of our nation were defended by precisely those who fought courageously, who did not fear encirclement and who unstintingly carried out their military duty to the very end. In light of this it is difficult to understand why the

authors of certain articles most extol not those who showed steadfastness and courage but rather those who fled, abandoning their troops, and then surrendered.

Regardless of the numerous injustices and factual inaccuracies committed in light of today in Orders No. 270 and 227, they were basically directed against those who were guilty of cowardice and confusion, who carried out their duty poorly and in this context these and other orders played a positive role in increasing the steadfastness of the troops and improving resistance to the enemy. "Many...facts show the steadfastness of our troops, the high morale of our fighters, commanders and commissars," stated Order No. 270. And precisely these "numerous facts" were the main purpose of all our press and of all the mass information media of those times. Certainly during the first weeks of the war our soldiers fought in such a manner that the motherland commended them with its highest decorations, and awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The first in the wartime galaxy of Heroes of the Soviet Union were the glorious pilots M.P. Zhukov, S.I. Zdorovtsev and P.T. Kharitonov. They became heroes in the very first month of the fight against the hated enemy.

"But we cannot conceal the fact that recently there have been several shameful instances of surrendering to the enemy. Individual generals set a bad example for our troops," stated Order 270. The entire article then is devoted to precisely these several shameful facts. Of course, judging from everything, this order was written hurriedly. The facts given in the order were not checked out and rechecked. As it turned out later, when the tragicness of the situation in the first weeks of the war had declined, none of the commanders mentioned in the order had surrendered voluntarily. Since all of this has been clarified, the names of these generals have been incorporated in all the military encyclopedias. The terrible accusations against three generals turned out to be nonsense. And again it must be said that we must not take a groundless approach to those who were captured. Each instance must be investigated personally and thoroughly. And only after this should each be given his due. In this context we must have more to say about prisoners generally. Today on the pages of newspapers and magazines really fantastic figures are "on parade": 4.5, 5, 6, 7.... These are supposedly the millions of our soldiers, officers and generals who were captured by the enemy.

The figures, of course, require the closest verification now. Certainly the basic, if it can be so said, mass of our prisoners was in the hands of the Germans during the period from 22 June through September 1941. This was the most tragic period for us. But where the 4.5...million? At that time in the West we did not have anywhere that number of troops. Yes, the losses on our side were enormous. But, as they say, no one knows how to count better than the German in Europe. There were enormous files of prisoners. And on each card there was a photograph.... There is still much that is important in this

file. They were able to count and carefully keep their "records." But there never could have been such numbers of Soviet prisoners as are presently found in some of our current publications.

Presently, the true number of our prisoners is being ascertained. The time will come and a precise figure will be announced. However, the fact remains the fact that Order 270 was issued in August 1941, and already in September the number of persons surrendering to the enemy had gone into a sharp decline. What does this show? Any army, aside from all else, is commanded by orders. Here they do not hold assemblies and meetings on the question of how the battalions and regiments are to fight. The regiments and battalions in an army fight exclusively upon orders of the commander, upon orders of the command. This aspect of army life is strengthened almost to the absolute in wartime, in a combat situation. And the order not to surrender was far from the most, so to speak, terrible order in the war. It was nothing in comparison with the order "To the assault! Forward!..." This simple order, which was seemingly quite different and not smelling of powder, among all else, brought the soldiers under bullets and shells, under bombs and bayonets, to death. What is it in comparison with the same Order 227 or 270? Nothing really! On the front there are much more terrible orders. Everyone who served on the front knew this well enough and is sincerely amazed that at present there is so much noise, so much discussion around, for example, Order 270. And to be completely frank and objective, it actually did sound insulting to Matrosov, Pokryshkin, Gastello, Talalikhin.... But, unfortunately, in a war there are not only Matrosovs.... Such orders as 270 are written for the non-Matrosovs.

But were there exaggerations and extremes in Order 270? Of course. Presently, it seems that the families of even the vilest deserters and traitors would probably not be subjected to any punishment as arrest while the families of the Red Army men who surrendered should not be deprived of their assistance and aid. The children are certainly not to blame. Neither on the moral, the legal or any other level can one justify such a situation where nothing is known specifically or completely about what happened but already there are punishments and repression. There is no word about it there were examples of shameful surrender, but these did not come under Order 270, but the families did of those who later had to be justified and rehabilitated. Repression against the families of those who were taken prisoner generally are not within the keeping of either the logic or any laws. But, on the other hand, on the front there is no "dovish" order. On the front there is a "scream" in each order. Because the front is a different, displaced world. And what on any front seems to the frontline veteran natural and valid because each day and night he looks death in the eyes, outside of the front, away from the forward edge and particularly in peacetime this now seems both dangerous, dirty, bloody and cruel. In vain, peacetime takes

offensive with the front. Even worse, often peacetime does not understand the front. It is condemned and profaned.

But orders are orders and life is life. Orders are on paper and life is among humans. And the words in Order 270 about the arrest of families is, aside from all else, also words that if you on the front refuse to defend your family against murderers and rapists to the last drop of your blood, then who will defend it. If I am not for myself then who is for me? But if I am only for myself, where do I belong?

It would be a good thing if there never was a time in our land when it was necessary to speak with our people in the language of Orders 227, 270 and other similar ones. But in 1941, it was precisely such a time, it was such a situation, and it dictated the method of communication in order to halt the evil thug, to stop, not to surrender and to drive back.

In a similar situation, V.I. Lenin said: "If one realizes what ultimately lies at the most profound base of that historical miracle which happened, that a weak, impotent backward nation has been victorious over the strongest countries of the world, then we can see that this is the result of centralization, discipline and unprecedented self-sacrifice" (V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 241). Moreover: "The person who does not aid the Red Army completely and unselfishly who does not maintain with all his force order and discipline in it, this person is a traitor...he must be eliminated unmercifully" (Ibid., Vol 39, p 172). Lenin's conclusion on this question was completely definite and straightforward: In order to be victorious there had to be the greatest struggle, there had to be iron, military discipline and this had to be instilled firmly and unmercifully.

Today we speak about the large number of our prisoners. In so doing we say that this is terrible, this is inadmissible and this, finally, is shameful. Our words are just, our feelings are just, and certainly Order 270 of 22 June 1941 forced many to think precisely about this from the state's standpoint. There are times when the personal is completely dissolved in the concept of the motherland. And then not even the harshest words directed against an individual sound unjust. There are also times when the personal overshadows the concept of the motherland. When such times arrive, people begin to see in history, in the history of their fatherland, only an echo of their small and cozy life. What trenches? What hand-to-hand battle? Have you gone crazy to block a machine gun with your body? Who in his right mind would walk from Brest to Stalingrad and then back from Stalingrad to Berlin? Matrosov did it. Talalikhin did it. But Vlasov is now seemingly the victim....

Presently, they are writing more about Pavlov than they are about Chernyakhovskiy. Today they are writing more frequently about Kachalov than they are about the

legendary hero of Stalingrad, Gen Rodimtsev.... At present, they are writing with greater satisfaction about Petelin than about the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Gen Lavrenenkov, who, being a Hero of the Soviet Union, was taken prisoner, he behaved heroically, he escaped, he fought again and downed so many Nazi aircraft after being prisoner that he was awarded a second Hero's Star and completed his service in the rank of colonel general. No, neither Pavlov nor Kachalov, nor Petelin, nor the millions of those who were taken prisoner were traitors but it is essential to remember one thing: they were out of the war, they were not on the battlefield. To be a prisoner in a war is always condemned and shameful. Kachalov was not captured. He perished in battle. He did make his contribution to victory. Petelin and Kachalov also made their contribution to victory. They did not defame their honor while in Nazi captivity. No, none of them voluntarily raised his hands before the enemy. And still the final and unconditional victory was brought to us by soldiers on the forward edge who did not take a step back, who did not surrender when it seemed that there could not be any other way out. Gen Chernyakhovskiy and Gen Rodimtsev were victorious...as they were more intelligent and skillful than their "opponents." No, the time of heroes in our land is not over!

But...the deheroization in literature has been lethal for literature. It is a hundred times worse when we deheroize a war in which we won the greatest of victories, we conquered a fatally dangerous enemy, an enemy of unprecedented strength. The deheroization of the Great Patriotic War is a hundred times more dangerous because ultimately the fostering of antiheroes will produce antipatriotism, pseudodedication and pseudolove for the motherland. The future of a state is clouded when the younger generation is indoctrinated on such a basis.

If one reads closely in Order 227 and Order 270, one discovers without fail that both have been written about the same thing, namely about responsibility. About the responsibility of the commander, the responsibility of the battalion commander, the responsibility of the rank-and-file soldier. Naturally, the commander is responsible for more than the soldier and for him the punishment for irresponsibility is greater than for the rank-and-file. And who knows, possibly precisely this persistent idea, this deep purpose of Orders 227 and 270 at present is not to the liking of some. But certainly the idea is simple to the point of obviousness: you are the solely responsible commander, you are responsible for everything that happens in the company; if you are a company commander, you are responsible for everything that happens on the front if you are its commander. You are the solely responsible commander. You are responsible alone. This has always been fused together.

The idea is simple to the point of geniality: the motherland has called you to war so fight and be a hero; the motherland has raised you to the assault and defeat the

enemy, be a hero; the motherland has put you in command of regiments so win the battles and be a hero; the motherland has sworn you to loyalty, so be loyal to the oath to the grave. Order 227 and 270 say a great deal about punishment. But the military oath puts it much more strongly about the punishment of a retreater: "If I violate this my solemn oath, then let me fall under the severe punishment of the Soviet law, the universal hate and disdain of the Soviet people. Among all else, these are the words from the oath which in our days is taken by each young man to whom the motherland entrusts a weapon and confides the security of the peaceful life of our people.

Let us read the wartime orders issued during those most tragic days. Possibly there actually nothing in the profession of a military man except responsibility for the assigned job. Possibly in truth, there is nothing in it except self-sacrifice and valor, readiness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of the fatherland, for the sake of one's people. And all of this is happening exactly now, exactly in your company, in your division, in your military district. Then nothing impedes you, nothing will divert you from the true path to a feat and there will never be a repetition of 22 June 1941.

The old orders of a previous war.... They reflected both our failures and our successes. They contain both the experience and lessons of the war which are our mighty weapon. Each of these orders reflects only individual facets and they must be understood only in context, in an inseparable link with those conditions when they arose. Altogether they tell us how we ultimately achieved victory. And they can again ring inexorably and tragically if we forget the previous lessons, if we allow ourselves to let down, and if our hearts are filled with indifference and laxness, complacency and irresponsibility.

One must understand well that clemency is good if it is directed to our close ones. And it is essential to understand that clemency is a disaster when it is directed exclusively at the self. Particularly for us, the military. It is a disaster for you, a disaster for your relatives and close ones, a disaster for the motherland. This is what Orders 227 and 270 are about.

Order of Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army No. 270 of 16 August 1941

To all members and candidate members of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee to the secretaries of the obkoms, kraykoms, the central committees of the Union republic communist parties. To the chairmen of the oblast and krayispolkom, the SNK [council of people's commissars] of the republics. To all the secretaries of the raykoms and gorkoms and to the chairmen of the rayispolkom and gori-spolkom.

Not only our friends recognize but also our enemies have been forced to admit that in our liberation war against the Nazi invaders, the Red Army units, the great majority of them, their commanders and commissars have behaved flawlessly, courageously and at times completely heroically. Even those units of our army which have been accidentally cut off from the army and have been encircled have kept their spirit of strength and courage, they have not surrendered but have endeavored to cause the enemy more harm and break out of the encirclement. As is known, individual units of our army, having been encircled by the enemy, use every opportunity to defeat the enemy and break out of the encirclement.

The Deputy Commander of the Western Front, Lt Gen Boldin, in being in the area of the 10th Army near Belostok and which was surrounded by Nazi troops, organized detachments from the Red Army units remaining in the enemy rear and these detachments over a period of 45 days fought in the enemy rear and made their way to the main forces of the Western Front. They destroyed the headquarters of 2 German regiments, 26 tanks, 1,049 cars, transport and staff vehicles, 147 motorcycles, 5 artillery batteries, 4 mortars, 15 medium machine guns, 3 light machine guns, 1 aircraft at an airfield and a bomb dump. Over a thousand German soldiers and officers were killed. On 11 August, Lt Gen Boldin attacked the Germans from the rear, he breached the German Front and, linking up with our troops, led out of the encirclement 1,654 armed Red Armymen and a commander, including 103 wounded.

The Commissar of the VIII Mechanized Corps, Brig Commissar Popel, and the Commander of the 406th Rifle Regiment, Col Novikov, fought their way out of encirclement, bringing out 1,778 armed men. In stubborn fighting against the Germans, the Novikov-Popel group covered 650 km, causing enormous losses to the enemy rears.

The Commander of the 3d Army, Lt Gen Kuznetsov, and the military council member, Army Commissar 2d Rank Biryukov, led out of encirclement 498 armed Red Armymen and commanders from units of the 3d Army and organized the breakout of the 108th and 64th Rifle Divisions from encirclement.

All of these and other numerous similar facts show the steadfastness of our troops and the high morale of our fighters, commanders and commissars.

But we cannot conceal that recently there have been several shameful facts of surrendering to the enemy. Individual generals have set a bad example for our troops.

The Commander of the 28th Army, Lt Gen Kachalov, being surrounded with the staff of the troop group, showed cowardice and surrendered to the German Nazis. The staff of the Kachalov group escaped from encirclement, units of the Kachalov group made their way out of encirclement, but Lt Gen Kachalov preferred to surrender and preferred to desert to the enemy.

Lt Gen Ponedelin, commander of the 12th Army, having been surrounded by the enemy, had every opportunity to make his way to friendly troops, as had been done by a predominant majority of the units from his army. But Ponedelin did not show the necessary tenacity and will for victory, he gave way to panic, he turned coward and surrendered to the enemy, he deserted to the enemy, having thereby committed a crime to the motherland, as a violator of the military oath.

The Commander of the XIII Rifle Corps, Maj Gen Kirillov, who was surrounded by Nazi troops, instead of carrying out his duty to the motherland and organizing the units entrusted to him to steadily rebuff the enemy and break out of the encirclement, deserted the battlefield and surrendered to the enemy. As a result of this the units of the XIII Rifle Corps were defeated and some of them surrendered without serious resistance.

It should be pointed out that in all the above-indicated facts of surrendering to the enemy, the army military council members, the commanders, the political workers and the special section workers, when they were surrounded, showed inadmissible confusion and shameful cowardice and did not even attempt to prevent the cowardly Kachalov, Ponedelin, Kirillov and others from surrendering to the enemy.

These shameful facts of surrendering to our avowed enemy show that in the ranks of the Red Army which is strongly and unstintingly defending its Soviet motherland against the infamous invaders, there are unstable, faint-hearted and cowardly elements. These cowardly elements are to be found not only amongst the Red Armymen but also amongst the leadership. As is known, certain commanders and political workers by their conduct on the front have not only not set an example of boldness, steadfastness and love for the motherland for the Red Armymen but, on the contrary, have hidden in the trenches, they spend time in the offices, they do not see or observe the battlefield and with the first major difficulties in combat quail before the enemy, they tear off their insignias and desert the battlefield.

Can one tolerate in the ranks of the Red Army cowards who desert to the enemy and surrender or such faint-hearted superiors who with the first problem on the front tear off their insignias and desert to the rear? No, we cannot! If we allow these cowards and deserters to have their way, they will soon destroy our army and lose our motherland. The cowards and deserters must be destroyed.

Is it possible to count as battalion or regimental commanders those commanders who hide in the trenches in battle, who do not see the battlefield, do not observe the course of battle on the field but still consider themselves regimental and battalion commanders? No, we cannot! These are not regimental and battalion commanders but imposters. If such imposters are allowed to have their way, they will quickly turn our army into a complete group of clerks.

Such imposters must be immediately removed from position, relieved of duties, broken to rank-and-file and when necessary executed on the spot, filling their places with bold and courageous men from the ranks of the junior command personnel or from the Red Armymen.

I order:

1. The commanders and political workers who during battle tear off their insignias and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy are to be considered evil deserters the families of which are subject to arrest as families of deserters who have violated their oath and betrayed their motherland.

All superior commanders and commissars are obliged to execute on the spot such deserters from the leadership.

2. The units and subunits which have been encircled by the enemy are to fight unstintingly until the last opportunity, to protect materiel as the apple of their eye, to make their way to friendly troops through the rears of the enemy troops, causing defeat to the Nazi dogs.

To oblige each serviceman, regardless of his service position, to demand that the superior chief, if the unit is surrounded, must fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to friendly troops, and if such a superior or unit of Red Armymen, instead of organizing a rebuff of the enemy, prefers to surrender, then they are to be destroyed by all means, both ground and air, and the families of the Red Armymen who surrendered are to be deprived of their state assistance and aid.

3. To oblige the divisional commanders and commissars to immediately remove the battalion and regimental commanders who hide in trenches during battle and are afraid of leading the course of battle on the battlefield, to remove them from their position as imposters, to break them to rank-and-file and when necessary execute them on the spot, filling their position by bold and courageous men from the junior command personnel or from the ranks of the outstanding Red Armymen.

The order is to be read in all companies, squadrons, batteries, crews and staffs.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army:

Chairman of the State Defense Committee	I. Stalin
Deputy Chairman of State Defense Committee	V. Molotov
Marshal Soviet Union	S. Bedenny
Marshal Soviet Union	K. Voroshilov
Marshal Soviet Union	S. Timoshenko
Marshal Soviet Union	B. Shaposhnikov
Army General	G. Zhukov

From the Editors. The accusatory and rehabilitation documents for Gens Kachalov, Kirillov and Ponedelin will be published by us in future issues of our journal.

**Order of the People's Commissar of Defense, No. 0391,
of 4 October 1941 from Moscow**

Content: On facts of replacing indoctrinational work by repression.

Recently, frequent instances have been observed of illegal repression and flagrant exceeding of authority by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates....

Such intolerable facts in the Red Army of distorting disciplinary practices, exceeding granted rights and authority, lynchings and aggression are to be explained by the fact that:

- a) The method of persuasion has been incorrectly shifted to the background while the method of repression in terms of subordinates has assumed first place;
- b) Daily indoctrinational work in the units in a number of instances has been replaced by swearing, repressions and aggression;
- c) They have abandoned the method of explanations and talks by commanders, commissars and political workers with the Red Armymen and the explaining of misunderstood questions for the Red Armymen is often replaced by shouting, intimidation and coarseness;
- d) Individual commanders and political workers under the difficult conditions of combat lose their head, surrender to panic and conceal their own confusion by using weapons without any ground;
- e) The truth has been forgotten that the employment of repression is an extreme measures permitted only in instances of direct disobedience and outright resistance under the conditions of a combat situation or in instances of an intentional violation of discipline and order by persons consciously working to thwart the orders of the command.

The commanders, the commissars and political workers must remember that without a correct combination of the method of persuasion with the method of coercion it is inconceivable to instill Soviet military discipline and strengthen the political and moral state of the troops.

The severe punishment toward the malicious violators of military discipline, the supporters of the enemy and the outright enemies should be combined with a careful analysis of all instances of the infraction of discipline requiring a detailed investigation into the circumstances of the cast.

Unsound repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness and aggression on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of a lack of will and clumsiness,

they often lead to the opposite results, they contribute to a decline in military discipline and the political-moral state of the troops and can impel unreliable soldiers to desert to the enemy.

I order:

1. To restore indoctrinational work to its rights, to widely employ the method of persuasion and not to replace daily explanatory work by administrative rule and repression.
2. All the commanders, political workers and superiors are to have daily conversations with the Red Armymen, explaining to them the need for iron military discipline, for precisely carrying out one's military duty, the military oath and the orders of the commander and superior. In the talks to also explain that a serious threat has been hanging over our motherland and for defeating the enemy it is essential to have the greatest self-sacrifice, unflinching steadfastness in battle, disdain for death and a merciless struggle against the cowards, deserters, maimers, provocateurs and traitors of the motherland.
3. To explain widely to the leadership that lynchings, aggression and foul language, in belittling the rank of soldier in the Red Army, lead not to a strengthening but rather to the undermining of discipline and the authority of the commander and political worker.
4. All phenomena of illegal repressions, aggression and lynching must be combated in the most decisive manner, even up to turning over the guilty parties to the court of a military tribunal.

The order is to be announced to all the leadership of the operational army down to the regimental commander and commissar, inclusively.

People's Commissar of Defense, I. Stalin Chief of General Staff, B. Shaposhnikov

Order on elimination of negligence in oral propaganda and agitation; the order was issued to military councils, chiefs of the political directorates of fronts and districts, to the chiefs of the army political sections, to military commissars and the chiefs of political bodies

A check on the state of propaganda and agitation has shown that in many units oral propaganda and agitation, propaganda in living words are languishing, they are divorced from the life of the unit and subunit, and do not respond to the questions concerning the Red Armymen and commanders.

The political workers are underestimating the propagandizing in the living word and particularly individual talks as the simplest and most accessible form of indoctrinating the Red Armymen, studying the moods and immediately responding to all problems in the life of the subunit and unit. The truth has been forgotten that under wartime conditions the company personnel is often replaced and that it is essential to explain to the new recruits the most important party and governmental documents and the orders of the people's commissar of defense and that the Red Armymen who have recently arrived in the unit or who have nonprogressive attitudes need special supervision, particularly on the march.

Political information in many units is given out irregularly and often by untrained individuals. As a result, the Red Armymen do not obtain answers to pertinent questions which concern them. The political exercises are organized unsatisfactorily not only in the rear services of the operational army but also in a number of the units of the rear districts. Lecture work is neglected with few lectures and reports given not only for the rank-and-file but also for the leadership. Often the lectures themselves are of an abstract nature.

Work with the interior agitators has lessened. In many units the agitators have become lost. In the operational units, the political instructors and military commissars are not concerned with replacing the lost inferior agitators.

The political instructor is left on his own, he does not receive aid from the unit commissar, the propaganda instructor or the party bureau secretary. The political sections use their workers incorrectly, they frequently turn them into regular soldiers and do not give them specific assignments in dispatching them to the troops.

The military commissars and political bodies do not inculcate in the political workers a love for oral propaganda, they do not teach them to work with the individual man, and do not pass on the experience gained during the war by the best propagandists and agitators.

All of this shows that the political workers have not understood the importance of the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense, Comrade Stalin, No. 0391 of 4 October 1941 "On Facts of Replacing Indoctrinational Work by Repressions," they have not been able to restore indoctrinational work to its rights, they fight poorly for a correct combination of the methods of persuasion with the methods of compulsion and have not organized all the commanders, political workers and superiors to speaking daily with the Red Armymen.

The main reason for the unsatisfactory organization of oral propaganda is that certain political bodies and military commissars show a bureaucratic attitude toward propaganda questions. In being infatuated with printed propaganda, and considering it a universal

means of indoctrination, the political bodies and military commissars have forgotten that printed propaganda is not accessible for all strata of the Red Army personnel and that the newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets and other printed publications are a vast field for oral propaganda and for talks.

Moreover, many political workers do not understand that printed propaganda cannot be as flexible as oral propaganda, it cannot provide on a daily basis answers to all the questions which presently concern the Red Armymen of a given subunit, and cannot cover many of the questions of the unit's life.

I order:

1. **To restore oral propaganda and the propaganda of the living word to their rights.** Oral propaganda is to be put at the center of attention of the military commissars and political bodies remembering that **the neglect of oral propaganda and agitation means nothing more than the neglect of political work in the unit.**

2. The attention of the political bodies and party organizations is to be directed at carrying out the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense, Comrade Stalin, No. 0391 of 4 October 1941 "On the Facts of Replacing Indoctrinational Work by Repressions"; **to restore the method of persuasion to its rights and ensure a correct combination of punitive measures with indoctrinational measures.**

3. To oblige the commissars of the formations, the workers of the political sections, the unit commissars, the propaganda instructors, the secretaries of the party and Komsomol bureaus, the political instructors and the deputy political instructors **to have daily contact and converse with the Red Armymen**, explaining to them the questions of the current moment and answering all urgent questions in the life of the subunit and unit. Particular attention is to be paid to individual talks with the Red Armymen and junior commanders.

4. In all the units and subunits groups of low-level agitators are to be established from the combat aktiv including the best communists, the best Komsomol members and the nonparty Bolsheviks. Daily leadership should be provided for the inferior agitators, in remembering that they, in being directly among the men, are remarkable heralds of our cause.

5. The oral propaganda (talks, political information sessions, political exercises, lectures, reports and so forth) should be focused on combating what impedes the strengthening of the Red Army's might; it should be used in order to directly and indirectly fight against the weak links in our work in the army. Periodically we should repeat the subject of the talks, political information sessions, political exercises, lectures and reports; it must not be forgotten that the units and subunits are receiving new men who must be explained the most important

decrees of the party and government as well as the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense. Particular attention must be given to constantly explaining the Order of Headquarters Supreme High Command No. 270 of 16 August 1941.

6. All forms and methods of indoctrination, oral propaganda, agitation and talks must be focused on combating elements of defeatism and surrender. The commanders and political workers must remember that the greatest danger is the fear of losing the prospect of struggle by some of our personnel or belief in our victory.

7. Planned political work is to be carried out in the reserve units and formations being readied for the front, using for this all the propaganda forces, all the forms and methods of party-political and political indoctrination work. Not a single unit or a single soldier should leave for the front unpropagandized.

8. The political bodies and military commissars in the operational army must pay particular attention to the political indoctrination of personnel from the reinforcement companies arriving in the unit. The regimental political workers must personally talk with **each man** from the arriving reinforcements. The commanders and political workers should acquaint the recruits with the unit, its military traditions, describe where the unit fought and against whom, popularize examples of valor, courage and heroism, disdain for death, and acquaint the recruits with enemy tactics and the methods of combating this.

9. The military commissars and political bodies must institute systematic instructing of the company political instructors, the deputy political instructors, the propagandists and the inferior agitators, talk with them on current matters, provide guidance in the political and military situation, and drawing upon practical examples teach them oral propaganda, in passing on the experience of the best unit and formation political workers.

10. The chiefs of the political directorates of the fronts, armies and districts are not to assign propaganda and agitation to the apparatus but are to personally direct the propaganda and agitation. They must firmly realize that without well-organized propaganda and agitation by the living word, there is and cannot be any true political work in the masses, it is impossible to respond quickly to all the crucial aspects of the unit's life and true indoctrination of the personnel is inconceivable.

11. All the political indoctrination and particularly propaganda and agitation by the living word should be aimed at the moral uplift of the troops, creating an offensive drive and carrying out the instructions of the leader of our people and the Red Army, Comrade Stalin: "...To exterminate all the Germans down to the last man who have broken into the territory of our motherland as occupiers."

12. The political directorates of the fronts and districts and the political sections of the armies are to **continuously** monitor the state of propaganda and agitation directly in the units and using the sampling method cover all the formations.

The current directive is to be issued to the political sections of the divisions, to the regimental commissars, the company political instructors and is to be discussed at the party meetings.

The state of propaganda and agitation and the course of work on rectifying the mistakes are to be forwarded to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army in individual reports on the 15th and 1st of each month.

**Chief of the RKKA Main Political Directorate Army
Commissar 1st Rank L. Mekhlis**

7 December 1941, No. 268

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Components of Victory

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29 Aug 88) pp 33-37

[Article, published under the heading "Party Political Work," by Col A.A. Beletskiy, candidate of historical sciences, and Col A.F. Vakarov: "Components of Victory"; the article deals with the indoctrination of high moral-political and combat qualities in tank army personnel]

[Text] Continuous and effective party political work aided significantly in successfully carrying out battle tasks by the tank armies operating as part of the mobile groups of the fronts during the offensive operations in the third period of the Great Patriotic War. The fierce resistance of the doomed enemy and the switch to fighting outside the Soviet state—all of this placed increased demands on the morale of the personnel and on its moral-political and fighting qualities.

The main efforts of the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations in the tank armies were focused on maintaining high offensive drive among the tank troops, ensuring bold, enterprising and decisive actions as well as skillfully employing the armored equipment in a difficult combat situation. In line with the Soviet Army's carrying out of the historic mission of liberating the European peoples from Nazi enslavement, new tasks arose in the area of the international indoctrination of the personnel, strengthening its feeling of Soviet patriotism, constant political vigilance and ideological steadfastness in combating bourgeois ideology.

Unflagging attention was required to the questions of strengthening military discipline and organization as well as maintaining the honor and dignity of the Soviet military overseas.

In considering the particular features of the situation and the nature of the missions being carried out, the political bodies in the tank armies defined the content and most effective forms and methods of ideological influence on the various categories of tank personnel, they effectively planned political support for the combat of the troops under various conditions, they provided help to the political sections of the formations, to the party political apparatus and to the party and Komsomol organizations in the units in shaping and developing high offensive zeal in the men, they trained the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol aktiv in the methods of ideological and political indoctrination of the men, and they generalized and introduced advanced experience in fighting and in party political work.

The requisite moral-political and combat qualities were indoctrinated in the personnel in the process of the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers, political exercises for the soldiers and NCOs, systematic training of the party and Komsomol aktiv as well as with the aid of various forms and methods of agitation and propaganda.

Special concern was shown for the ideological tempering of the officers. The commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations helped the officer personnel improve its ideological and theoretical knowledge, they recruited, placed and trained the leaders of the Marxist-Leninist study groups and ensured a high quality for the exercises. The subjects for study, as a rule, were worked out by the Main Political Directorate or by the political directorates of the fronts and were closely correlated with the requirements of the party and the Soviet government and with the instructions of the Supreme High Command on defeating the enemy. The political bodies of the field forces and associations, in considering the combat situation, were closely concerned with organizing the Marxist-Leninist studies of the officers. The troops regularly held theoretical conferences, seminars, colloquiums and consultation sessions. In the period of preparing for the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation, for example, the leadership of the 4th Tank Army (military council member, Maj Gen Tank Trps V.G. Gulyayev; political section chief Col N.G. Kladovoy) gave over 100 lectures and reports to the officers. In addition, the agitation and propaganda department of the army political section in the corps and brigades during this period organized over 20 instructive lectures and reports for the agitators.¹ Political workers from the corps and brigade political sections and members of agitation-propaganda groups spoke to the officers in the units and subunits.

In their activities the political bodies followed the instructions of the Main Political Directorate on the need "to eliminate the existing underestimation of work

with the officers and primarily the platoon and company commanders who are the direct indoctrinators of the rank-and-file and NCOs."² This demand was not accidental. Many junior officers in the tank troops held their positions for a comparatively short time and the level of their ideological and theoretical training was insufficient. Some had no experience in organizing political indoctrination for subordinates. For this reason the political bodies gave particular attention to this category of commander. The most effective forms of exercises for them were assemblies, meetings, seminars and instructive talks.

The Main Political Directorate demanded that the political bodies and party organizations "improve indoctrinational work with the party aktiv and put an end to the underestimating of its role in the combat and political life of the troops."³ In accord with these instructions, they established and had regularly working daytime and evening schools of the party aktiv as well as circles for the young members and candidate members of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)]. The schools were organized under the political bodies of the field forces and formations. Studying in the day schools were the deputy commanders for political affairs of the regiments and battalions, the party and Komsomol organizers of the primary party and Komsomol organizations. Thus, in the 1st Guards Tank Army on 11 December 1944 there were 9 groups of day party schools attended by 240 political workers.⁴ In the evening schools were the party and Komsomol organizers from the company party and Komsomol organizations and the party aktiv of the NCO personnel.

On the question of shaping the moral and political qualities of the tank troops, an important place was held by the political training of the soldiers and NCOs and the subjects of this were worked out on the basis of the party and governmental documents, the tasks confronting the tank field forces and the demands on the personnel carrying out the liberation mission outside the motherland. For example, in political exercises in the units and formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army (political section head, Maj Gen A.G. Zhuravlev) in preparing for the Berlin Operation they studied the subjects "The Bolshevik Party—Inspirer and Organizer of the Red Army Victories," "The Moral Qualities of the Soviet Soldier," "On Soviet Patriotism and the Struggle Against Bourgeois Influence" and others.⁵

In line with the shifting of hostilities to the territory of the Western European countries, the Main Political Directorate demanded a "restructuring of the content of party political work...and more concrete leadership of agitation and propaganda."⁶ In carrying out these instructions, the political bodies widely involved in mass agitation the command and political leadership as well as the party and agitation-propaganda aktiv. The main efforts were focused on indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The political workers widely propagandized and

explained Lenin's ideas, the decisions of the party and the government and the orders of the Supreme High Command and they popularized the successful actions of the tank troops, the examples of heroism, courage and self-sacrifice.

The political sections of the tank field forces did a great deal to indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of friendship of the Soviet peoples and for unifying the multinational collectives. This was very important as fighting in the tank armies, as a rule, were men from 35-40 nationalities and minorities of our motherland. Of great indoctrinational significance were the meetings for servicemen of different nationalities, the collective and individual talks, the exchange of letters with enterprises and kollektives of the Union republics, the circles for studying Russian and so forth. Upon instructions of the political section of the 3d Guards Tank Army (chief, Col A.D. Kapnik), for example, in the period of preparing for the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation, the units held meetings for the personnel with the agenda "The Red Army—An Army of Friendship and Fraternity of the Soviet Peoples" and speaking here were commanders and political workers who had excelled in the fighting of the war.⁷ An effective means for indoctrinating feelings of patriotism, friendship and military comradeship in the Red Armymen was the front newspapers produced in the minority languages.

In the aim of developing in the personnel a feeling of burning hate for the Nazi invaders, the political bodies actively used materials concerning the investigation of crimes by the Nazi occupiers, the appeals of the military councils of the fronts and armies and conducted meetings for the servicemen at the graves of comrades who had fought heroically and perished in battle.

The nature of the combat tasks carried out by the tank armies in operating away from the main forces in the operational depth of the enemy defenses, demanded that the commanders and political workers maintain in the personnel high political vigilance, strong military discipline and organization. The necessity for this was also caused by the fact that the enemy continuously carried out espionage and sabotage activities. It was impossible not to consider a possible pernicious influence of bourgeois ideology and propagandizing of the habits of a capitalist society. In the aim of increasing vigilance and discipline, the men had explained to them the slogans and appeals of the party Central Committee, the orders of the Supreme High Command, the directives of the Main Political Directorate, the main military councils of the fronts and armies as well as articles in the central and army newspapers. Effective work was carried out by the party and Komsomol organizations which analyzed the reasons for the occurring instances of failure, the dulling of vigilance, infractions of discipline and made certain that the communists and Komsomol members unflinchingly carried out the prescribed requirements and the orders of the commanders.

An inseparable component part of the combat training of the tank troop personnel and in maintaining and boosting the offensive drive in them was the work by the political bodies to improve the combat skill of the tank troops. These questions were the subject of meetings, military technical conferences and assemblies of the party aktiv. Thus, the political section of the 5th Guards Tank Army (chief, Guards Maj Gen V.M. Sharov) in the period of preparing for the Belorussian Operation conducted a series of measures to ensure a high quality of troop combat training. At officer conferences and party meetings they discussed the results of the previous fighting and the tasks of combat training. Training procedural exercises were conducted for the commanders and political workers to study the appropriate orders of the Supreme High Command.⁸

Great attention was given to improving the level of military knowledge and technical training for the political officers. Even in March 1943, a system was introduced for the military technical training of political workers with the passing of exams. In the tank troops exercises for them were held twice a week for a period of 2 hours each. They studied tactics, equipment and weapons and the regulations.⁹ The political bodies made up the groups, selected the leaders for them, exercised supervision over the organization of studies and provided help in supplying the required literature.

The work aimed at improving military technical knowledge by the soldiers and NCOs, the gaining by them of firm skills in operating the equipment, the improving of class skills, weapons training, the mastery of tactical procedures, the learning of related specialties and the achieving of complete interchangeability in the crews was subordinate to forming the essential moral and fighting qualities.

A good deal was done for this, in particular, by the political section of the 3d Guards Tank Army (chief, Col A.D. Kapnik) in the period of preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation. It demanded that the political bodies of the formations and the deputy unit commanders "place at the center of attention the tank crews and primarily the drivers."¹⁰ At sessions of the party bureaus in the subunits they discussed the question of the state of indoctrinational work in the tank crews. In the platoons and where possible in the crews they appointed party group organizers and instructional exercises were conducted for them.

In the course of preparing for combat, the party and Komsomol aktiv worked directly in the tank crews, explaining to the men the set tasks, acquainting them with the situation on the front, with the state of the enemy and the particular features of the terrain in which they would be fighting. At the forming up places, if conditions allowed, they organized meetings for the tank crews with the riflemen and submachine gunners assigned as the assault force. The experience of the leading drivers was generalized and popularized and the

feats of the tank troops propagandized. The best crews were commended in orders and at meetings, the newspapers wrote about them and combat leaflets informed about them. The party and Komsomol organizers gave the communists and Komsomol members assignments aimed at the exemplary execution of the command's orders.

In working to strengthen the party influence, the political bodies were constantly concerned for further strengthening the party organizations and raising their activeness and militancy. During the third period of the war, the problem was basically solved of establishing full party organizations in a majority of the companies and batteries. This was achieved by admitting to the party the best soldiers and commanders and the fighters who had distinguished themselves in battle as well as by a skillful reallocation of party forces. Thus, while in the subunits of the 2d Guards Tank Army (political section chief, Col M.M. Litvyak) by the start of 1944 there were 374 party organizations and 36 party groups, during the period of the 1945 offensive operations there were 508 party organizations in the companies and equivalent subunits. Here a majority of the company party organizations consisted of 5-15 members and 5-10 candidate members of the party.¹¹

The commanders and political bodies worked so that the tank crews had a sufficiently large party and Komsomol stratum. The following data show this. In January 1945, in the 1st Guards Tank Army of the First Belorussian Front, of the 433 commanders of tanks and self-propelled mounts, 258 were members and candidate members of the VKP(b) and 85 were Komsomol members, while of the 542 drivers, 137 were communists and 141 were Komsomol members.¹² This made it possible to organize active party political work directly in the crews, on a daily basis and in any situation to have an effective influence on all the personnel of the tank subunits and units and effectively form in them the moral-political and combat qualities essential for victory over the enemy.

The experience gained during the years of the last war has not lost its pertinence under present-day conditions and merits study and creative application at present considering the changes occurring in military affairs.

Footnotes

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 323, inv. 4762, file 25, sheet 73.
2. Ibid., folio 32, inv. 795436, file 10, sheet 38.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 3063, file 37, sheet 347.
5. Ibid., file 73, sheet 3.

6. Ibid., folio 308, inv. 4144, file 17, sheets 3-6.
7. Ibid., folio 315, inv. 4451, file 22, sheet 35.
8. Ibid., folio 237, inv. 4982, file 138, sheet 32.
9. Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4154, file 26, sheet 128.
10. Ibid., folio 299, inv. 3063, file 42, sheets 350-351.
11. Ibid., folio 32, inv. 11318, file 179, sheet 112; folio 308, inv. 4154, file 14, sheet 1.
12. Ibid., folio 300, inv. 23607, file 2, sheet 415.

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Features of Rear Support in Mountain Desert Terrain

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[Article, published under the heading "Military Economy and Rear Services," by Col P.P. Butkov, candidate of military sciences, docent; and Col V.V. Shmidt, candidate of military sciences: "Particular Features of Rear Support in Mountain Desert Terrain"; the article was written from the experience of the Transbaykal Front in the Manchurian Operation]

[Text] The work of the rear services of the Transbaykal Front in the Manchurian Offensive Operation was organized and carried out under a difficult situation. The remoteness of the theater of operations from the central regions of the nation, the broad zones of advance, the high rate of advance, the lack of roads as well as the specific physicogeographic conditions raised a series of new tasks for the front's rear services such as supplying the groupings operating on separate axes, providing the troops with fuel and water and the crossing of epidemiologically bad terrain.

The stockpiling of the materiel needed to conduct the operation began even before the end of military operations against Nazi Germany and increased gradually, particularly after 3 June 1945, when the State Defense Committee [GKO] established the amounts of their supplies on the fronts by the start of the operation. The Transbaykal Front (commander, MSU R.Ya. Malinovsky, rear services chief, Col Gen V.N. Vostrukhov and chief of the rear staff, Maj Gen F.M. Malykhin) was to organize significant supplies of ammunition for all types of weapons (from 4.0 to 5.0 units of fire), fuel (30 loads of aviation fuel, 20 loads of motor vehicle gasoline and 10 loads of diesel fuel) as well as food (a 6-month supply).¹ Such a large amount of supplies had not been established in any of the other strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War.




Diagram 1. Deployment of Rear Services of Transbaykal Front
by Start of Offensive

- Key:
- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1—Headquarters of front rear services | 8—Work battalion of army depot |
| 2—Headquarters of army rear services | 9—Separate army servicing company |
| 3—Capacity of rail section | 10—Hospital base of front (army) |
| 4—Front fuel (artillery, food) dump | 11—Army depot |
| 5—Department of front dump | 12—Veterinary directorate of front (army) |
| 6—Army dump | 13—Loading (unloading) strips of transport aviation |
| 7—Department of army dump | |

The increased number of troops in the Transbaykal Front and primarily on Mongolian territory, required a sharp increase in materiel at Bain Tumen Station. Being the end and best equipped station on the Union-gauge railroad, it had become the point of concentrating the front and army supplies of materiel. From it deliveries commenced over the military field railroad of Bain-Tumen—Tamsak-Bulak and over dirt roads. For centralization and better troop supply a front depot was opened at Bain-Tumen Station in July 1945. All its dumps were located along a newly-built rail ring the length of which was 27 km.² The remaining front dumps were deployed on the rail section Karymskaya, Borzya and partially at the rail stations of the double-tracked mainline of Ulan-Ude, Cheltuy, Chita, Darasun and elsewhere.

In the difficult rail-based situation, it was not possible to allocate individual railheads to the armies. Only the 36th Army received its own rail section of Matsiyevskaya, Kharanor, Dosatuy and the Borzya railhead.

In the area of the Tamsak-Bulak Salient where the assault grouping was to be concentrated, they moved up departments of the front dumps with supplies of materiel and a large portion of the motor transport was moved there. The deployment of the front's rear services on Mongolian territory by the start of the operation is shown in Diagram 1.

The army depots of the main grouping of the front were deployed in the field 30-90 km from the troops. The gap of the front depot from the army ones reached 240-340 km and for the horse-mechanized group [KMG] up to 600 km.

By the start of the operation the ammunition supplies for all types of artillery weapons had been set by the military council directive as follows: at the front dumps in Mongolia there was to be 0.75 of a unit of fire and in the armies and troops 2 each.³ By the start of the operation the artillery supply of the front (chief, Col M.I. Khalaburdin) had been able to build up ammunition supplies which greatly exceeded the planned amounts. However, due to the insufficiently clear planning of transport, the ammunition available to the troops was uneven. For example, there were 1.8-1.9 of a unit of fire for 85-mm tank and 100-mm cannon rounds at the front dumps, and 13.0-13.9 units of fire for the 152-mm howitzer rounds and the M-13 rockets. A similar situation existed at certain army dumps, where there were 2.2-2.6 units of fire for the 45-mm shells and the 120-mm mortar shells, and 10.2-12.0 units of fire for the 122-mm and 107-mm rounds.⁴ As a whole, the ammunition supplies organized on the front and in the armies ensured the carrying out of the operation and did not limit their consumption.

Fuel supplies (chief of the fuel supply section, Col A.M. Kondratyev, were to be established in an amount of six loads: two loads at the front dumps, and four loads in the troops and at the army dumps. However, regardless of

the efforts of rail and motor transport, it was not possible to fully deliver the planned fuel supplies. By the start of the operation, the front had 4.3 loads of motor vehicle gasoline, 4.0 of diesel fuel and 4.7 of aviation gasoline.⁵ Serious difficulties arose due to the lack of stationary and mobile tank capacity. Particularly acute was the question of providing the troops with small containers, the shortage of which on the front was 24,000 barrels.⁶

The lack of tank capacity also did not make it possible to move the fuel supplies closer to the troops. The main supplies were built up in tank cars at rail stations. This was delivered to the troops literally "from the car" and this greatly reduced the transport capabilities of the railroad as frequently the tanker rolling stock stood idle for a long time while waiting to unload.

The main fuel supplies for the front were concentrated in the area of Ulan-Ude, Chita, Borzya and Dauriya Stations. There was significantly less at the dumps on Mongolian territory. But since the main grouping of the Transbaykal Front was located precisely here, great work had to be done to move the fuel closer to the troops.

The fruit and fodder supplies (front quartermaster, Col A.S. Pavlovskiy) were to be established at an amount of 15 daily rations in the armies and 10 daily rations on the front. Here the basic amount of front supplies was to be concentrated in the area of Borzya, Kharanor in order, as the troops moved forward, to deliver the food and fodder by rail as far as Otpor Station and then as the Chinese East Railroad (KVZhD) was rebuilt.⁷ Due to the fact that the troops had to fight in desert and semidesert uninhabited terrain, there was also the acute question of supplying the units with water and heating fuel. The situation was aggravated by the absence of data on the hydrology of the concentration areas and the areas of forthcoming fighting. The smallest supplies of water were found in the area of the Tamsak-Bulak Salient and the northwest of Chakhar Province. Water supplies in the front's concentration area met only one-third of the troops' requirements.

During the preparatory period, here extensive work was done to dig and equip water sources, particularly along the route of Solovyevsk, Bain-Tumen, Tamsak-Bulak as well as in the outskirts of these towns. For the economic consumption of water, the command set daily consumption rates which were very strictly observed: 5 liters per man, 26 liters per motor vehicle and 100 liters per tank. A rifle division per day was to use 75-100 m³ of water on the march, 100-140 at rest and 150-200 in their positions.⁸

The logistic plan envisaged the establishing by the beginning of hostilities of heating fuel supplies in the 6th Guards Tank Army for 8-11 days and in the remaining armies for 5 days. In addition, there were plans to have a 10-day supply of firewood at the army heating fuel dumps. In actuality, the 36th and 6th Guards Tank Armies had supplies for 5 days and the others for just 3.⁹




Diagram 2. Movement of Rear Units and Facilities of Transbaykal Front in Course of the Operation (as of 20 August 1945)

Key: 1—Combat area of army main forces
2—Position of army depot

The main reason for the incomplete satisfying of the troop requirements for firewood was the great distance of the felling areas and the insufficient amount of rail and motor transport. Firewood had to be hauled over 500-600 km. Each day up to 50 rail cars and much motor transport were required. The situation forced the conversion in the units of a good number of heating systems to liquid fuel.

Under the conditions of the great transport distances and the amount of hauling, positive results were achieved by assigning the front motor transport to permanent routes. As a result the motor units were able to organize fueling facilities, vehicle maintenance stations and rest areas for the personnel along them. The drivers quickly mastered the routes and the working conditions on them. The chiefs of the motor columns, in having a good knowledge of the location of the army dumps, were able to significantly reduce the time for hauling materiel. The delivery of freight to the troops was accelerated.

Due to the great length of the lines of communications and the poorly developed rail network, the role of the military roads (VAD) increased sharply. The length of

the four front VAD by the start of the operation was 2,279 km, the army VAD were 949 with a total of 3,228 km.¹⁰

For servicing the front VAD, in addition to the TOE road units, they used two non-TOE mechanized detachments which had operating tractors, graders and other equipment as well as the most experienced personnel coming from the road construction organizations of Chita Oblast.¹¹ The travel of columns and individual vehicles in the desert-steppe terrain was slowed down due to the lack of sharply expressed landmarks and the monotony of the terrain. For this reason the road service was also assigned additional labor-intensive jobs in marking the main routes and setting up signs.

In the organization of rear services command, a characteristic feature was the dispersed location of the rear staffs in the front and army rear and caused by the great distances between population points on Mongolian territory (up to 300-400 km). Thus, the rear services headquarters of the KMG was 402 km away from the front rear services headquarters, the 36th Army was 340 km away and the 6th Guards Tank Army some 280 km.¹² This greatly impeded the work of the rear bodies. Command and control were carried out by telegraph as well as by using aircraft and motor vehicles through agents of the army rear services located at the front's rear services headquarters. In the aim of continuously supplying the main grouping of the front and bringing the headquarters bodies closer to the troops, the front's chief of rear services organized in Tamtsak-Bulak an operations group of the rear services headquarters and this included officers from the rear services staff, the quartermaster and motor vehicle-tractor directorates as well as the fuel and artillery supply sections.

The troops of the Transbaykal Front carried out an offensive along individual, separate axes with great gaps between the assault groupings. This also predetermined certain features in the organization and operation of the rear services. The configuration of the front's rear services until the very end of the operation virtually did not change. The front dumps remained in their former locations. The entire burden of delivery and evacuation during that period rested on motor and partially air transport. Due to the shortage of motor transport and the difficult road conditions, the delivery of materiel was significantly complicated in the army and front rear services.

Over the 5 days of the offensive, the troops of the front covered 240-250 km, while the 6th Guards Tank Army covered almost 500 km. On the 12th day of the operation, the distance from the front dumps located in the areas of Bain-Tumen and Tamtsak-Bulak to the forward units of the 6th Guards Tank Army had risen to 980 km.¹³ For this reason the departments of the main front dumps with supplies of materiel on the ground were moved closer to the advancing troops (see Diagram 2). Where it was possible, the other armies also set up in the

field departments of army dumps for the main types of supply as well as at the stations of the routes and sections being rebuilt on the Manchurian railroads. Thus, the 39th Army on 13 August had located the head departments of the army dumps in the area of Bain Station, on 20 August at Wangyemiao, and the 30th Army in the area of Yakeshi.

The length of the front's VAD in the course of the operation quickly increased and by 20 August reached 4,940 km (3,280 km of front and 1,660 km of army).¹⁴ There were few hard-surfaced roads in Manchuria and the dirt ones were in a poor state. The bridges on them were usually weak with a capacity of approximately 5 tons. As a rule, the enemy had blown up major bridges. Previous rains on a number of sectors had washed out the dirt roads, leaving them impassable. Regardless of the reinforcing of the armies with road troops, there were not sufficient forces to rebuild the entire length of the roads as well as for organizing a traffic control service. Because of this the road troops directed their chief attention at supporting the crossing by the units of the worst "bottlenecks," that is, mountain passes, rivers, salt bottoms and so forth. After the troops the road reconnaissance groups and bridge-building battalions with spare building materials usually moved up on motor transport. In leap-frogging, they carried out the required bridge work and prepared bypasses on impassable areas. The road construction battalions and rear units moved up behind them.

With the great length of the front and army roads, only the most difficult sections, where blockages might form, were under the supervision of the mobile traffic control points. Road signs and indicators were set out on forks and crossings, at bypasses and around population points.

By 20 August, the advancing troops had become significantly separated from the front dumps. Motor transport was diverted to bring the main rear units and facilities closer to the troops. In line with this the amount of hauling declined sharply. Thus, the front motor units in which the number of motor vehicles had risen from 3,000 to 6,600, over the period from 20 August through 1 September, delivered only 2,700 tons of freight to the troops.¹⁵

During this period the role of air transport increased. The front had at its disposal two military transport air divisions (160 aircraft of the Li-2 and C-47 type). In a single trip they could carry 280 tons of cargo (with a cargo capacity of 1.5-2.5 tons per aircraft depending upon the length of flight). These divisions played a major role in supplying the front's troops with materiel. In individual instances, aircraft delivered to the troops not only fuel and ammunition but also food and even water. For example, in mid-August, transport aviation delivered 186 tons of ammunition to the formations of the 6th Guards Tank Army.¹⁶ And in the total amount of transporting materiel, fuel in the course of the operation held a central place.

Although the armies had been reinforced with the front tanker trucks and tank capacity and mobile departments of the front and army fuel dumps had been organized, with a portion of the sided vehicles being equipped with barrels and jerry cans, the troops constantly experienced an acute need for fuel. The problem was that the climatic and geographic factors in the theater of operations had not been fully considered and even from the first days of the operation there was a very great overconsumption of fuel by combat and transport vehicles. Thus, under the roadless conditions the 6th Guards Tank Army in 4 days consumed 3.0 loads of gasoline and 3.1 loads of diesel fuel.¹⁷ The fuel consumption rates for the main types of equipment are shown in the Table. From it one can see that the greatest overconsumption was for diesel fuel. As a total, during the operation (from 9 August through 2 September), the front's troops consumed 6,610 tons of high-octane aviation gasoline or 3.2 loads, some 2,869 tons of B-70 aviation gasoline or 5.3 loads, 22,330 tons of motor gasoline or 6.27 loads, and 4,533 tons of diesel fuel, or 4.5 loads.¹⁸

Table: Fuel Consumption Rates in Operation*

Type of Operations	Type of Equipment	Fuel Consumption Rate, ** kg	Actual Consumption, kg	Overexpenditure, percent
Offensive on desert-steppe terrain	T-34 tank	24	45	87
	ZIS-5 motor vehicle	25	33	30
Offensive in mountains	T-34 tank	32	62	95
	ZIS motor vehicle	28	37	30

* TsAMO [Central Archives of Ministry of Defense], folio 210, inv. 3152, file 55, sheet 52.

** For tanks per hour of operation, for motor vehicles per 100 km of run.

When in the course of the operation difficulties arose in transporting the fuel by motor transport, air delivery was organized for this. But since in planning the method of operation such a method of delivery had not been envisaged, the fuel supply service was unprepared for this. At the front dumps the fuel had not been loaded into barrels. Moreover, there were not enough barrels. The transport aircraft at the loading areas in Youtoutou, Lubei and Tungliao were forced to wait for the return of emptied containers after the fueling of the tanks. However, regardless of all the difficulties, just on 12 and 13 August, the air transport delivered 940 tons of fuel for the 6th Guards Tank Army. As a total in the course of the operation, air transport delivered 2,456 tons of fuel, chiefly diesel fuel.¹⁹

Many problems also arose in the storing of water as well as its prompt delivery to the rapidly advancing troops. Due to the lack of containers for storing and hauling water, iron and wooden barrels, tubs and so forth had to

be employed. The poor state of the roads led to great water losses in transporting. For this reason, the command of the fronts, the armies and the formations as well as the rear service bodies considered water supply for the troops one of the main tasks of the rear services.

The work of the medical service during the operation was eased by the fact that few sick and wounded arrived at the medical battalions and hospitals. Experience showed that with a high rate of advance and with low casualties, it was advisable to move up behind the troops light medical battalions from the divisions and first-line hospitals while the regimental medical stations would be strengthened with surgeons. This made it possible to quickly provide skilled aid to the wounded.

There were no outbreaks of infectious diseases in the troops as the medical service bodies had previously vaccinated all the personnel against dangerous infections, including against plague. The local inhabitants in contact with the troops were given preventive inoculations and medicines were issued. In the army medical-epidemiological detachments, there were specially organized antiplague squads which continuously moved up behind the advancing troops and conducted active reconnaissance. The measures carried out by the military medical service in the course of the operation ensured the medical safety of the personnel and the rapid curing of the sick and wounded. Some 79 percent of the wounded returned to action.²⁰

The veterinary service also carried out difficult and responsible tasks. Various infectious diseases common to both humans and animals were widespread in the Manchurian areas. Outbursts of such particularly dangerous epizootics as cattle plague, glanders, anthrax and others had to be quickly localized and destroyed and their penetration into the troops and onto Soviet territory also had to be prevented. In the border zone all livestock was inoculated and for this purpose they used personnel from the front veterinary hospitals and laboratories. Captured and purchased livestock was assembled in herds at stipulated points. The routes for driving livestock were designated ahead of time. Veterinary inspection stations were set up on the roads. There was also supervision over the supply of meat for the troops and this was delivered chiefly from the field slaughterhouses, from the herds and after the slaughter of the livestock, directly in the units.

Due to the great distance of the rear control posts (TPU) of the armies from the front TPU, from the front dumps and other rear formations, units and facilities, serious difficulties arose in organizing command of the rear services due to the shortage of communications equipment. On the territory of Mongolia and Manchuria there was a limited amount of local permanent wire communications lines. For this reason, the main means of control in the front, army and even the organic rear services was radio. However, the radios of the rear staff,

due to the low power of the radios, operated intermittently. Moreover, many rear units and facilities did not have any means of communications. All of this had a negative effect upon the command and control of the rear services. This explains why in the given operation mobile means of control such as aircraft, motor vehicles and motorcycles were employed significantly more widely than in the operations in the West. On the operational level they, in essence, were the main and sometimes the sole means of command.

The Rear Services Director of the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East (chief of rear services, Col Gen V.N. Vinogradov) played a major role in the rear support of the front. This directorate was organized from the Soviet Army Rear Services Directorate. For the troops of the front, the Rear Services Directorate carried out a great deal of work to stockpile ahead of time supplies of materiel, to prepare the railroads and highways as well as for the medical support of the troops.

Thus, according to the instructions of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC], work was carried out to strengthen the capacity of the Transbaykal Railroad. The sector Karymskaya—Borzya—Otpor began handling up to 18 pairs of trains a day. On the single-track section Borzya—Bain-Tumen, the troops built 13 new sidings and this made it possible to increase its capacity from 7 to 18 pairs of trains a day. The road and motor vehicle units of the front were significantly reinforced by the arrival of contingents from the west. The front received two fuel pumping battalions and construction-reconstruction subunits for the fuel service. Upon instructions of Headquarters, the Central Military Medical Directorate allocated the front forces sufficient to reconstitute the ambulance companies from two-platoon to three-platoon strength.

The experience of supporting the troops of the Transbaykal Front operating in mountain desert terrain on isolated axes confirmed that the maneuvering of the rear formations, units and facilities as well as the supplies of materiel could be carried out in the course of the operation only with great difficulties. This necessitated the early establishing and deployment of supplies in accord with the axes of troop operations. It also showed that the successful execution of the set tasks for rear support of the troops was achieved primarily by the early and careful preparation of the rear units and facilities, by the prompt stockpiling of various supplies of materiel on the axes of troop operations, by a knowledge and consideration of the natural climatic features of the combat area as well as by dependable control of the rear units and formations.

Footnotes

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, p 209.

2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 210, inv. 3152, file 49, sheets 650-653.

3. Ibid., file 55, sheets 8-11.

4. Ibid., folio 81, inv. 174096, file 214, sheets 5-7, 85-90.

5. Ibid., folio 210, inv. 3116, file 212, sheet 280; inv. 3152, file 55, sheet 47.

6. "Final" [Finale], Moscow, Nauka, 1969, p 141.

7. TsAMO, folio 210, inv. 3152, file 55, sheets 51, 52.

8. "Final," p 141.

9. TsAMO, folio 210, inv. 3152, file 55, sheets 63-68.

10. Ibid., sheets 25, 39.

11. Ibid., folio 67, inv. 32174, file 422, sheet 10.

12. Ibid., folio 210, inv. 3152, file 55, sheet 7.

13. Ibid., folio 10, inv. 95, file 312, sheet 131.

14. Ibid., folio 210, inv. 3152, file 55, sheet 96.

15. Ibid., sheet 35.

16. Ibid., folio 360, inv. 6134, file 32, sheets 38, 83; inv. 515277, file 1, sheets 89-111.

17. Ibid., folio 339, inv. 5179, file 98, sheet 90.

18. Ibid., folio 210, inv. 3152, file 55, sheet 102.

19. Ibid., sheet 72.

20. Ibid., folio 1, inv. 44668, file 277, sheet 186.

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Unforgettable

00010002g Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press
29 Aug 88) pp 46-51

[Unattributed interview, published under the heading "Our Interviews," with Hero of the Soviet Union, Lt Gen Tank Trps Viktor Ilich Baranov: "Unforgettable"; date and place of interview are not given]

[Text] [Interviewer] Hero of the Soviet Union, Viktor Ilich Baranov began service in the Soviet Armed Forces in 1923. In the army he followed a long path from officer candidate to lieutenant general. In 1936, he fought actively against the fascist rebels in Spain and he commanded a tank brigade involved in the Soviet-Finnish War.

Maj Gen Tank Trps V.I. Baranov began the Great Patriotic War as the commander of a tank division and he ended it as the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Leningrad Front.

For valor and courage shown in fighting the enemies of the motherland, he was awarded the Gold Star and was decorated with 10 orders and many medals.

The journal's editors asked Viktor Ilich to answer a number of questions.

Viktor Ilich, you have devoted more than 40 years to the Armed Forces. Under what conditions did your service commence?

[Baranov] When I recall the distance I have traveled, my comrade friends with whom I served, inevitably the prewar years come to mind. These were unusual, difficult times. Our people had to endure harsh testing: defend the victories of October, fight against hunger and chaos, erect new cities and plants, build schools and hospitals. We, the young people, were proud of our involvement in major undertakings. Before our very eyes striking changes occurred in the nation. Life in the cities and villages became more beautiful and richer.

It is a pleasure to recall how ardently the youth strived for knowledge. For them the doors of schools, technical schools and institutes were thrown open. My contemporaries then mastered the most diverse professions. I myself was firmly determined to become a regular military man.

In 1923, I was admitted to the Tula Military Infantry School and which was soon thereafter moved to Vladikavkaz (now the city of Ordzhonikidze). Here under the leadership of experienced commander leaders, we learned military affairs. Our pedagogues were highly educated, strict, demanding and just. By this they instilled in us a love for our profession, they tempered us physically and spiritually and taught us to work with others.

After the completion of school in the autumn of 1926, I was appointed a platoon commander in the 64th Rifle Regiment of the 22d Krasnodar Rifle Division. Here for 5 years I was in command of a rifle platoon and was admitted to the ranks of Lenin's party.

At the beginning of 1931, I was transferred to Naro-Fominsk, to a rifle regiment, where I became acquainted with armored equipment. To speak honestly, I envied the tank troops. I very much wanted to command a tank subunit. New combat equipment was beginning to arrive in the army. I was sent to Moscow to courses for the retraining of command personnel under the Academy of the Armed Troops. After completing my studies in 1932, I was appointed to the position of tank company commander.

[Interviewer] You were among the first Soviet internationalist soldiers to defend the independence of the Spanish Republic. Please tell us about this period.

[Baranov] October 1936 comes to mind. The tank company was preparing for the November parade on Red Square. During one of the drills a representative of the superior command called on us. He was interested in the course of training and asked me to form up the personnel. Having introduced himself to the men, the officer asked them: "Who of the tank troops wants to volunteer to defend the Spanish Republic?"

At that time we were well informed about events in Spain. We knew that the German and Italian imperialists were providing military aid to the Franco forces which were endeavoring to institute a fascist dictatorship in the state. And although the proposal was a complete surprise for the company personnel, all the men, down to the last, decided to fight on the side of the Republicans.

Late in the autumn of 1936, the fighting in Spain was in full swing. The German and Italian interventionists were committing atrocities. They had turned the nation into an enormous test range and were working on the methods of total war. Their aviation bombed and strafed the cities and villages and the troops conducted punitive operations against the peaceful inhabitants. All of this recalls the monstrous crimes which the Nazis later committed in World War II.

I did not command the tank company which became the international one in Spain. I was a military advisor here. I was given the mission of quickly aiding the Republican tank troops master the weapons and military equipment delivered from the Soviet Union, to teach them to fight the enemy and win out against it. And this had to be done not in classrooms, on tank driving ranges but during combat. On the defensive the troops learned to fire cannons and machine guns not at targets but at a real enemy, in moving to other sectors of the front they learned to drive the combat vehicles and drilled in firing on the move and from brief halts. They learned combat skills in defending the independence of their motherland.

The military political situation in Spain grew worse. I had to assume direct command of a Republican tank battalion. I will not analyze the actions of my subordinates. I would point out that among them a majority was persons dedicated to communist ideals. In disdaining death, they heroically fought the fascists, they unquestioningly carried out all the instructions of their commanders, they trusted them and gave a hand in a difficult moment. The men carried out their duties flawlessly.

Late in the autumn of 1938, I arrived back in Moscow and was appointed the commander of a tank brigade stationed in Peterhof (Leningrad Military District). Here also numerous internationalist soldiers were serving.

They generously shared their combat experience with the personnel and taught subordinates in mastering the military equipment and weapons.

[Interviewer] Viktor Ilich. Where were you serving on the eve of the Great Patriotic War?

[Baranov] In 1941, I was serving near Leningrad. In mid-June, I assumed command of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division. The pride of the formation was rightly considered to be two tank regiments which had become famous in the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus in 1939-1940. Communists and Komsomol members comprised almost one-half of the division's personnel. Some 24 tankmen were Heroes of the Soviet Union and over 400 had earned orders and medals. The formation had 370 medium and light tanks, 53 armored vehicles, while modern howitzer cannons and new small arms had begun to be delivered instead of the old artillery systems. By the end of 1941, there were plans to convert the division to new armored equipment, the KV and T-34 tanks.

However, the war settled things in its own way. On the night of 19 June, the formation was put on combat alert. Upon orders from the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lt Gen M.M. Popov, the rifle formations of the 14th Army were to covertly move up to the frontier and take up the defensive. Our 1st Red Banner Tank Division was assigned to reinforce them.

War was drawing closer not by days but by hours. We learned of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union in approaching the designated area. The tank regiment of Hero of the Soviet Union, Col D.D. Pogodin, and other units from the formation were concentrated in the area of the Alakurti Railroad Station near the frontier with Finland. The regiment under the command of Maj P.S. Zhitnev remained to the south of this station in order to support the rifle formations of the 14th Army.

The personnel were given the task of quickly carrying out defensive measures and to be ready to repel the advancing enemy. There was virtually no time to dig trenches, dugouts and shelters.

[Interviewer] Please tell us in more detail about the first combat against the Nazis.

[Baranov] I will remember this fighting all my life. Accustomed to achieving easy victories, the Nazis were planning by a rapid thrust to crush the Soviet troops and turn them into flight. But in vain. Even in the border engagements against the enemy, the Soviet soldier, NCOs and officers demonstrated tenacity and intrepidity as well as high combat skill.

The first to enter battle in the Alakurti area was the tank battalion of Capt A.Z. Oskotskiy. His subordinates fought cool-headedly, precisely, and with accurate fire

neutralized the enemy personnel and combat equipment. The company of Sr Lt S.K. Pechnikov over a period of 4 days destroyed 11 tanks, 4 mortars, several heavy-caliber machine guns and up to a battalion of enemy infantry.

One cannot help but be amazed by the feat committed in host July days by the crew under the command of the company party organizer, Sr Sgt Aleksandr Borisov. As part of a subunit, their tank was in an ambush in the aim of preventing the enemy from reaching a crossing over the river. For more than 32 hours the tank troops fought an uneven battle. Their accurate fire forced the enemy to retreat. Five times the tank was replenished with ammunition, there were six holes in its turret, many men were wounded, but all attempts by the Nazis to break through to the crossing were unsuccessful.

After battle, the division's command warmly congratulated the courageous men on their victory. For this feat Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Borisov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union while the other crew members were awarded high governmental decorations.

[Interviewer] What impressions have remained with you about the first days of the war and about enemy tactics?

[Baranov] It is no secret that initially the enemy was superior to us in tanks, infantry and aviation. It was counting on an easy victory. At times we saw ahead of the front one or another company of scores of Nazi combat vehicles. Repeatedly they broke into the battle formations of the rifle subunits but our soldiers with heavy fire cut off, forced to the ground and destroyed the Nazi infantry and frequently themselves went over to a counterattack. The commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizers of the companies and battalions, in inspiring the soldiers, with submachine guns, antitank grenades and Molotov cocktails were the first to engage the enemy tanks and assault guns. By their example, they inspired their subordinates.

During the first days of the war, enemy aviation operated virtually with impunity and it was superior in the air. But soon thereafter Soviet aircraft—fighters and bombers—also began to appear. Group air battles broke out constantly. We were always happy when our “hawks” overtook the praised Nazi aces, forcing them to drop their bombs at random.

I had learned the actions of the Nazis well while in Spain. They attacked, as a rule, after air strikes or artillery softening up. Their actions were routine and amazingly stereotypic: ahead was a group of medium tanks and behind them the light tanks, assault guns supported by infantry. In coming under heavy fire, the combat vehicles retreated to shelter and called in aviation for new strikes at times, in truth, endeavoring to attack on a different axis.

The situation was then very difficult but in the formation there was no flight, panic or confusion. The units and subunits fought courageously, defending each meter of Soviet land. In the second week of the war, the enemy succeeded in wedging into our defenses and encircle a rifle regiment and a tank battalion fighting with it. Emergency measures had to be taken to aid the comrades which had suffered a disaster. In my reserve there were only two battalions: a motorized rifle and one of flame-throwing tanks. In a hurry at night we had to remove from other sectors and shift to this axis the battalion of heavy tanks under Capt I.B. Shpiller, the medium tank battalion of Capt A.Z. Oskotskiy and several rifle companies.

The very rugged terrain, the lack of roads, the steep slopes and hills, the ravines and glades strewn with boulders prevented us from mass use of the tanks. For this reason the vehicles were divided into groups. Each included five or six medium and heavy combat vehicles and a rifle company. At dawn of 6 July, we attacked the enemy by surprise. We succeeded in breaking the ring of encirclement and helping the rifle regiment and the supporting tank battalion in escaping.

The combat successes did not come easily. In the battle mentioned by me the tank platoon commanders, Lts G.T. Bystrov and I.M. Kruglov, the tank commanders, A.S. Kharlamov, P.V. Danilenko and G.S. Golovgalov, as well as other remarkable comrades of ours died a death of the brave.

On 8 July, the 1st Red Banner Tank Division was pulled out of combat. The units and separate subunits were concentrated 24 km to the northeast of Alakurti.

The results of the first fighting were summed up at the party and open Komsomol meetings. Here it was a question primarily of carrying out the directive of the council of people's commissars and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 29 June 1941. This important party document formulated a program for defeating the Nazi invaders. The slogan “Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!” advanced by the party became the battle standard of the Soviet people. From party positions we examined both the achieved results as well as our further tasks.

[Interviewer] Viktor Ilich. You have touched upon the question of party meetings. We would like to hear from you examples of the mobilizing role of the communists in battle.

[Baranov] I have already said that the communists always endeavored to be where it was more difficult. The men respected them and tried to equal them. Precisely they, in possessing enormous authority among their comrades in arms, more often than the others showed unprecedented courage, disdain for death, valor, resourcefulness and an unbreakable will for victory.

These simple and humble men carried the party's word into the troops and by their personal example inspired the men to an unstinting struggle against the Nazi invaders. In the Alakurtti area, the personnel of our formation in joint battles with units from the XLII Rifle Corps repelled 39 enemy assaults, caused it significant losses in personnel and equipment and prevented the reaching of the Kirov Railroad.

The crews of communists Bystrov, Golovachev, Danilenko, Kruglov, Smirnov and others fought the enemy heroically. To their scores were scores of destroyed tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns, mortars as well as hundreds of enemy soldiers and officers.

The Komsomol members followed the example of the communists. The feat of the Komsomol member, Sgt Vasilii Sukhodolya, a tank driver, has always remained in the memory of his fellow servicemen. The crew of his combat vehicle for 4 hours repelled assaults by besieging Nazis. In the heat of battle the Nazis succeeded in hitting the tank and severely wounded the commander, gunner and loader. Vasilii carried his comrades to shelter and himself returned to the tank. The courageous soldier resolved to fight to the last cartridge. He alone acted for the entire crew: he observed the battlefield, loaded the gun and fired accurately from it. The enemy succeeded in setting the tank afire but the courageous sergeant continued to fight until the last cartridge. Vasilii Sukhodolya died a hero, having carried out his military duty to the end.

The political workers, K.P. Kulik, I.P. Kurochka, Ya.Ye. Penskiy, I.V. Yakovlev and others maintained high morale, steadfastness, valor and support for the division's tank troops. They constantly endeavored to be among the soldiers both in battle as well as during minutes of a lull. They showed paternal concern for the tankmen in endeavoring to make certain that everyone was promptly fed, clothed and shod as they should be and had a good knowledge of the combat situation and the status in the country and abroad.

[Interviewer] As is known, your formation participated in the defense of Leningrad. Please tell about this.

[Baranov] In mid-July 1941, an enemy threat hung over Leningrad. Upon orders by the front's command the 1st Red Banner Tank Division was urgently shifted to defend the city on the Neva.

I will not describe the difficult military situation which developed at that time before the walls of Leningrad. This has been described in sufficient detail in our literature. I will merely say one thing: complete revolutionary order reigned in this city. The entire population from the small to the great rose to a sacred struggle against the hated invaders.

The formation did not arrive in full strength in the new combat area. The tank regiment of Maj P.S. Zhitnev and certain subunits from other units continued fighting in the Petrozavodsk area.

In order to stop the enemy and prevent it from exploiting the success, it was essential to have not only steadfastness, an unbelievable straining of physical forces and an unbroken will for victory on the part of the men, but also the ability of all levels of commanders to intelligently carry out the battle tasks and by their personal example mobilize subordinates for successful actions.

All our men fought unstintingly. The tank troops in the company under the command of Sr Lt Z.K. Kolobanov set an example of steadfastness, valor and high combat skill. Due to their resourcefulness and initiative a Nazi tank column was paralyzed on a road running across a peat works. By accurate fire from ambush, the men succeeded in hitting the front and tail enemy tanks. The Nazis were in a unique trap as there was no room for them to turn around as to the right and left of the road were only swampy areas. The enemy began to panic. The men of the company took advantage of this. In a short period of time they destroyed the column of Nazi light and medium tanks. For the heroism shown and for combat skill all the men in the company were awarded orders and medals. Sr Sgt A.M. Usov was presented with the Order of Lenin and Sr Lt Z.K. Kolobanov received the Order of the Red Banner.

In 1941, our tank formations suffered significant losses in combat equipment. It was impossible to replenish these quickly. Upon the decision of the superior command on our front all the mechanized corps and the tank divisions comprising them were broken up. On the basis of them separate tank brigades and battalions were established.

The designated measures were essential during that period. The first battles showed that it was rather difficult to control cumbersome formations which in a majority of instances were equipped with obsolete combat vehicles. In order to be victorious over the strong enemy, it was essential to achieve closer cooperation between the rifle and tank units and subunits as well as highly fluid actions by the troops. This became possible due to the organizing of small tank formations. Thus, on the basis of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division they constituted the 123d Separate Tank Brigade under my command. From the other tank divisions they created close support tank brigades and battalions.

The tank troops directly supported the infantry, they strengthened its strike force and contributed to the rate of advance in all stages of the operation. Many of them demonstrated examples of military valor and high combat skill. It was precisely then that we were convinced how right the superior command had been in reorganizing the tank corps and formations.

At the beginning of spring 1942, I was appointed to a new position as commander of the armored troops in the 54th Army and later the Leningrad Front. All during the war I served among the tank troops. These intrepid, courageous men, the workhorses of the war were constantly in the thick of the fighting, they were always ahead, on the most dangerous axes. They defended stubbornly, they attacked boldly, they were the first to break into enemy occupied population points, they made rapid, long raids into the Nazi rear, they fought from ambushes and often took on themselves the entire storm of enemy fire. This was the case from the first to the last day of the war. A majority of these remarkable, brave fellows did not live to see the joyous Victory Day. They carried out their duty completely, having added glory to the colors. Their names are sacred.

[Interviewer] What was your service like in the postwar period?

[Baranov] After the victorious 1945, I continued serving in the Leningrad Military District. In the summer of 1950, I had to say farewell to the city on the Neva which had become dear and close to me as I was transferred to the Far Eastern Military District. Here I continued serving in my previous position as the commander of the district armored troops.

In the autumn of 1952, I was sent back to Moscow for officer advanced training courses at the General Staff Academy. A year after completing my training I left for Czechoslovakia as a military advisor.

At the end of 1955, I returned to Moscow and here I continued my service in the Central Apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense until retiring on pension.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that basically my army life has been linked to the armored troops. I have no complaint. Side by side with the tank troops, I followed the difficult roads of the war. In the postwar period I taught our youth to defend our motherland and to vigilantly guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

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About DIE WELT, LA VANGUARDIA and So Forth

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29 Aug 88) pp 52-59

[Article, published under the heading "Against Bourgeois Falsifiers of History," by Army Gen P.N. Lashchenko: "About DIE WELT, LA VANGUARDIA and So Forth"; the article has been written as an aid in overcoming the stereotypes of anti-Sovietism and suspicion]

[Text] The present-day international situation is characterized by a growing struggle for peace, by a more profound awareness on the part of peoples and governments of the danger of a military disaster and by an

understanding of the need to improve relations between nations and achieve peaceful agreements and disarmament. Over the last 3 years, which we have termed the time of restructuring and new thinking, the Soviet-American summit meetings have become stepping stones on the path of disarmament. The Moscow meeting of the Soviet and U.S. leaders undoubtedly was a logical continuation of the course passing through Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington. In the course of this, there was an exchange between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, and the U.S. President, R. Reagan, of instruments of ratification for putting into effect a Soviet-American Treaty for eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles. Thus began the countdown on the age of nuclear disarmament.

The main and determining importance of the results from these talks and meetings involving the Soviet and American defense ministers is that they have predetermined a new quality in Soviet-American relations and the nature of international relations as a whole, and they establish new political and social realities for peace. There is every reason to say that the efforts of the USSR, all the peace-loving states and peoples will not be in vain. The active dialogue between the USSR and United States on a broad range of questions creates good prerequisites for strengthening the positions of collaboration in the area of eliminating the threat of war and establishing an all-encompassing international security system.

Certainly not everything is going smoothly. There have been and remain differences. For each country, the interests of its security are important and for this reason in the course of discussing the current problems various viewpoints have come forward. The Soviet leaders openly voice, for example, their negative attitude toward attempts by certain Western political forces to compensate for the commenced disarmament with a new weapons build-up.

"Incidentally," said M.S. Gorbachev, "we have merely to raise this issue when the Western press raises a hubbub that supposedly the Soviet Union wants to drive a wedge between the United States and NATO, between the other members of this bloc. We have already said and I repeat again: we have not had and do not have such intentions."¹

And how many noisy speeches and appeals have issued forth on the part of the leaders of the Western countries to link a further reduction in nuclear weapons to the eliminating of a certain "imbalance" in conventional ones. This was emphasized at a recent session of the NATO Council in Brussels. However, when the Soviet Defense Minister Army Gen D.T. Yazov, in a meeting with the American Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci in Bern, stated our readiness to exchange data on the number of troops of the sides from the Atlantic to the Urals, the leaders of the NATO countries did not show proper attention to this.

Many obstacles remained to be overcome on the path to reducing the level of weapons and to true mutual understanding. The experience of the previous summit meetings and the discussion of questions related to military doctrines and the activities of the armed forces have shown that by talks it is possible to find mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of ensuring stability, security and disarmament.

Richard Nixon recently wrote a book entitled "1999: Victory Without War." In it he correctly wrote that the over-all task of our nations is to prevent a nuclear war, and for this reason they cannot allow themselves to become enemies, but will never become friends. In his words, the two powers will remain rivals and the rivalry will grow sharper. There will be no war but the question of victory or defeat will not be settled.

At the same time, regardless of a definite lessening of tension in international relations, there is still an acute clash in the ideological sphere. A number of the Western mass information media has not reduced the slanderous campaign aimed at undermining confidence in the Soviet Union and at its peaceful initiatives in foreign policy and restructuring within the nation. Our efforts at maintaining a military-strategic parity are often used by them for reinforcing the still rather persistent stereotype about the "Soviet military threat" and which is a serious impediment to establishing trust between East and West. The impression is gained that the Western press is simply ignoring statements by the leaders of their countries on the need to achieve mutual understanding between the socialist commonwealth states and the NATO ones. These statements have been made repeatedly by them, including in the course of the summit meetings. The press, radio and television broadcasts employ the old procedures. For decades the authors of publications have distorted, incorrectly interpreted or completely overlooked the Soviet position and statements by the Soviet political, state and military figures on various problems of detente and the maintaining of peace. They have been armed by the anti-Soviet stereotypes worked out over the years concerning "red militarism," "the Soviet military threat," "Russian expansionism" and so forth. Things have reached a point that among the Western hard-liners even a restructuring of our society causes fears since a consequence of this could be increased economic might in the Soviet Union and this would lead to a stronger "Soviet military threat."

Frequently, the mass information media in the West cast doubt on the sincerity of our peace-loving policy. The West German newspaper DIE WELT on 12 February 1988 wrote that M.S. Gorbachev "is endeavoring to obtain an extended breathing space by normalizing relations with the West and imposing on it a 'new political thinking.' The Kremlin leader is following Lenin's principle: 'To gain time means to gain everything.' For this reason, Gorbachev is doing everything possible to reduce

the level of international confrontation. However, we must not foster the illusion that Moscow has abandoned the idea of world revolution."

Individual newspapers have flagrantly distorted certain places from a speech by the Soviet Minister of Defense, Army Gen D.T. Yazov, at a ceremony in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. In particular, the French newspaper QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS (24 February 1988) and the Spanish newspapers LA VANGUARDIA (23 February 1988) and EL PAIS have written about an "opposition to the process of democratization and glasnost" which has sprung up in the Soviet Armed Forces and not about the "inertia of thinking in a certain portion of the military personnel" (as was actually said) but rather about the "inertia of thinking in the leadership of the Armed Forces." It is not difficult to see that these are far from the same things but such has happened rather often. The American magazine ARMY (No 7, 1986) has distorted certain ideas in the articles of MSU N.V. Ogarkov as published in our press.

Recently, the Soviet defensive doctrine has been subjected to the strongest attacks by the perils of tendentious Western propaganda as by every means they have endeavored to depict this doctrine as offensive, asserting falsely that it stems from the Marxist ideology of class struggle and serves the expansion of socialism. Attempts are being made to show that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states as a whole does not contain any fundamentally new provisions and the document concerning it of 29 May 1987 has been described by a number of Western political leaders as "too general" and "not saying anything."

For backing up its theses, Western propaganda has resorted to various methods. One of the main ones as before is the falsifying of Soviet military history. In tendentiously setting out and distorting the jubilee documents and speeches relating to the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Western mass information media (for example, the French newspaper QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS and the Spanish LA VANGUARDIA) have endeavored to show the "aggressiveness of the Soviet Army" and ascribe functions which are not inherent to it. The same emphasis was put on this by American television which for approximately a month before 23 February showed films about our army. Thus, the military actions forced on the Soviet Union or the coalition of socialist states to defend the victories of socialism have been described as an expression of an "expansionist policy." The Western propagandists, in endeavoring to "refute" the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and undermine confidence in its defensive nature, have also resorted to other tricks. They have picked out obsolete provisions from the military doctrine of the socialist countries and which are given without any reference to place and time. These are offered up to the public as still active principles in the policy of the socialist commonwealth. The Western mass propaganda media have also pointed out that the content

of the document concerning the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states as well as the time of its adopting are supposedly proof that the USSR and its allies are not interested in disarmament and detente but rather are trying to gain a vitally essential "breathing space" in order to establish the economic base for a new hike in the arms race.

These fabrications are refuted by the entire history and peace-loving policy of the Soviet state and by those measures which have been worked out and are being carried out by the Communist Party on the international scene and in the domestic life of our nation.

The Western publishing houses often print works and articles by Soviet military authors. But, as a rule, these are accompanied by forewords or conclusions which distort the fundamental ideas of the published materials, cast doubt on what is said in them and obscure the truth.

For example, the Paris weekly L'EXPRESS has carried on its pages the fake document of the not unknown anti-Soviet A. Besancon and containing flagrant slander of Soviet foreign policy. This author endeavors to persuade the uninformed reader that the talk about peace, about new thinking, glasnost and disarmament is designed to confuse Western public opinion and conceal militant plans. "For domestic consumption, for the party leadership and particularly for the military," he asserted, "ideas and 'a different type of literature' are encouraged." These supposedly would place the Western nations in opposition to one another, and prepare for a victorious nuclear war, the launching of a surprise attack and so forth.

A. Besancon has stated that he found all of this in the books published in 1986 and 1987 by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, namely "Voyna i sovremennost" [War and the Contemporary World] by S.A. Tyushkevich and "Politicheskoye soderzhaniye sovremennykh voyn" [The Political Content of Modern Wars] by Yu.Ya. Kirshin, V.M. Popov and R.A. Savushkin. The author endeavors to depict both publications as a "methodical program of preparing for World War III." "The real practice of Soviet diplomacy," he insists, "is enrolled in this program."

The assertions of A. Besancon are debunked with a careful study of the designated works. They do not even contain a hint of those conclusions and ideas which are ascribed to them. Conversely, the authors emphasize that "a society which is working out creative plans right up to the next millennium cannot even think about war." Both on the international scene and within the country, Soviet policy is united in a consistent defense of peace and in the struggle to prevent a new war. It proceeds from the view that a war in the nuclear missile age cannot be an admissible, reasonable or let alone effective means for achieving political goals. The prevention of war is the main goal of Soviet military policy and the defensive military doctrine.

In England the publishing house Pergamon-Braisses International Defense has published in English the book by Col Gen M.A. Gareyev, "M.V. Frunze—voyennyy teoretik" [M.V. Frunze—Military Theorist]. In the foreword to it by the leading consultant for national security, Joseph D. Douglas, the basic provisions of this work are flagrantly distorted and essentially Douglas's own ideas and viewpoint on nuclear war are set out as well as his view on the problem of the first nuclear strike, lightning and protracted wars and so forth and conclusions are drawn which are completely the opposite to those set out in the book. Although according to the agreement with the All-Union Agency on Author Rights (Article VI) the publishing house should have sought the approval for the foreword's text from the author of the book, this was not done. Here J. Douglas employs the long-known procedure of bourgeois falsifiers of misinterpreting the author's ideas. Everywhere that Douglas affirms the war for which the Russians are supposedly preparing, he "forgets" to say such fundamental words for us: "If this war is imposed on us by the imperialists." M.A. Gareyev writes about what must be undertaken if we are unable to prevent an attack while J. Douglas ascribes to him the words on how the Soviets will attack them. It is perfectly obvious that as long as the danger of war survives, "we in the future will do everything necessary to maintain defense might on a level which would exclude the military superiority of imperialism over socialism."² But this is a forced measure caused by the desire of the West for social revenge.

In the comparatively short foreword, J. Douglas gives a significant place to arguments about the "first strike" in a nuclear war. This is a painful point for Western propaganda, for precisely the USSR has assumed the obligation of not being the first to employ nuclear weapons. But J. Douglas by manipulating the references to the book by MSU V.D. Sokolovskiy "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy] published in the 1960s endeavors to prove that the Soviet Union is preparing to be the first to attack.

But any conscientious reader, having become familiar with the book's contents, would be persuaded that it contains nothing of the sort. The book is devoted to showing the truly defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. For affirming this on the historical level, the words of M.V. Frunze are quoted: "I consider it the most harmful, stupidest and childish venture to talk now about offensive wars on our part" (p 440). In describing modern Soviet military doctrine, it is repeatedly emphasized on pp 237, 441 and elsewhere that "the Soviet Union has solemnly assumed the obligation not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. Along with the other Warsaw Pact states, the USSR has proposed that a treaty be concluded with the NATO member states on the reciprocal nonemployment of military force and the maintaining of relations of peace, in other words, on not being the first to employ either nuclear or conventional weapons or any force at all against one another" (p 441).

M.V. Frunze, proceeding from the experience of World War I and the Civil War in the USSR, on the theoretical level analyzed various views existing in the 1920s in a number of states concerning the questions of a "strategy of attrition" and a "lightning war [blitzkrieg]" while the author of the foreword without any grounds for this projects them into modern Soviet military doctrine.

One is also struck by the circumstance that in certain Western publishing houses, the forewords to books by Soviet authors on military theoretical questions and the reviews of these works are assigned primarily not to professional military theorists or field officers but rather to various sorts of political scientists who reduce everything to political speculation. It is no accident that J. Douglas "did not spot" in the book "M.V. Frunze—Voyenny teoretik" that the author has drawn a number of new and interesting conclusions on the history of the development of military thought, for the first time has provided a sound classification for the entire aggregate of the system of knowledge concerning war and the army, has voiced original ideas on the relationship of military science and military art and has also posed other questions meriting the attention of a military reader. The author of the forward or review may not agree with the various views, but if this is a conscientious and professional scientist, he should at least show respect for the reader and point out these questions.

Here one can clearly trace the logic of the foreword's author: he takes the concrete thesis related to war or disarmament and from anti-Soviet positions and by using an arbitrary interpretation or giving shortened quotes taken out of context distorts the content and endeavors to prove what he must. Thus there is a clear falsifying of the author's views.

The listed publications do not exhaust the flow of lies and slander against the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces and which abound in the Western Mass Information Media.

Reactionary bourgeois propaganda has focused its main efforts on distorting the main provisions of Marxism-Leninism concerning war and peace, Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland, our military history, the defensive doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries as well as the nature and direction of the organizational development of their armed forces. Here the campaign to revise military history carried out in the West has a carefully coordinated, international nature. Among the bourgeois historians who have written numerous false books about the Soviet Union and its army are the well-known names of the Englishmen B. Liddell Hart and B. Pitt, the Americans R. Ruth and J. Toland, the West Germans M. Messerschmidt and E. Klink and many others.

The falsifying of military history is being used by the most inveterate reaction in the United States and the other NATO countries for fostering an atmosphere of

chauvinism, for strengthening militarization, for maintaining the arms race and for undermining the noted detente and mutual understanding. The more noticeable the successes of our country in building a new life and in fighting to preserve peace, the fiercer the attacks on the past and present of the USSR and the more intensely the slanderous campaign is pushed. At present, it covers a broad range of our history. Coming under the sights of the tendentious Western press are events from the Civil War, the causes and results of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet defensive doctrine, the entire 70-year history of our Armed Forces and many other problems.

Bourgeois historians, sociologists and military writers, in treating the events of the Civil War, endeavor to justify the anti-Soviet military intervention and its organizers, to refute the natural victory of the young socialist state, to distort the nature and purpose of the class struggle and defame the role of the Communist Party in the defeat of the interventionists and White Guards.

Typical versions for the bourgeois historians such as the American Peter Kenes, the Canadian John Keene and the Englishman M. Kettle are fabrications (as a rule, with references to statements and works by former White Guards) that the Civil War in Soviet Russia was caused by the revolution and not by intervention of the imperialist states. By this they endeavor to confuse the working masses of their own countries with the inevitability of civil war and its related hardships as obligatory accomplices of a socialist revolution.

In taking up the interwar period, bourgeois historians make the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty of 23 August 1939 a subject of insinuation and which upset the plans of international imperialism to establish a united anti-Soviet front. The most widespread in bourgeois propaganda is the slanderous assertion by the historians, the American S. Morris, the Englishman M. McCauley and W. Paul from West Germany that supposedly the Soviet-German Treaty was a "major event" which made "war in Europe inevitable." Western propaganda is still endeavoring to depict things as if "there had been neither the Munich Agreement with Hitler signed by England and France in 1938 with active assistance from the United States, nor the Austrian anschluss, nor the crucifixion of the Spanish Republic, nor the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Klaypeda by the Nazis, nor the conclusion in 1938 of nonaggression pacts by London and Paris with Germany."³ Thus, the fact of the concluding of the treaty is used by them to slander the prewar policy of the USSR and thereby spread doubt as to the sincerity of the peace initiatives undertaken by our country at present. Here no mention at all is made of the efforts by the Soviet Union to establish collective security and that these efforts encountered fierce resistance from the imperialist powers, primarily England, the United States and France, the ruling circles of which were blinded by hate for socialism and in every possible way endeavored to focus Nazi aggression on our country.

World War II and the most important, decisive component of it, the Great Patriotic War, had an enormous impact on the destiny of mankind. Their results and lessons are closely linked with modern times and for this reason continue to be at the center of attention of the bourgeois falsifiers who do everything to eradicate the truth about the war from the memory of the people, to shake the confidence in the invincibility of socialism, to undermine the authority of the USSR and to rehabilitate imperialism as the main source of wars and justify its aggressive policy. In the works, articles and speeches of Western historians such as T. Dupuy, P. Martell, E. Zimke, H. Salisbury (United States), A. Seaton and G. Stephenson (England) and R. Hinze (West Germany) the reasons for the entry of the USSR into the war are distorted, the decisive role of the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan is denied, the role of the Western Allies is extolled in achieving victory, Soviet military art is belittled, the actions by the American, English and French armed forces as well as the temporary successes of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German Front are idealized, the liberating mission of the USSR and the Soviet Army is distorted while the experience of the coordinated actions by the Allies during the war and the decisions on the postwar peace settlement are forgotten.

Bourgeois propaganda gives great attention to examining the questions of the second front in Europe with the celebrations for the 40th anniversary of this being widely noted in the United States. Here the Western historians evermore frequently raise the question of revising and more clearly "allocating the role in completing the defeat of Germany," having in mind the playing down of the role of the USSR and exalting the contribution of the Allies. Western authors in modern works on World War II act as though there was no attempt by certain circles in the United States and Great Britain to reach a separate peace with Nazi Germany and thwart the opening of the second front in Europe. All of this is done to increase the prestige of the Americans as dependable Allies in the eyes of the Western European public and to dull concern for the readied plight as the first to go down in a nuclear war in Europe.

The increased authority and influence of the Warsaw Pact has caused ire and irritation among the reactionary bourgeois propaganda. By direct lies or the distorting of facts these forces have endeavored to misconstrue the nature of the political and military cooperation between the allied socialist countries, they speak about the presence of supposed "permanent contradictions" and "crises" in the Warsaw Pact and declare the "hegemonistic aspirations" of the USSR vis-a-vis the Allies. Such fabrications are constantly refuted by the coordinated political activities of the Warsaw Pact states and by their equal participation in resolving common problems.

The heroism of the Soviet people has long been an object of bourgeois falsification. Along with propagandizing the myths of "red militarism," "the Soviet military threat"

and "Soviet expansion," the "deheroization" of the Soviet soldier holds an important place in the ideological struggle against the USSR.

The current campaign of "deheroization" goes far back in history. The attacks on the "man with a gun" as a defender of socialism began at the very dawn of Soviet power. The wave of such attacks has had both declines and rises. An analysis of works published in the United States in the 1980s (the authors M. Muhlinex, P. Blackmore, E. Howell and F. Nelman) indicates that, having adapted their ideas to win political favor, these authors have turned largely to the image of the Soviet soldier established during the period of the Cold War. Bourgeois propaganda denies the mass heroism of our people and their soldiers explaining this by traditional Russian patriotism, it endeavors to ascribe to us certain militaristic traits, and steadily denies the spiritual link between the generations of Soviet people and the succession of heroic traditions. A falsifying of the image of the Soviet soldier is essential to reactionary bourgeois propaganda in order, in deceiving the peoples of their own countries, to instill in them hate for socialism and the Soviet Army.

It is perfectly obvious that all the possible methods of bourgeois falsification and the stratagems employed by them are aimed at undercutting the confidence in the Soviet Union, arousing the West to repudiate the policy of detente carried out by the USSR and to continue the extensive pressure on the USSR. In this context it is wise to recall the words of M.V. Frunze said by him in a report at the Third Congress of USSR Soviets in May 1925: "One of our comrades has merely to make some comment on the necessity of attention to the cause of defending the Union and immediately in the foreign press a series of articles appears pointing to preparations for war by the USSR. If militaristic aspirations cannot be found in any manner, then the comment is made that this peaceable tone has been specially assumed to conceal warlike intentions and so forth to infinity. In such a situation, of course, it is impossible for us to persuade foreign powers of our peaceful intentions."⁴

The interests of mankind demand a repudiation of the policy of force and confrontation. "It must be once and for all understood," emphasized M.S. Gorbachev, "that the Soviet and American societies have different values, and we must not endeavor to impose our orders and our notions of what is good and what is bad. Each country has many of its own problems, and let each of them work on these in its own way. This does not exclude but presupposes a reciprocal study and exchanges in the area of culture, science and so forth. Let the people themselves look and judge everything. We do not intend to teach the United States and we do not recognize its right to teach us."⁵ Under present-day conditions, it is more useful to undertake every measure to know one another better, to understand each other and to strengthen confidence between the peoples as we were able to do during World War II, having united the efforts of the peoples and the armies in the fight against Nazism. This is all

the more important in the fight to prevent a nuclear war which would threaten all mankind. This is not just for the Soviet nation. We sincerely favor an honest, objective comparison of our views on all questions, including military science and military doctrine, to seek out ways for lowering the level of military opposition as well as for close collaboration between peoples.

Recently it can be noted with satisfaction how both the Soviet people and the Americans sincerely welcome the indications of improved relations between our countries.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 16 March 1988.
2. M.S. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroyka: revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya" [October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues], Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, p 55.
3. Ibid., p 24.
4. M.V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol II, 1957, p 257.
5. PRAVDA, 23 April 1988.

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Munich: Leap to War

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[Article by Col A.S. Orlov, candidate of historical sciences: "Munich: A Shift Toward War"]

[Text] Fifty years ago, at the end of September 1938, there was an event which became a decisive step on the path to World War II. On 29-30 September in Munich, gathering for a special conference on the issue of Germany's territorial claims against Czechoslovakia were the heads of government of Germany, Italy, England and France (without representatives from the Czechoslovak Republic). They concluded an agreement which obliged the Czechoslovak government to turn over the most industrially developed part of the nation, Sudetenland, to Nazi Germany.

Why was precisely the Munich Agreement the strongest impetus for the Nazi war machine which had long been careening toward aggressive war? What aims were the rulers of France and England pursuing in allowing the Nazis to tear up their ally, Czechoslovakia? Could Czechoslovakia defend its own independence? What are the lessons of the Munich conspiracy? These questions for 50 years have attracted the attention of political scientists and historians from many countries on both sides of the Atlantic. As is known, the preparation for war, the capturing and subjugating of other states were the aim of German Naziism from the first days the Nazis

came to power, and Czechoslovakia held an important place in Hitler's far-reaching aggressive plans. This is not surprising. Bourgeois Czechoslovakia in the interwar periods had a well-developed industry and intense agriculture. Based on a modern scientific and technical foundation, the defense industry made it possible to Czechoslovakia to become the "world's arsenal." Its proportional amount in the sale of weapons and military equipment on the world market was 40 percent.¹ In addition, the seizure of Czechoslovakia put Germany in an advantageous strategic position for attacking Poland and for further aggression to the East. All of this fanned the appetites of the Nazi rulers in the Third Reich.

Even in March 1933, at a meeting with the Italian Fascists at Locarno, the leader of the foreign policy section of the Nazi Party Rosenberg proposed the following plan: 1) Germany would absorb Austria; 2) the united Germany and Austria would either completely absorb Czechoslovakia or take Moravia and Slovakia from it as well as the Carpathian Ukraine.² Such was the first part of the program for conquests by German Naziism.

Thus began unrestrained preparations for war. These were carried out under the cover of demands for "German equality in weapons" which had been restricted by the Versailles Treaty and chiefly under the slogan of combating Bolshevism. Hitler had proclaimed the Third Reich the "bastion of Europe" in the fight against revolutionary Russia. England and France accepted this program favorably closing their eyes to the danger of German armaments as they wanted very much to have the Germans get rid of the hated socialist country. The plans of German militarism were not resisted by England and France. The governments of these countries did not foresee that before attacking the USSR, German Naziism would conquer Western Europe. In Berlin they realized that the time for action had arrived. The touchstone was the occupying of the Rhineland which was demilitarized under the Versailles Treaty.

On 7 March 1936, three German battalions crossed the Rhine. The German troops (a division) occupied the Rhineland. The Nazis anxiously awaited the response of France and England but they were silent. Hitler later said: "The 48 hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nervous in my life. If the French had entered the Rhineland then, we would have to slink off with our tail between our legs as our military resources were insufficient to put up even the humblest resistance."³ England and France, however, silently swallowed this pill. The local "land police" in the Rhineland was merged into the Wehrmacht. Two years later, the Anschluss of Austria was carried out without a shot. The independent nation became a province of the Third Reich. Twelve divisions of the Austrian Army were incorporated in the Wehrmacht. The Western powers made believe that they had not noticed the disappearance of an entire state from the map of Europe.

The policy of inciting the aggressor on the part of the Western powers encouraged Hitler and his henchmen in the belief that they could do anything and pushed them into the path of further seizures. Strengthened by the economy and defense potential of Austria, the Nazi Reich prepared for new aggression.

The elimination of the Czechoslovakian state became the next point in the Nazi plans for conquering "living space" ["lebensraum"] for the Third Reich. "It is my firm decision to destroy Czechoslovakia by military attack in the near future" was how it was put in the Directive on the "Plan Grun" (the seizure of Czechoslovakia) and signed by Hitler on 30 May 1938.⁴

This "firmness" had strong underpinnings. Even on 19 November 1937, Lord Halifax, at that time the deputy prime minister of Great Britain, assured Hitler that the British ruling circles had a complete understanding of the "legitimate" territorial demands of Germany vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland. He merely voiced the request that the possible changes in the given part of Europe "be carried out by a peaceful evolution." The French newspaper TEMPS asked with doubt: "Is it necessary for the sake of saving Czechoslovakia to set the whole world aflame and doom 3 million Frenchmen to death?" With reason the Fuhrer said that England and France "had already tacitly abandoned Czechoslovakia."⁵

Seeing such a stance by the Western powers, the Nazis began to seize Czechoslovakia. On 24 April 1938, the Nazi Sudeten German Party of Henlein and which was operating in the Sudeten upon instructions from Hitler, proposed that autonomy be granted to the Sudetenland. This, in essence, would mean that Czechoslovakia was to abandon sovereignty over the most developed part of its national territory. A meeting of the French and British prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs held in London in the same month recommended that Czechoslovakia agree to Germany's demands.

Only the Soviet position evoked concern among the ruling circles of the Western countries as the USSR had conducted a consistent policy of establishing a system of collective security in Europe and checking the aggressor. The Soviet Union which in 1935 concluded a treaty with Czechoslovakia and France on joint defensive actions against the forces of aggression, repeatedly stated its readiness to aid Czechoslovakia in repelling Nazi aggression. Its words were backed up by deeds. In 1937, an agreement was concluded for the Soviet Union to provide aid to Czechoslovakia in building airfields and delivering it aircraft. The first 40 aircraft arrived in Czechoslovakia in April 1938. Immediately after the seizure of Austria by Germany, the USSR, on 15 March 1938, made an official announcement that it was ready to carry out its obligations provided under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact. On 25 May, the Soviet government

reaffirmed that in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, the USSR would provide it with the necessary aid. Similar statements were made on 25 June and 22 August.⁶

In this situation the reactionary politicians in London and Paris hurried to aid Hitler under the pretext of organizing "mediation" between Germany and Czechoslovakia. They did not like the policy of thwarting the aggressor being carried out by the USSR or the Soviet-Czechoslovak Mutual Aid Treaty. The main idea of the English and French ruling circles was to deflect German expansion from themselves, and to direct this to the East. In order to carry out this idea, it was essential to isolate the Soviet nation and thwart the collective security plans. The absorption of the most important part of Czechoslovakia by Germany aided these plans. "The English," wrote the English historian P. Bell, "were hoping to satisfy German claims by talks and thereby prevent any cooperation with the USSR. Such a policy was based on the experience gained over 20 years of ideological hostility and mistrust and gave rise to a firm determination to hold the USSR in isolation."⁷ Moreover, they felt that after the repressions in 1937-1938 in the USSR, the strength of the Red Army had been weakened. The same views were held in France. "The French General Staff," wrote the magazine PARIS MATCH in March 1938, "had strong doubts as to the offensive capabilities of the Red Army. In its opinion, the army was trained only for defensive warfare."⁸ But this merely reinforced Chamberlain and Daladier in their anti-Soviet plans, that is, to settle the question of the fate of Czechoslovakia behind the back of the Soviet Union and, having surrendered it to Hitler, drive him further to the East, in every possible way painting the weakness of the USSR, ultimately to bring Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union together in a fatal clash.

At a meeting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938, the British Prime Minister M. Chamberlain agreed to his demand to turn over to Germany a portion of the Czechoslovak territory where more than 50 percent of the citizens was of German origin. Chamberlain promised the leader of the Third Reich that after the discussion of this question in the English and French governments, he would ensure the acceptance of Hitler's demands by the Czechoslovak government.⁹

In actuality, 2 days after the talks, the English Cabinet approved the "Principle of Self-Determination," as the separation of Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia was hypocritically called. There then followed the Anglo-French consultations and as a result an Anglo-French ultimatum was forthcoming: Czechoslovakia was ordered to satisfy Germany's claims "in the interests of European peace."¹⁰

The people of Czechoslovakia and primarily the communists acted decisively against the encroachments by the Western powers on the nation's territorial integrity. "What is now being advised from London, in terms of its

dimensions, is nothing more than would be demanded from Czechoslovakia in the event of a lost war," stated the General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee, Klement Gottwald, speaking on 19 September before the permanent committee of the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic. "We know," he continued, "that the Soviet Union would not hesitate in carrying out the existing treaty obligations. We will not voluntarily permit the dismembering of the republic. If we are attacked, we will defend ourselves and we will not be alone."¹¹

Under the pressure from the people, the Czechoslovak government was forced to resort to shifting tactics. President E. Benes, in ensuring the representatives of the USSR and the CPCZ that "capitulation is excluded," asked for a clarification of the Soviet viewpoint on the question of the granting of Soviet military aid to Czechoslovakia.

On 19 September, a telegram was sent from Prague to Moscow: "Benes requests the USSR government give an answer as quickly as possible to the following questions:

"1. Will the USSR, according to the treaty, provide immediate and effective aid if France remains loyal and also provides aid?

"2. In the event of an attack, Benes will immediately send a telegram to the Council of the League of Nations.... In line with this, Benes requests help in the League of Nations and requests from the Soviet government the same immediate answer to whether or not the USSR will help as a member of the League of Nations...."

The reply came from Moscow immediately, on 20 September:

"1. To the question of Benes whether the USSR, according to the treaty, will immediately and effectively aid Czechoslovakia if France remains loyal to it and also provides aid, you can give an affirmative reply on behalf of the government of the Soviet Union.

"2. The same affirmative answer can also be given to the other question of Benes...."¹²

This reply on the same day was immediately forwarded by telephone to Benes. On 21 September, the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Aleksandrovskiy visited Benes personally and verbally reaffirmed the Soviet position. On the same day, in speaking at a plenary session of the Council of the League of Nations, the Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M.M. Litvinov, also announced the readiness of the Soviet Union to carry out its obligations vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia, having thereby emphasized the need for convoking a conference of the European great powers and other interested nations "for elaborating a collective demarche."¹³ Thus, the Soviet Union proposed a way out of the developing crisis.

However, on the same day Benes stated that Czechoslovakia would accept the Anglo-French demands. This news caused a wave of mass protest demonstrations and strikes in the nation. The Czechoslovak leadership under the pressure of the masses of people announced universal mobilization. A new government was formed headed by Gen J. Syrový. The appointment of a general as prime minister seemingly emphasized the determination of the Czechoslovak ruling circles to put up resistance, but, as subsequent events were to show, they were merely pretending that they intended to defend the republic.

In the peak of mobilization, on 27 September, a representative of the Red Army arrived in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union again stated that the USSR was ready to immediately provide aid to Czechoslovakia if its leadership requested this.¹⁴ However, this did not come about. England and France continued to pressure Czechoslovakia, seeking concessions from it for Nazi Germany. The Czechoslovak bourgeois government did not wish to realize the existing opportunities to rebuff the aggressor.

Fear of the people turned the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie into the grave digger of their own country.

On 29-30 September 1938, a meeting (conference) was held in Munich between Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini. The agreement signed at it for dividing Czechoslovakia provided the following: the transfer to Germany from 1 through 10 October of the Sudetenland and the areas bordering Austria with all the structures and fortifications, agricultural and industrial enterprises located on these territories, with the supplies of raw materials, lines of communications, means of communications and so forth. In addition, Czechoslovakia promised within a period of 3 months to satisfy the territorial claims of Horthy Hungary and landowner Poland. The participants in the conference "guaranteed" the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. On 30 September, the Czechoslovak government without discussion accepted the conditions of the Munich Agreement. Germany took from Czechoslovakia approximately 20 percent of its territory where one-quarter of the nation's population lived and almost one-half of the heavy industry product, 86 percent of the chemical products, 80 percent of the textile industry, 70 percent of the electric power and 70 percent of the ferrous metallurgy were produced and 66 percent of the coal mined.¹⁵ Thus, without a shot, the Nazis and their henchmen conquered one of the most industrially developed nations of Europe betrayed by its own government and the Western Allies.

At the same time, Czechoslovakia possessed great opportunities to rebuff the aggressor. In September 1938, the Czechoslovak Army had under arms 2 million soldiers and officers, 45 divisions, around 16,000 aircraft and

almost 500 tanks. Its morale, like that of all the people, was high. The German Army (2.2 million men) in the same period numbered 47 divisions and had 2,500 aircraft and 720 tanks.¹⁶

German superiority in forces was minimal. The surprise factor also did not exist as Czechoslovakia had carried out mobilization. The nation possessed a defensive line equipped with the last word of technology and equal to the Maginot Line and occupied by troops. The first-rate Czechoslovak aviation within a few minutes could carry out devastating bombings of German chemical plants located near the common frontier and cause the enemy serious harm. In the estimate of the German General Staff in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army in the event of military operations had the opportunity to cause serious damage to the Wehrmacht.¹⁷

With good reason Hitler subsequently said: "When after Munich we were able to investigate Czechoslovakia's military might from within, what we saw shook us strongly: we had exposed ourselves to a great danger. The Czech generals had prepared a serious plan." Keitel in Nuremberg said: "...If Czechoslovakia had decided to defend itself, its fortifications would have held us up, as we did not have the forces to breach them."¹⁸

Having moved up strong forces to the Czechoslovak frontiers, the German Command left on the west and south of the country only a thin screen of 12 divisions, having 8 divisions in the reserve and 10 in the stage of organization.¹⁹ Opposite these forces on the other side of the Franco-German Frontier were 40 French divisions which, if France had been loyal to its obligations, could have dealt a major defeat to the enemy.

Thus, a disaster could have been prevented with solidarity in the anti-Nazi states. For this the Western powers would have to support the Soviet idea of collective security. And the ruling circles of England and France did not want this most of all. Recalling the days of Munich, Daladier said in 1963 that at that time "ideological problems frequently overshadowed strategic imperatives."²⁰

At that time, 30 rifle divisions were concentrated on the western frontier of the Soviet Union in the aim of providing immediate and effective aid to Czechoslovakia. Tank troops and aviation were on combat alert.²¹ However, the bourgeois government of the country and President E. Benes himself preferred surrender to Nazi Germany over Soviet military aid. At Munich the English and French governments entered into conspiracy with Hitler. The U.S. government approved their policy of indulging Nazi aggression. In endeavoring to mislead public opinion, the Anglo-French "peacemakers" depicted the Munich Agreement as a "step in the direction of ensuring peace." "My friends!!" exclaimed Chamberlain upon return to London, turning to the crowd which filled the street in front of his residence on

Downing Street, "...here on Downing Street an honorable peace has come from Germany. I believe that we will have peace in our times."²²

But this was not to come to be. During those same days in Munich, Hitler and Mussolini at an unofficial meeting agreed "to act shoulder to shoulder against Great Britain." In October 1938, Ribbentrop told the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ciano: "The Czech crisis showed our strength. We have the advantage of initiative and we are the masters of the situation. We cannot be attacked. From the military viewpoint the situation is excellent: in September 1939 we will be able to wage war against the great democracies."²³ The lie of the Western peacemakers was unmasked during those very days. On 4 October 1938, PRAVDA wrote: "An entire nation has been given over for the aggressors—Germany and its Allies—to tear up, Czechoslovakia has been delivered in believing of the nobility of the governmental circles in England and France." And thus it happened: not 6 months had passed when on 15 March 1939, German troops, having trampled on the Anglo-French "guarantees," invaded Czechoslovakia and eliminated it as an independent state.

The Munich Agreement and all the policy of the Western powers unambiguously showed German Naziism that there would not be a collective security system in Europe. The Western governments planned by collusion with the aggressor states, and primarily Germany, at the expense of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe to open the gates to a Nazi crusade against the Soviet Union. At present, the ruling circles of these powers, "in endeavoring to wash away their sins, are trying to persuade others that the start of the Nazi attack on Poland and hence World War II was provided by the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939. It was as if there had been no Munich Agreement with Hitler signed by England and France in 1938 with the active support of the United States, nor the Austrian *anschluss*, nor the crucifixion of the Spanish Republic, nor the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Klaypeda by the Nazis, nor the conclusion of the nonaggression pacts with Germany signed in 1938 by London and Paris."²⁴

Munich has gone down in history as a symbol of the betrayal of the interests of the people and as a symbol of conspiracy by dark forces. But in our times, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Munich Agreement and the start of World War II, the United States, England, France and West Germany are putting out new editions which attempt to justify the Munich conspiracy and cast doubt on the then-existing opportunities to prevent World War II by a collective rebuff of the advancing aggression.

Moreover, politicians are appearing who endeavor to label the policy of trust which is presently gathering strength as another Munich. On 5 January 1988, in the newspaper NEW YORK TIMES, the chairman of the executive council of the "Committee on the Existing

Danger," the well-known anti-Soviet Eugene Rostow published an article. It stated that certain circles "consider the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces a new Munich, that is, the start of an American retreat to isolationism when confronted with that covert threat which the growing superiority of Moscow represents."²⁵ Having likened the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles to the agreement in Munich, its opponents are endeavoring in every possible way to blacken the process of improving Soviet-American relations in the eyes of the world public and are intending to spread doubt as to the sincerity of the USSR.

Thus, they are endeavoring to cast shadow on history's first agreement to destroy an entire class of nuclear missile weapons and marking a major step toward a nuclear-free world, in comparing this with the disgraceful conspiracy which opened the way to war.

However, the peoples are not deceived. They know that in 1938, Munich lay the path to war. It took a half-century for a treaty to appear which lay a path to excluding wars from the life of mankind.

Footnotes

1. "Strany Tsentralnoy i Yugo-Vostochnoy Yevropy vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne: Voenno-istoricheskiy ocherk" [The Nations of Central and Southeast Europe in World War II: Military History Essay], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, p 216.

2. W. Shirer, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich," New York, 1976, p 240.

3. Ibid., p 342.

4. "Prichiny vozniknoveniya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Reasons for the Outbreak of World War II], Moscow, Nauka, 1982, p 184.

5. Ibid., p 180; D.M. Proektor, "Fashizm: put agressii i gibeli" [Fascism: The Path of Aggression and Death], Moscow, Nauka, 1985, p 112; "Prichiny vozniknoveniya vtoroy....," p 80.

6. "Prichiny vozniknoveniya vtoroy....," p 23.

7. P. Bell, "The Origin of the Second World War in Europe," London, New York, 1987, p 235.

8. PARIS MATCH, 11 March 1988, p 6.

9. "Prichiny vozniknoveniya vtoroy....," p 186.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p 187.

12. Quoted from: "O proshlom vo imya budushchego. Vtoraya mirovaya voyna: prichiny, itogi, uroki" [About the Past for the Sake of the Future. World War II: Causes, Results, Lessons], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1985, p 18.

13. Ibid., p 19.

14. "Strany Tsentralnoy i Yugo-Vostochnoy....," p 218.

15. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 5, 1978, p 457; D.M. Proektor, op. cit., p 139.

16. "Strany Tsentralnoy i Yugo-Vostochnoy....," p 219.

17. PARIS MATCH, 11 March 1988, p 6.

18. W. Shirer, op. cit., pp 517-518.

19. PARIS MATCH, 11 March 1988, p 9.

20. Ibid.

21. "O kproshlom vo imya....," p 19.

22. W. Shirer, op. cit., p 532.

23. Ibid.

24. M.S. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroyka: revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya" [October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues], Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, p 24.

25. PRAVDA, 10 January 1988.

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Surprise Factor

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[Article, published under the heading "World War II," by Col (Ret) B.G. Solovyev, doctor of historical sciences: "The Surprise Factor (Preparations and Unleashing of World War II)"]

[Text] World War II began on 1 September 1939. In terms of its scale, fierceness and bloodiness it has had no equal in history: over 50 million lives were carried away, some 60 million states were drawn into its orbit and over 110 million men were under arms.¹ The war was carefully and lengthily prepared for by the forces of international imperialist reaction and was initiated by Nazi Germany, Italy and militaristic Japan.

In the prewar years, these countries, in fostering an arms race, made a great effort to establish the maximum favorable political, diplomatic and ideological conditions for carrying out their predatory policy. There was

an intense process of putting together military blocs, work was carried out in the area of forming new military doctrines and all areas of military art were intensely worked out. Particularly close attention was given to working out the "blitzkrieg" theory and to the methods of the covert preparation and achieving of a surprise attack.

The shaping of Nazi Germany military doctrine was strongly influenced by Gen Ludendorff. In his book "Totalnaya voyna" [Total War], he asserted that modern wars acquire a "total nature," they demand the straining of all the forces of the people and the state and for this reason even in peacetime the entire policy and economy of the state must be put into the service of their preparations. One of the key Ludendorff ideas was the wagering on a "lightning war" ["blitzkrieg"] which was to be waged with all firmness and mercilessness and only offensively. Here crucial importance was given to a surprise attack. The military doctrine of Nazi Germany envisaged an attack without a declaration of war, a "lightning" waging of military actions, criminal severity for the enemy, the mass destruction of the peaceful population and the capturing of material valuables.

The "blitzkrieg" theory was the basis of Wehrmacht strategy. According to it, victory over the enemy was to be achieved in the course of one swift military campaign by surprise powerful thrusts using large groupings of motorized troops and aviation. In line with this, in preparing for and conducting a "blitzkrieg," measures were provided for covert mobilization, concentration and deployment of the operational army in anticipating the enemy troops in this, the employment of the maximum possible amount of forces, even during the first surprise thrust in the aim of capturing strategic initiative, and achieving a decisive success which would determine the outcome of the war. Thus, the memorandum of the German Supreme High Command "The Problem of Organizing the Leadership of the War" of 19 April 1938 pointed out, "the forms of initiating a war and opening military operations have changed over time. A state, its armed forces and the population are to be brought to the state of the highest possible mobilization readiness even before the publishing of the mobilization order. The surprise factor as a prerequisite for rapid and large initial successes often will force the start of hostilities before the end of the mobilization and even before the complete deployment of the ground troops."² The main provisions of "blitzkrieg" theory were embodied in the concrete strategic plans for war against Poland, France and the Soviet Union.

The very essence of "blitzkrieg" theory demanded the use of any means and methods to ensure covert preparations for the war, the disinformation of the enemy, and the use of its unpreparedness for military operations. Such a situation could be achieved only in the instance that the enemy remains uninformed about the measures being carried out to prepare for the invasion. This requires that in peacetime a whole series of major state

and military measures united by a single over-all plan be carried out relating to operational-strategic camouflage and political disinformation.

Basically, the versions of "blitzkrieg" theory worked out in Germany, Japan and Italy were similar. However, in the views on the nature of the war being prepared and the methods of unleashing it, in the political and military circles of these countries there were definite differences brought about by the specific tasks which had to be carried out by the armed forces, by the particular features of the theaters of operations, by the available forces and the preparedness of the armies, as well as by the balance of the military-economic potentials of the aggressor countries and their enemies. For example, Japanese military doctrine proceeded from the inadvisability or even the impossibility of permitting an extended war against the Soviet Union or the United States. It was planned that the first attacks by the Japanese Armed Forces should have inherent "speed, surprise, military and political neutralization of the enemy to limits creating an objective necessity for it to move to surrender."³ The superior forces of the American and English fleets were to be defeated by surprise attacks by carrier- and land-based aviation against the main enemy groupings with the subsequent commitment to battle of the combined fleet and particularly its forces of the line.⁴

The military-political leadership of Nazi Germany was wagering on a surprise attack long before the start of World War II. This as a decided act was discussed at a conference on 5 November 1937 which was attended by Hitler, the minister of foreign affairs, the defense minister, the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, the navy and air forces. "The degree of surprise and the speed of our actions," it was pointed out at the conference, "are crucial for the position of Poland."⁵ This idea was formulated just a definitely in relation to the attack on Czechoslovakia: "...the attack on the Czech lands should be carried out in a 'lightning' manner."⁶

The Nazi leadership was largely concerned with the question of achieving the covert arming of the Wehrmacht with new military equipment and its surprise employment on the battlefields. At the same conference it was pointed out: "Logistic support and armament are modern and if one continues to wait then there is the danger that they will become obsolete. Above all, it is impossible to keep 'special types of weapons' secret permanently."⁷

During the years preceding the start of World War II, the questions of camouflaging the aggression being prepared and the surprise of attack were intensely worked on by various levels of the Wehrmacht. In a concentrated form these were reflected in a speech by the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Gen F. Halder, at a military academy directly before the start of World War II. In formulating German doctrine, Halder pointed out that this includes: a surprise armed attack

which is stunning in its mass effect; catching the attacked side unawares; the defeat of the state rear of the nation which has been attacked by terror, sabotage, the murder of government leaders and so forth; a decisive non-stop offensive, disregarding losses and the absence of reserves.⁸

With the outbreak and during World War II, the Wehrmacht repeatedly succeeded in carrying out a surprise invasion of various European countries. To a significant degree this was ensured by the fact that the aggressor in all stages of preparation for the invasion conducted carefully worked-out measures for operational-strategic camouflage and political disinformation and thereby dulled the vigilance of the states against which the attack was being prepared.

In concealing the true aims and plans of the Nazi aggressors in preparing for World War II, the first aggressive actions aimed against Czechoslovakia, Poland and other Western European countries, of important significance was the well thought out use of the anticommunist and anti-Soviet attitudes in the ruling circles of England, France and the United States and their desire to direct the brunt of aggression against the Soviet Union. The Nazi leadership skillfully created the impression that events would develop precisely according to such a scenario and under the cover of this story they prepared their own version of initiating the war, the succession of attacks and the defeat of the enemies one by one. Only relying on the resources of conquered Europe could the Nazi aggressors plan an attack on the USSR.

Political disinformation and the fanning of the myth about the conquering plans of the Soviet Union played an important role in allowing the Nazis to succeed in a surprise attack on a number of countries. The imperialist leaders blinded by anti-Sovietism were incapable of correctly assessing the development prospects of the military-political situation, they tacitly agreed to all acts of aggression committed by the axis countries on the eve of World War II and in the first stage of it and, in addition, by their financial and economic aid assisted in creating the Wehrmacht's military might. Under the guise of "noninterference" and "neutrality," they carried out a policy of encouraging Nazi Germany, Italy and militaristic Japan in aggression. This showed their desire to resolve contradictions within the imperialist system at the expense of the Soviet Union. The policy of "nonintervention" was most clearly embodied in the Munich agreement in September 1938. The English and French governments betrayed their ally, Czechoslovakia, having allowed Germany to seize its Sudetenland and they opened up the path to the East for Nazi aggression.

The Accountability Report of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee to the 18th Party Congress provided a thorough analysis of the true meaning of this policy. "In the policy of nonintervention," stated the report, "one can see the aspiration

and desire not to prevent the aggressors from doing their evil deeds, not to prevent, for instance, Japan from entering a war against China or even better against the Soviet Union, not preventing, for instance, Germany from becoming involved in European affairs and involved in a war against the Soviet Union, to allow all the participants in the war to become deeply stuck in the quagmire of war, to encourage them in this on the sly, to allow them to weaken and exhaust each other and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to emerge on the scene with fresh forces, to intervene, of course, 'in the interests of peace,' and dictate their terms to the weakened participants in the war."⁹

The mechanism of preparing for war continued to operate with increasing strength. By the efforts of the Nazi aggressors and their supporters, man was brought directly in contact with bloody tragedy the first act of which was the aggression by Nazi Germany against Poland.

At the basis of the plan for the war against Poland (the Plan Weiss) lay the idea of defeating it by surprise coordinated strikes by all the armed services. The ground forces by rapid deep thrusts were to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Polish Army. The crucial role in achieving this goal was assigned to the armored troops and aviation. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Col Gen von Brauchitsch, in the Directive on the Plan of Attack on Poland pointed out: "...To start the war by surprise, powerful strikes...in order by a surprise invasion of Polish territory to anticipate organized mobilization and concentration of the Polish Army...."¹⁰

In the aim of achieving surprise, the Germans worked out ahead of time and successively carried out an entire system of political, diplomatic and military-strategic measures to conceal the attack being prepared involving for this not only the military command bodies but also the state administration. Intelligence and counterintelligence, diplomacy and the mass information media were widely employed in the aim of camouflage. The Nazi leadership assigned a major role to political disinformation. In following the previously elaborated tactics, by concealing its true aims and by numerous assertions on its peaceful aspirations and on the limited nature of the claims against Poland it endeavored to achieve surprise in initiating the aggression, to isolate Poland in diplomatic and military terms and avoid a war on two fronts. Hypocrisy and lying permeated all the foreign policy demarches of the German leadership. In the New Year's speech on 1 January 1939, Hitler assured: "The German government is seized with only one desire, to protect peace so that in the forthcoming year we will be able to bring events to a universal truce."¹¹ Preparations for the attack were carried out under the cover of talks with other countries, in particular with England and France.

In achieving a surprise attack, equally important significance was given to operational-strategic camouflage. In the Directive Governing the Uniform Preparation of the

Armed Forces for War of 11 April 1939, it was pointed out: "...It is desirable and necessary to prepare an unexpected attack. The secret or open universal mobilization will be announced as late as possible on the day preceding the attack."¹²

In order to ensure the covertness of mobilization, the Nazi Command introduced in a significant number of formations an organizational structure allowing their rapid build-up to wartime TOE; it split up the areas of mobilization and the constituting of new units in such a manner as to minimize the movement of personnel and materiel; mobilization supplies were established and deployed close to the formation points. For lulling the vigilance of the enemy, they made it a practice to call up reservists and carry out a significant number of mobilization exercises and trial mobilizations. Their repetition and periodicity should ultimately dispell the rising fears in the victim of aggression.

In the aim of ensuring a surprise attack and anticipating the Polish Armed Forces in deployment, provision was made to begin the invasion only with the available regular divisions brought up to peacetime TOE and occupying the forming-up place ahead of time. As was pointed out by Muller-Hillebrand, "the forces which have not been able to concentrate in this 'flying start' were to be committed to battle from depth as they reached their forming-up places...the formations could reach their forming-up places only after their mobilization and movement, that is, after 3-7 days."¹³

One of the large-scale measures in operational-strategic camouflage for the concentration of the German troops was the building of defensive structures by the Wehrmacht on the Polish frontier. From the spring of 1939, construction work was carried out at a rapid pace. E. Mannstein has written that entire divisions, in constantly relieving one another, were relocated for several weeks to the Polish frontier for building this "Eastern Rampart."¹⁴ The concentration of troops in East Prussia, in addition, was carried out under the pretext of ceremonies devoted to the 25th anniversary of the victory of the Kaiser's Army over the Russian troops at Tannenberg in August 1914.

Thus, in conducting the camouflage measures, the aggressor endeavored primarily to conceal his intention to attack one or another country, the time of the start of aggression and its scope. Along with this the shifting of the Armed Forces from peacetime status to wartime was carefully camouflaged along with their regrouping, concentration on the selected sectors and operational deployment, the relocating of aviation, as well as the deployment of the rear services and maintenance facilities. Up to World War II, history had not known such refined, wide-scale efforts to ensure surprise attack. This was caused by a number of factors. In the military area, these consisted in the fact that surprise attacks by a previously prepared invasion army which was based upon tank and motorized formations and supported by

strong air forces had fundamentally altered the nature of initial operations and from the very start of the war made it possible to seize strategic initiative, to cause maximum damage to the main enemy groupings, to prevent mobilization and the strategic deployment measures, to introduce disorganization in the work of the military and state authorities, that is, to achieve results which fundamentally predetermined the further course and even the outcome of the armed combat.

The plan for the war against Poland and the practical measures to achieve strategic surprise in the attack served for Nazi Germany as that scheme which lay at the basis of the planning for the war against France, England and then against the USSR.¹⁵

The tragic experience related to the preparations for and the unleashing of World War II by the aggressors must not be forgotten. Nations which have a comparatively small territory, as a result of the surprise attack by the Nazi troops, suffered a crushing defeat. The Soviet Union was able to withstand the surprise attack of the enemy hordes. However, it required enormous efforts and sacrifice by the people and gigantic organizational activity by the party and government in order to overcome its consequences, to break the course of armed combat and be victorious. A dear price was paid for the victory.

Under today's conditions, the presence of nuclear missile weapons which possess unprecedented destructive force and virtually unlimited range opens up broad opportunities for an aggressor to make surprise massed strikes of enormous destructive force, to seize the strategic initiative and cause for its victim monstrous losses which can predetermine the outcome of the war in the aggressor's favor. The fact must be considered that the nations comprising NATO have highly mobile, combat-ready troop groupings capable of going over to the offensive without preliminary deployment.

The nature of the tasks to be carried out by the NATO Armed Forces in the course of operational and combat preparation also indicates that their main efforts are to be concentrated on mastering the methods of achieving surprise in initiating a war against the socialist commonwealth countries and conducting decisive offensive actions from the very outset.

The work underway to militarize space represents a major danger. The essence of the so-called "strategic defense initiative" consists in deploying attack space systems capable of hitting objects located in space, in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth and to gain a new terrible weapon for launching the first strike.

The Pentagon views the current West German Bundeswehr as its main military ally and considers it essential to use the experience of its predecessor, Hitler's Wehrmacht, and the experience of the military-political leadership of Nazi Germany in preparing and unleashing a

nuclear missile "blitzkrieg," naturally considering the changes occurring in the development of armaments and intelligence equipment. Recently the West German magazine DIE STERN wrote: "In American special military literature, the German 'blitzkrieg' are presented as unsurpassed models of tactical-strategic skill. Here, little by little, they are beginning to rave about such 'merits' of the soldiers in the Nazi Wehrmacht as 'fighting spirit' and 'mobility' shown during the years of World War II. At present, one out of every three cadets from West Point is studying German and many of them do this to have an opportunity to read Wehrmacht documents in the original.... Inspiration by the 'professionalism' of the Wehrmacht has overcome the memory of the crimes of Naziism."¹⁶

One other foreboding historical parallel. Imperialist circles, regardless of the noted detente related to the signing of the Treaty on Eliminating Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles and the fundamental agreement on reducing the strategic offensive arsenals of the USSR and United States, continue to use anticommunism for achieving their aggressive, neocolonialist aspirations. The myth of the "Soviet military threat," "expansion" and "hegemonistic aspirations" is spread intensely. The apologists of this myth almost literally repeat the words of Hitler and Goebbels who said them in endeavoring to depict the treacherous aggression against the USSR as having the nature of a "preventive war."

Thus, as before, the main emphasis in the strategic concepts of the imperialist forces is put upon the surprise initiation of a war, on preemptive military actions and the conducting from the very outset of large-scale offensive operations with decisive goals. For this reason, the task of preventing a surprise attack by the aggressor is assuming exceptional importance. In 1980, the Soviet Union drew attention to this, having submitted for review by the XXXV UN General Assembly Session the memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security." This pointed out: "Repeatedly and steadily the Soviet Union has raised the question of the need to elaborate measures to **prevent the possibility of surprise attack.**"¹⁷ Under present-day conditions characterized by an arms race in not only quantitative but also qualitative terms, this question requires an immediate solution. This question was raised again by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, on 27 December 1985 in a meeting with the heads of the diplomatic missions accredited to the Soviet Union. He pointed out: "Our nation, from its own bitter experience having felt what such a treacherous attack is, is interested in the reliability and strictness of monitoring just as much as anyone else."¹⁸

High vigilance and high combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces restrain the imperialist aggressors and are a powerful obstacle on the path to unleashing a new war. As was pointed out at the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet people and our

party rely on their Armed Forces, they do everything to strengthen them and are right to feel that no aggressive forces can catch us by surprise.¹⁹

For this, as was emphasized in the Resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, "all defensive construction from now on should be oriented predominantly at the quality parameters—both in terms of equipment and military science and the personnel of the Armed Forces. In guaranteeing dependable security for the Soviet state and its allies, this construction should be carried out in strict accord with our defensive doctrine."²⁰

Footnotes

1. "Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1986, pp 168, 170.
2. "Sovershenno sekretno! Tolko dlya komandovaniya!" [Top Secret! For Command's Eyes Only!], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, p 74.
3. Quoted in: "Yaponskiy militarizm (Voyenno-istoricheskoye issledovaniye)" [Japanese Militarism (Military History Research)], edited by and with introductory article of Academician Ye.M. Zhukov, Moscow, Nauka, 1972, p 164.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1974, p 372.
5. "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1937-1939" [Documents and Materials From the Eve of World War II of 1937-1939], Moscow, Politizdat, Vol 1, 1981, p 31.
6. Ibid., p 32.
7. Ibid., p 29.
8. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva: Sbornik materialov" [The History of Military Art] A Collection of Materials], Moscow, Voenizdat, No 4, Vol 2, 1952, p 227.
9. "XVIII syezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy partii (b) 10-21 marta 1939 g.: Stenograficheskiy otchet" [18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) of 10-21 March 1939: Verbatim Report], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1939, p 13.
10. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1969, p 68.
11. D.M. Proektor, "Fashizm: put agressii i gibeli" [Fascism: Path of Aggression and Death], Moscow, Nauka, 1985, p 145.
12. "Dokumenty i materialy kanuna...", Vol 2, p 67.

13. B. Muller-Hillebrand, "Sukhoputnaya armiya Germanii 1933-1945 gg." [The Land Army of Germany of 1933-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostr. Lit., Vol II, 1958, pp 12-13.

14. E. Mannstein, "Uteryannyye pobedy" [Lost Victories], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957, p 25.

15. P.A. Zhilin, "O voyne i voyennoy istorii" [On War and Military History], Moscow, Nauka, 1984, p 151.

16. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 14, 1986, p 19.

17. PRAVDA, 26 September 1980.

18. Ibid., 28 December 1985.

19. KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1987, p 45.

20. Ibid., No 10, 1988, p 67.

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Star Wars and SDI

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[Review, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by I.A. Panshin, doctor of technical sciences, professor; Capt 1st Rank L.D. Chernousko of recently published books on Star Wars and SDI: "Star Wars and SDI"; the books reviewed are listed in Footnotes 1-6 at the end of the article]

[Text] Mankind has expected a great deal from the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. However, the Washington administration has refused to sign the nuclear disarmament treaty over fundamental differences on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI]. The U.S. ruling circles have held tightly to the SDI, seeing in it a possibility of developing new plans for nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

For many years now, both the Soviet and the foreign press has paid great attention to SDI which should provide a new powerful impetus for the strategic arms race, in sharply increasing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. For this reason new books on this subject written by prominent Soviet scientists and writers are met with great interest by readers. In showing all the lethality for peace of developing the new base of aggression in space as conceived of by the imperialists, they name the possible measures for offsetting the space weapons.

The first book which we would like to present is "Zvezdnyye voyny—bezumiye i prestupleniye" [Star Wars—Folly and Crime], written by the winner of the USSR Lenin and State Prizes, Academician V.S. Avduyevskiy, and Candidate of Legal Sciences A.I. Rudnev.¹

The authors have paid special attention to the questions of the peaceful development of space and the importance of international collaboration in this area in the interests of all peoples. It is emphasized that millions of Soviet people feel practical benefit from the satellites which provide long-distance telephone and telegraph communications, the relaying of television programs and radio broadcasting. From the book we learn that information on remote earth sensing from space is received by more than 800 organizations in our nation. The national economic effect obtained in this has been assessed annually at hundreds of millions of rubles. Satellites helped, the book recalls, in precisely bringing the atomic icebreaker "Arktika" to the North Pole and due to them collaboration is developing successfully among the socialist nations under the Intercosmos Program.

The beneficial joint work of Soviet and American cosmonauts on the spacecraft Soyuz and Apollo was a good example of international collaboration in the peaceful development of space. However, due to the American side, the authors write, a large portion of points in the agreement reached in this area remains unrealized.

The title of the book indicates that Star Wars is a folly and a crime. Yes, precisely the crimes of the American military-industrial complex to all peoples, including its own, for preparing a worldwide thermonuclear fire. For now, the militarization of space brings unprecedentedly high profits for the U.S. capitalists and according to data in the foreign press, the SDI Program should cost from \$1.5 to \$2 trillion. The authors trace the prehistory of SDI the idea for which did not arise in a vacuum. A majority of the satellites launched in the United States are intelligence designed to collect espionage information about many countries. As is pointed out in the book, the Pentagon is planning to outfit the combat orbital stations with X-ray and chemical lasers, and with ray, microwave and other directed-action weapons which supposedly would be capable of hitting any targets on earth, in space and in the airspace.

For developing the various space weapons systems, the United States is intensely conducting nuclear explosions in Nevada. The foreign press has pointed out that at least a thousand nuclear tests should be carried out in the interests of the SDI Program. Washington intends to deploy the first stage of SDI at a forced pace by 1994 and this will include land- and space-based missiles capable of downing the enemy ICBM and warheads.

The authors of the reviewed work draw attention to one other important circumstance: the space weapons race can sharply increase the probability of nuclear war as a result of a "surprise intentional, unprovoked or random outbreak of it" (p 112). The entire world knows of dangerous instances of disasters and accidents with American bombers carrying nuclear bombs on board, the nuclear submarines, the Titan-2 and Pershing-2 missiles, the Challenger spacecraft as well as numerous instances of false alerts due to technical malfunctions in the U.S.

Air Defense System, when the strategic forces were brought to a high state of alert. The book's authors warn that since the space weapons systems are fully automated and the time for activating them is measured in seconds, the probability of the accidental outbreak of a war is sharply increased to extremely dangerous limits.

"The Pentagon is planning," the book points out, "that, having assumed dominant positions in space, the combat orbital stations, like aircraft carriers in the open sea, will become the base of space troops capable of conducting combat in space and from space" (p 68). This is why in Reykjavik it was not possible to reach agreements on the questions of strategic weapons and medium-range missiles and which could become historic for the fate of mankind. The SDI has a strictly militaristic nature and is aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The authors link the questions of preventing the militarization of space with the demands of international law and treaty obligations. At the end of the book, the reader will find the texts of the treaties concluded between the USSR and the United States on weapons systems, and in particular the antimissile defense which was a subject of sharp debate in Reykjavik and is presently being subjected to attacks and distorted interpretation by certain circles in Washington. Familiarization with the texts of the treaties convinces one that: "The sinister plans and real deeds of the U.S. ruling circles linked to the Star Wars Program either directly contradict the provisions of the international agreements on space or do not conform to their spirit and undermine the bases of the existing agreements" (p 119).

In the book by V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudnev the imperialist plans for the militarization of space are put in clear opposition to the Soviet program for the peaceful scientific and economic use of space. However, it poorly depicts the military-technical aspect of the problem and in the introduction the authors promise to show how the Pentagon intends to employ attack space weapons in military actions as they are being developed for this medium. A major shortcoming is also that the book does not have illustrations.

To a significant degree these shortcomings have been eliminated in the book "Zvezdnyye voyny—illyuzii i opasnosti" [Star Wars—Illusions and Dangers].² It shows how the United States on a large scale is building up and improving its offensive nuclear potential. The American strategic forces are receiving qualitatively new weapons systems which have high aiming accuracy, maneuvering individually targeted nuclear warheads. In planning the first "disarming" strike overseas they are counting on a combination of attack space and strategic weapons. Here the clumsy fib is lofted that the USSR has supposedly been long at work on the militarization of space.

The book points out that the Pentagon from the very start of the space age has been viewing near space as a staging area for waging aggressive wars. Thus, the United States was the first nation to test in 1959 an antisatellite weapon: a missile launched from a B-47 bomber with the intercepting of the satellite Explorer-6. In the 1960s, on the Pacific islands, ground antisatellite systems were developed based on the Nike-Zeuz and Thor-Agena antimissile missiles. In 1984, two flight testings were conducted of the ASAT aviation missile system developed on the basis of the F-15 fighter. The use of manned spacecraft of the Shuttle type has also assumed an outright military purpose. The book is well illustrated with 12 colored drawings and diagrams. On a double-page spread, they show a version of the antimissile system being developed in the United States and this is a component part of the potential of a first nuclear strike.

The lessons of history teach that it is essential to struggle against a military threat before weapons are used. If the United States begins to militarize space and thereby sets out to undermine the existing military-strategic equilibrium, the Soviet Union will be left with no choice but to take measures in response (p 54). The USSR has always found a proper response to any threat to its security. This was the case with nuclear weapons, intercontinental strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, multiple individually targetable warheads and, finally, long-range cruise missiles. Our nation possesses sufficient intellectual, scientific-technical and industrial potential for this.

For the meanwhile, official Washington is extolling the SDI which will supposedly protect the United States as a dependable "shield" against ballistic retaliatory missiles. The dialectics of the development of weapons systems shows that with the present-day level of technical progress, it is impossible to develop an "absolute weapon" which the SDI developers are dreaming of in accounting that they will make the "enemy ICBM unnecessary and senseless."

Let us now give the floor to the members of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War who have prepared the book "Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti" [Space Weapons: The Dilemma of Security].³ This emphasizes "in order that the strategic forces of one of the sides could carry out the mission of causing unacceptable damage to the other side in a retaliatory strike, their effectiveness as measured by the ratio of the number of nuclear warheads reaching the designated targets to their initial number can be just 1 percent or even less" (p 137). The Pentagon "shield" on which so many hopes are being placed overseas could not repel 99 percent of the retaliatory strikes. Even 1 percent of lethal retaliation is sufficient for the aggressor.

American specialists have also pointed out possible shortcomings, failings and weak points in the system. Among these they mention first of all the great complexity in orbiting the combat spacecraft and there should be

from several hundred to several-score thousand of them and in contrast the comparative simplicity of determining the trajectories and their location. The Americans themselves recognize that the electronic "nervous system" of the SDI is very vulnerable and even at present it is not hard to find active devices for its disruption or complete disabling. Foreign specialists feel that it would be possible to develop devices for the direct hitting and neutralization of the SDI component elements. A system of spacecraft, the book emphasizes, would be very vulnerable in terms of different types of weapons. For example, there could be various-based small missiles, a ground laser weapon, specially launched clouds of space "shrapnel" as well as satellite "mines" guided to the combat spacecraft.

In the reviewed books, the conclusion is drawn that the SDI Program is an equation with many scientific-technical and military-political unknowns. However, even now it is clear that the continuation of this program will involve the world in an unprecedented arms race and destabilize the strategic situation and substantially impede the talks between the USSR and the United States. Washington has already involved in its "starry" adventure its NATO allies of England, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and West Germany as well as Japan and Israel with the intention of making maximum use of the scientific and technical potential of these countries.

The Soviet and American leaders have proclaimed that in a nuclear war there can be no victors! For this reason, it is essential to work to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik showed a real opportunity to reach agreement in this area. The Washington administration, as is emphasized in the reviewed books, must show a new, constructive approach to the question in which all mankind is interested in an affirmative solution.

In 1987, the collection was published "SOI—amerikanskaya programma 'zvezdnykh voyn'" [SDI—The American Star Wars Program]⁴ prepared by the collective of Soviet scientists from the United States and Canada Institute as well as the Space Research Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences. The authors of the collective—Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev, Doctor of Historical Sciences A.A. Kokoshin, Candidates of Sciences A.A. Vasilyev, M.I. Gerasev, S.A. Kulik and S.N. Rodionov—have done great work in reviewing and analyzing around 200 U.S. official documents, monographs and articles by foreign authors devoted to the history of SDI.

In analyzing the course of development of various weapons under the SDI Program, the authors of the collection have pointed out: "The technical level of development in all these weapons over the near future remains clearly insufficient for carrying out the task posed by the U.S. administration of developing an absolutely dependable antimissile defense for the territory of the United States"

(p 110). The American specialists themselves recognize that even major achievements in any technical area will scarcely provide any substantial change in the current situation.

In considering all the arguments by the overseas supporters and opponents of SDI, the collection concludes that with the aid of this program Washington is endeavoring to resolve the political problems of relations with the USSR as was clearly confirmed by the summit meeting in Reykjavik. At the same time, the Soviet Union proposes to follow a path of lessening tension and confrontation between the two countries and to set out on a policy of limiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, strengthening mutual security and abandoning the militarization of space.

In taking up the possible consequences of developing SDI for U.S. relations with its NATO allies, the authors point out: "The arguments about an American (NATO) 'shield' covering Western Europe are groundless. There is every reason to assume that the real plan of the American strategists is, under conditions of a crisis situation, to cover the United States against a retaliatory strike by using the 'shield' while Europe is to be employed as an arena for conducting military operations" (p 321).

From the materials of the collection it becomes clear that the SDI System is not of a defensive but rather offensive nature. Combined with the strategic triad, it is designed for an aggressive first strike against the Soviet Union.

From the day of the announcing of the SDI Program, the Washington administration has steadily asserted that finally a universal means has been found for saving the world from nuclear war and that in the not distant future weapons of mass destruction will become senseless. The campaign to extol the SDI has involved highly-placed officials, representatives of the military-industrial complex and the Pentagon as well as journalists.

However, in the United States and Western Europe, there are also other people who honestly warn about the danger of shifting the arms race into space and who realize the adventurism of the new militaristic venture in the aims of "absolute" military superiority. This question is the subject of the book by the international journalist A.A. Shalnev entitled "Zvezdnyye voyny: chto dumayut amerikantsy" [Star Wars: What the Americans Think].⁵

The author has worked for a long time in the United States as a TASS correspondent and a special correspondent for IZVESTIYA and knows well what is being written overseas about SDI and how. Thus, the leader of the American Committee for East-West Accord E. Salk feels that the Star Wars Program is "purest folly" (p 56). The militarization of space opens up a new terrible page in the arms race, it complicates completely the international situation and strengthens the threat of global

nuclear confrontation. One must also recognize the logic of Congressman E. Markey who commented: "The SDI is designed not at all to protect the population but rather for protecting American ballistic missiles" (p 63).

"The SDI is a deception of mankind and an abuse of scientific forces," was how the West German natural scientists put it. "Absolute protection against nuclear weapons cannot be realized technically and on this we are in complete agreement with numerous specialists from the United States and the Soviet Union. Defense against nuclear weapons is impossible. Only disarmament in the nuclear area can provide effective defense" (p 73). It would be possible to give many such clear-headed arguments which have appeared on both sides of the Atlantic.

Even such figures as the former President J. Carter and the former Secretaries of Defense C. Clifford and R. MacNamara have ended up in opposition to the Reagan program for the militarization of space (pp 103, 114, 206), as well as many American scientists who have refused to participate in the implementation of SDI, considering it harmful for the cause of peace and disarmament.

Mankind breathed easier learning about the signing of the Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles between the United States and USSR. For the first time, the question has been resolved not to increase but rather to reduce nuclear missile weapons. A real prerequisite has been established for an important agreement to halve strategic offensive weapons. Seemingly, in the spirit of the new thinking, Washington must now close down its SDI Program. Certainly if things are leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, then why build a grandiose defense against them? However, the overseas militarists have their own plans. These have been described in the book "Kosmicheskaya ruletka Pentagona" [The Pentagon's Space Roulette]⁶ written by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Maj Gen V.S. Belous. This book examines the true goals of SDI and the plans of the U.S. military-industrial complex to develop an arms race of unprecedented scope on the earth and extend this into space.

The book emphasizes: "The desire to establish superiority in space is closely linked to the American 'doctrine of neoglobalism'" (p 59). But SDI is directed primarily against the USSR. This is happening at a time when the Soviet Union is putting forward one peace initiative after another and proposing a step-by-step plan for eliminating all types of weapons of mass destruction and completely eliminating the threat of nuclear war by the year 2000. Finally, in the course of the Soviet-American summit in Washington, a treaty was signed between the USSR and the United States to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles. Seemingly one could expect a policy of mutual disarmament. The book persuasively shows that the Pentagon continues feverishly to develop

the SDI components and is conducting various experiments. It is pointed out that certain foreign specialists are hopeful that an X-ray laser can be added to a number of strategic systems. Chemical lasers placed in space on platforms can be used for destroying missiles and for hitting various targets in the atmosphere or on the earth's surface.

"U.S. military experts have estimated," we read in the book, "that the energy supply of one space-based laser is completely sufficient to create around 10,000 fires. If one considers that there will be hundreds of such units in space, one can imagine the scope of the threat hanging over mankind" (p 73).

Under the conditions of the work initiated by the Pentagon on the SDI, the Soviet Union will be forced to undertake retaliatory measures to ensure international security and peace in our world. "If the United States does not abandon the SDI, we do not intend to make it easier for it," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev. "Our response will be effective, dependable and economic. We have plans on how to neutralize the SDI without spending on this those colossal amounts which the United States has needed to develop it. Let the Americans think again, is it worth exhausting themselves with the SDI. In any event it will not provide a reliable defense."⁷

Footnotes

1. V.S. Avduyevskiy, A.I. Rudnev, "Zvezdnyye voyny—bezumiye i prestupleniye" [Star Wars—Folly and Crime!], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, 222 pages.
2. "Zvezdnyye voyny—illyuzii i opasnosti" [Star Wars—Illusions and Dangers], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, 56 pages.
3. "Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti" [Space Weapons: The Dilemma of Security], edited by the Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ye.P. Velikhov, Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences R.Z. Sagedeyev and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof A.A. Kokoshin, Moscow, Mir, 1986, 182 pages.
4. "SOI—amerikanskaya programma 'zvezdnykh voyn': Sbornik obzorno-analiticheskikh materialov o tekhniko-ekonomicheskikh i voyenno-politicheskikh aspektakh SOI" [SDI—The American Star Wars Program: Collection of Review and Analytical Materials on the Technical, Economic and Military-Political Aspects of SDI], Moscow, Izd. Instituta SShA i Kanady AN SSSR, 1987, 360 pages.
5. A.A. Shalnev, "Zvezdnyy voyn: chto dumayut amerikantsy" [Star Wars: What the Americans Think], Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, 223 pages.

6. V.S. Belous, "Kosmicheskaya ruletka Pentagona" [The Pentagon's Space Roulette], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1988, 240 pages.

7. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Restructuring and New Thinking for Our Nation and for the Entire World], Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, p 254.

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific papers and Information," by Maj Gen R.M. Yusupov, RSFSR Honored Scientist and Technician, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor; Sr Lt (Res) V.P. Ivanov, Candidate of Technical Sciences: "Mathematical Modeling in Military Affairs"]

[Text] With the aid of mathematical methods, many problems are currently being solved in military scientific research involving the study of military (combat) operations on various scales (strategic, operational and tactical) and spheres (on land, at sea, in the air) and so forth. Mathematics and computers are the basis of military economic, military technical and operational-tactical calculations. And the first of these not only serves military affairs and in particular military science, but was initially and remains an active accelerator of their development.

Mathematical modeling holds a special place among the methods used in the designated area. A mathematical model is an approximate description of some process, phenomenon or object employing mathematical dependences and logical rules. Modeling is particularly effective when a direct experiment to investigate one or another process or object is practically impossible or entails significant material or time outlays.

The first attempts to employ mathematical methods in Russia for describing armed combat go back to the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries. During this period, mankind entered the age of imperialism and this involved the rapid development of the productive forces, industry, transport and science. "...Technical progress," pointed out F. Engels, "has revolutionized all military affairs."¹ The outfitting of the army with new, more advanced weapons (magazine rifles, machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, aviation and so forth) led to fundamental changes in the methods and forms of conducting military (combat) actions. Wars began to be waged by multimillion-strong armies while brief engagements were replaced by operations that were

enormous in scope and time. The need to analyze these events and the changes occurring in the armed forces brought about a definite revival of military theoretical thought in Russia.

One of the first works employing mathematics to describe combat actions would be the article by Ya. Karpov "Tactics of Fortress Artillery"² published in the journal VOYENNIY SBORNIK, the official organ of the Defense Ministry. In endeavoring to determine the suitability of rifles, machine guns and artillery pieces of various systems in repelling a storm on a fortress as well as to work out the demands on antiassault weapons and their tactics (combat employment), the author developed the appropriate mathematical models for the process of repelling the attacking enemy infantry formations.

In the process of working on the model for the employment of the gun, the author saw shrapnel as the chief means of repelling the infantry. He reasoned as follows. In bursting, the bullet's shrapnel covers a portion of the earth's surface. He reckoned that for thwarting the assault it was sufficient to release a quantity of shrapnel whereby there would be at least one bullet for each sector occupied by a man over a time needed by the man to cross the surface of the shrapnel burst. Consequently, the length of the defensive sector assigned for one gun was proportional to its rate of fire, the number of bullets in the shrapnel shell, the area of a sector occupied by a man and inversely proportional to the average rate of advance of an infantryman on the assault.

In determining a mathematical model for the employment of a machine gun, Ya. Karpov proceeded from the fact that the enemy would not cross the defensive sector which was assigned to a single gun. In this instance, the length of the defensive sector "assigned to the machine gun" according to the formula obtained by him was proportional to the rate of fire, the width of the front's sector occupied by a man, the depth of the covered space and inversely proportional to the average rate of advance of an infantryman on the assault.

The elaborated mathematical models made it possible for Ya. Karpov to assess the effectiveness of various weapons used for defending a fortress and employing here a single indicator, the length of the defensive front assigned to it.

The conclusion was drawn that for repelling an assault the rapid-fire guns and machine guns were the best weapon. Moreover, the author pointed out that machine guns possess greater clustering in comparison with guns for flanking fire on the assaulting troops and for this reason are preferable.

P. Nikitin continued and developed the research of this scientist.³ In relying on the models developed by Karpov, he analyzed a broad spectrum of weapons. The results of calculating the width of the defensive sector along the front L per weapon are shown in the table.

Having confirmed the conclusion of Ya. Karpov that a machine gun is approximately 40-fold more effective than a rifle, the author gave the experimental data of the Test Commission of the Officer Rifle School according to which, in firing at 2,000 paces, one machine gun was the equivalent of 45 riflemen. On the basis of the calculations made, recommendations were worked out for allocating forces in the defense of fortresses.

Data on the Width of the Defensive Sector Along the Front L Assigned to One Gun

Weapon	Width of Defensive Sector Correspondingly Sajene/Meter
3-inch rapid-fire cannon	8/17.1
57-mm antiassault cannon	
—grape shot	5/10.7
—shrapnel	2.5/5.3
Machine gun	3/6.4
Horse-drawn or light cannon of 1895 model, shrapnel	2/4.3
Horse-drawn or light cannon of 1877 model, shrapnel	1/2.1
9-inch cannon, shrapnel	1/2.1
4-pound cannon, grape shot	0.5/1.1

In the summer of 1914, World War I commenced. In the heavy bloody engagements of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, the Russian Army suffered heavy losses. Under these conditions, great importance was assumed by the questions of establishing the number of troops and analyzing possible losses in conducting the operations. The research of our compatriot M. Osipov was devoted to the given questions and the results of this were given in the article "The Influence of the Number of the Fighting Sides on Their Losses"⁴ and in the supplement to it.⁵

Osipov analyzed 38 major engagements of the 19th and 20th Centuries and concluded that in an approximate form the law of distribution for the losses, depending upon the numbers of the fighting sides, can be expressed by the side strongest in numbers suffers fewer losses than the weaker. He also proposed two hypotheses on the nature of the dependence of losses upon the over-all number of troops. In accord with the first it was proposed that for small armies (not over 75,000 men), the losses of the sides are inversely proportional to their number. According to the second, it turned out that the losses of the sides are inversely proportional to the square root of their number.

In examining the first hypothesis, M. Osipov obtained a model of combat in the form of the following differential equations:

(1)

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = -\beta y, \quad \frac{dy}{dt} = \alpha x,$$

which link the rate of change in the number of troops (combat units)

(2)

$$\frac{dx}{dt} \quad \text{и} \quad \frac{dy}{dt}$$

with the current number of the sides x and y and their corresponding intensity of losses A [α], B [β].

In deriving the equations (1), it was assumed that each side had a certain number of uniform combat units (riflemen) and any unit during combat could be either in a battleworthy state or defeated.

If one integrates (solves) the equations (1) considering the initial numbers x_0 , y_0 , then we obtain

$$x_0^2 - x^2 = \frac{\beta}{\alpha} (y_0^2 - y^2),$$

Hence with A [α] = B [β], there follows a quadratic law of losses: the difference of the squares of the numbers of the fighting sides in all phases of combat actions (battle) remains constant.

In developing his model, the author incorporated in it various weapons including rifles, machine guns and artillery pieces. Here he obtained coefficients for reducing the intensity of losses from some weapons to others.

Analogous ratios were derived by M. Osipov also in affirmation of the second hypothesis.

The author checked the adequacy of his models by investigating the results of numerous engagements of the 19th and 20th Centuries. He analyzed the causes (sources) of random and systematic errors. Among the former, for example, he put those when consideration was not given to the art of the leader, the morale of the soldiers, the relative size of reserves, a certain conditionality in the coefficients for converting the guns and machine guns into riflemen, indoctrination, organization and training of the troops, new means of defense and weapons. The second category of errors arose out of the absence of considering the terrain conditions, fortifications and the way of actions, the number of fighters, the density of the extended rifle line and the possibilities of maneuver, outflanking and enveloping.

The obtained mathematical models and concrete calculations for them made it possible for M. Osipov to formulate a series of conclusions and provisions from the area of the theory of military art:

1. "In strengthening our numbers, we cause the enemy great losses and at the same time we ourselves suffer even much fewer losses."

2. "With superiority of forces to send men into battle in the largest numbers does not mean to sacrifice them uselessly but, on the contrary, this means to preserve them and gain time for carrying out the set task."

3. "Those who become lost in battle are considered enemy allies. This is why cowardice has always been equated to baseness."

4. "From the viewpoint of losses, fortifications are of enormous significance for the defenders. Even field fortifications can be assaulted by an open force only with a significant superiority in forces and particularly in artillery."

5. "Both for the strongest and for the weakest it is advantageous to field the most active forces. This agrees fully with the known rule of military art to begin and conduct military operations with the full commitment of all forces."

6. "The gradual reinforcing of an extended line of infantry instead of immediately sending out a strong extended line is not beneficial to oneself but to the enemy who immediately sends out a strong extended line."

7. "The rule of hitting the enemy unit by unit serves as an indisputable affirmation of the given theory that the losses of the strongest in number should be less than in the weakest." "Do not split your forces but be strong at one place and, of course, at the most important under the given conditions."⁶

M. Osipov realized well that mathematical models do not replace the basic provisions of the theory of military art but rather create prerequisites for their more able and intelligent verification and employment. He wrote: "The sole practical aim of the theory of losses is the more aware control over the number of troops for reducing one's losses and increasing enemy losses."⁷

We feel that the work of M. Osipov is a valuable study for those times of military questions employing mathematical models. It has been well worked out procedurally. Its scientific level is high. The publication serves as an example of the thorough and comprehensive approach to solving an important problem for military affairs and an example of the skillful employment of mathematical statistics, differential calculus and algebra. The author not only worked out a mathematical model of losses but also conducted a detailed examination of their adequacy.

In speaking about the importance of the work done by our compatriot, we would like to point out three aspects.

In the first place, M. Osipov obtained simple models of combat actions in the form of the differential equations (1) which subsequently became a source of numerous research.

Secondly, this scientist introduced coefficients for converting certain combat weapons into others. Such an approach up to our times has been employed for developing various quantitative and qualitative methods for assessing the ratio of forces of the sides.

Thirdly, Osipov established a list of random and systematic errors in modeling combat and worked out certain procedures for their analysis and consideration.

Unfortunately, the authorship and primacy of M. Osipov has virtually gone unrecognized in the designated area. The equations (1) obtained by him have been named after Lanchester and the ratio (2) discovered by the Russian scientist is known as the quadratic law of the same English scientist.

F.W. Lanchester published his equations in 1916 in the book "Aircraft in Warfare."⁸ The goals of his research were different than for Osipov. After the start of World War I, in Great Britain the need arose for a correct assessment for the development prospects of aviation, including its combat employment. F.W. Lanchester was among the specialists engaged in studying this problem. He analyzed the combat capabilities of aviation, he took up the questions of its armament, he examined a number of combat missions to be carried out by it and so forth.

Proceeding from the same premises as M. Osipov, Lanchester in an analogous manner obtained equations for the two-sided combat actions in the form of (1). In analyzing these models, he also concluded that it was important to concentrate the troops in an engagement and that the role of active forces was essential as well as the degree of intensity of losses. Lanchester showed how applicable models were in assessing naval engagements and in analyzing the combat employment of aviation.

Thus, M. Osipov, judging from the publications, approximately a year before the designated work of F.W. Lanchester came out, in the journal VOYENNY SBORNIK described for the first time in world practice a dynamic model of combat actions. It can be assumed that the equations for combat dynamics were obtained by both authors independently of one another. Hence, in using these equations and in referring to them, it is more ethical to write and speak about the Osipov-Lanchester equations and the Osipov-Lanchester quadratic law.

The equations derived by the Russian and English scientists had a significant impact on the further modeling of combat. In the opinion of Academician N.N. Moiseyev, they "established the basis for a mathematical analysis of combat operations."⁹ The designated equations helped activate research on operations and comprised the nucleus of one of the areas of science concerned with a quantitative basis for decisions in all areas of human activity. On the basis of the given equations, the method of the dynamics of averages was finally formed.¹⁰ These equations and their further generalizations which took into account new weapons, changes in

the forms and methods of combat, resistance from the enemy, different versions for replenishing forces and other factors up to the present comprise the basis of many models for combat actions.

The development of the ideas set out in the examined and other works by Russian scientists and specialists at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries is pertinent today. The role of mathematical methods in military affairs is constantly growing.

Mathematics can and should have a substantial positive influence on all aspects of military affairs, on solving the problems of the organizational development, training and employment of the armed forces, on Soviet military science as a whole and so forth. To a significant degree this is guaranteed by the great concern shown by the party and government for its development. This is seen, in particular, by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on strengthening scientific research in the mathematics area.¹¹ The decree provides for the carrying out of a number of specific measures aimed at improving the material and technical support for research in the area of theoretical and applied mathematics and improved quality in the training of specialists. A nationwide program is to be developed for the extensive use of mathematical modeling methods in various areas of the national economy.

Moreover, the success in employing mathematical methods in military affairs to a large degree is determined by the level of mathematical and computer culture (literacy) in the officer personnel, particularly military scientists and staff officers of all levels, by the presence of close creative ties of the scientific research institutions of the Ministry of Defense and military scientists with specialists and scientific organizations in the mathematics area under the USSR Academy of Sciences and so forth.

Footnotes

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], 2d Edition, Vol 20, p 655.
2. VOYENNNYY SBORNIK, No 11, 1906, pp 81-92.
3. P. Nikitin, "Organization and Combat Activity of Artillery in the Attack and Defense of Modern Fortresses," ARTILLERIYSKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1911, pp 957-995.
4. VOYENNNYY SBORNIK, Nos 6-9, 1915, pp 59-74, 25-36, 31-40, 25-37.
5. Ibid., No 10, pp 25-37.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

8. F.W. Lanchester, "Aircraft in Warfare. The Dawn of the Fourth," London, Constable and Company Limited, 1916, 222 pages.

9. N.N. Moiseyev, "Matematika zadayet voprosy..." [Mathematics Asks the Questions...], Moscow, Znaniye, 1974, p 27.

10. Ye.S. Ventsel, "Issledovaniye operatsiy" [Operations Research], Moscow, Sovetskoye Radio, 1972, pp 329-365.

11. PRAVDA, 14 November 1986.

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Body of Higher Military Authority in Nation
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[Article, published under the heading "Military History Dates and Events," by Col (Ret) N.A. Maltsev, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "The Body of Higher Military Authority in the Nation; On the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of Establishing the Republic Revolutionary Military Council"]

[Text] The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) No 235 of 2 September 1918 stated that "The Soviet Republic is being turned into a military camp. A revolutionary military council [RVS] with one commander-in-chief is being placed at the head of all the fronts and all the military facilities of the Republic."¹ It further stated that the chairman of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council] was the people's commissar for military and naval affairs and he was to be approved by the VTsIK while all its members, including the commander-in-chief would be approved by the Council of People's Commissars (SNK). The first chairman of the RVSR was L.D. Trotskiy, the commander-in-chief was I.I. Vatsetis (from September 1918 through June 1919), and the members were K.Kh. Danishevskiy, N.A. Kobozev, K.A. Mekhanoshin, F.F. Raskolnikov, A.P. Rozengolts and I.N. Smirnov.² Soon thereafter the membership of the RVSR also included S.I. Aralov, N.I. Podvoyskiy, E.M. Sklyanskiy and K.K. Yurenev.³

On 30 September 1918, by a decree of the VTsIK the Regulation "On the Revolutionary Military Council" was approved and this emphasized:

"1. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is the body of superior military authority in the nation.

"All the forces and means of the people are to be made available to the Revolutionary Military Council for the needs of defending the frontiers of the Soviet Republic.

"All Soviet institutions are obliged to review and satisfy the demands of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council first.

"2. The Republic Revolutionary Military Council absorbs all the rights of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and all the members of which are to become part of the Council.

"3. All the military institutions are to be subordinate to the Republic Revolutionary Military Council and work according to its assignments."⁴

In addition, it was particularly pointed out that the commander-in-chief has complete independence in resolving all questions of a strategic-operational nature.

In its work the RVSR was guided by the decree and the instructions of the party Central Committee. At first, it carried out a series of important measures: it eliminated the different types of troop formations, it established uniform front field forces, it formed the RVS of the Northern, Eastern and Southern Fronts, and established the membership of the RVS of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th Armies. It exercised leadership over the Armed Forces of the Republic through subordinate staffs, the central and main directorates. Its main bodies were the staffs, the Field and All-Russian High Staffs. The first was concerned with the questions of conducting combat actions and the second with the organization of the rear services, the manning of the units and formations and their training.

One of the crucial functions of the RVSR, the RVS of the fronts and armies was direct leadership and control of the troops on the fronts of the Civil War. At first (until the announcing of the Regulation), there was a number of shortcomings and even conflicts in their activities. Thus, in the report of the members of a commission from the party Central Committee and the Defense Council I.V. Stalin and F.E. Dzerzhinskiy "On the Reasons for the Fall of Perm" it was pointed out that "the RVS of the 3d Army consists of two members, one of whom (Lashevich) is in command but as for the other (Trifonov) we were unable either to ascertain the functions or role of the latter. He does not supervise supply, he does not supervise the army political indoctrination body and generally does not do anything. In actuality, no RVS exists."⁵

Another example. On 29 September 1918, at a session of the RVS of the Southern Front⁶, a serious conflict broke out over the question of the rights of the commander. The front's commander, P.P. Sytin, stated that leadership over military operations was exclusively the competence of the commander. The front RVS members did not agree with him, in assuming that leadership of the military operations should be carried out by the RVS as a collective body. Sytin proposed that the session be halted and seek an explanation from the RVSR. However, the front RVS headed by I.V. Stalin on 2 October

decreed that Sytin should be removed from the duties as commander of the front and petitioned that K.Ye. Voroshilov be appointed to this post.⁷ However, the RVSR, having examined the conflict, proposed following a line of nonintervention by the commissars into operational affairs. The same conclusion as reached by the Orgburo of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and its decision was immediately telegraphed by Ya.M. Sverdlov to Stalin, Minin and Voroshilov: "Today there was a session of the Central Committee Bureau and then the entire Central Committee. Among other questions, the question was discussed of the subordination of all party comrades to the decisions deriving from the centers. There is no need to show the necessity for unconditional subordination. The Regulation of the RVSR was adopted by the VTsIK.... All decisions of the RVS are obligatory for the front military councils. There can be no unified army without subordination. Without halting the execution of the decision, it can be contested before a superior body, the SNK or the VTsIK and in an extreme case before the Central Committee. We urgently propose that the decisions of the RVS be carried out. In the event (if) you consider them harmful or incorrect, we propose you come here, discuss this jointly and take the proper decision. There must not be any conflicts."⁸ However, the given demand of the party Central Committee was not carried out by the front RVS and because of this on 6 October 1918, the RKP(b) Central Committee called back I.V. Stalin to Moscow and transferred him to other work. Then it formed a new RVS of the Southern Front consisting of the Commander P.P. Sytin and the RVS members K.A. Mekhanoshin and B.G. Legran.

These and other instances from the activities of the RVSR accelerated the elaboration and adoption of regulations governing the commander-in-chief of all the Republic Armed Forces and on the commanders of a front and armies. On 5 December 1918, these regulations were signed by the Chairman of the SNK, V.I. Lenin. They clearly set out the functions and competence of the members of the RVSR, the RVS of the fronts and armies.⁹ In being guided by this document, the RVS significantly intensified their activities in directing combat actions, particularly the RVS of the Eastern Front which was a model of the practical solution to all the most important questions of military organizational development.

After the end of the Civil War, the RVSR played a major role in the reorganization and strengthening of the Red Army and Navy, in equipping them with combat equipment and weapons, in involving the army in labor activities, in carrying out a military reform, in improving the party-political apparatus and party political work as well as other military questions.

A few words about the chairman of the RVSR, L.D. Trotskiy. Certain historians have asserted that he had a military talent and generalship abilities which were apparent in the course of such strategic operations as the

defeat of Kolchak, the fight against Denikin, the defense of Petrograd against Yudenich and the Polish Campaign. Of course, these operations were crucial in the Civil War but the facts show that Trotskiy and his supporters in the apparatus of the RVSR and the other military bodies ignored and sometimes simply thwarted the execution of major party and government directives. The party Central Committee and the Defense Council had to several times remove Trotskiy from the leadership of the designated operations.¹⁰

Some in the West feel that Trotskiy was an expert in military science. But here is what he himself said at a meeting of the military delegates at the 11th RKP Congress on 1 April 1922: "Really, were our manuals created by Marxist methods? This is the first time I have heard of this. The manuals summarize military experience. But how can these be reduced altogether by the Marxist method? This is a historical method, a social science.... There is no military 'science' and never was. There is a series of sciences on which military affairs are based. War is not a science, war is a practical art, a skill. War is the 'trade' for those who correctly study military affairs."¹¹ This statement alone is fully sufficient to convince oneself of the total falaciousness of Trotskiy as a military theorist. The attempts by Western propaganda are reputed by historical facts. The Red Army won victories on the fronts of the Civil War not because of but in spite of the interference by the RVSR Chairman Trotskiy.

Under the conditions of the deteriorating international situation and the threat of attack on the USSR, the Communist Party took measures to strengthen the USSR RVS. However, the work of the latter was complicated due to the antiparty activities of the politburo member, the chairman of the USSR RVS, Trotskiy, and which intensified in the second half of 1923 with the illness of V.I. Lenin. He tried to put the personnel of the Narkomvoenmor [People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs] in a special situation, to isolate it, depriving it of the supervision and leadership by the party Central Committee. At the October (1923) Plenum of the RKP(b) Central Committee, in the aim of strengthening party leadership of the USSR RVS, against the arguments of Trotskiy, K.Ye. Voroshilov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, I.V. Stalin and others were put on its membership.¹² At the same plenum, they organized the Presidium of the USSR RVS (RVS Chairman Trotskiy, Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, Deputy RVS Chairman Sklyanskiy, the Chief of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Staff Lebedev and members including Pyatakov, Lashevich, Stalin and Maralov).¹³ The formation of this body improved the structure of the USSR RVS and should have told positively on the activities of the latter. However, Trotskiy underestimated the work of the Presidium and at times ignored it. He was rarely present at its sessions (from February through December 1924 there were 19 Presidium sessions, but the USSR RVS chairman was present at only 5).¹⁴ For investigating the state of the Red Army, as preparations for the

January (1924) Plenum of the RKP(b) Central Committee, a commission was organized which included S.I. Gusev, A.A. Andreyev, A.S. Bubnov, K.Ye. Voroshilov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, I.S. Unshlikht, M.V. Frunze, M.N. Shvernik and others. After a careful and thorough study of the state of affairs, the commission reached the following conclusion: "In its present form the Red Army is unviable."¹⁵ On 11 March 1924, by a decree of the USSR SNK the position of deputy chairman of the USSR RVS was filled by the outstanding military and political figure M.V. Frunze (in the place of E.M. Sklyanskiy who had held this post since 1918). In the following year, the Plenum of the RKP(b) Central Committee recognized the further presence of Trotskiy in army work as impossible, and the presidium of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] on 26 January 1925 removed him from the held positions, appointing M.V. Frunze as the RVS chairman and as people's commissar of military and naval affairs. The new membership of the USSR RVS included: P.I. Baranov, A.S. Bubnov, S.M. Budennyi, K.Ye. Voroshilov, A.I. Yegorov, S.S. Kamenev, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, I.S. Unshlikht and others.

In line with the untimely end of M.V. Frunze (31 October 1925), the Presidium of the USSR TsIK on 6 November 1925 appointed K.Ye. Voroshilov the people's commissar for military and naval affairs and the chairman of the USSR RVS; his deputy was I.S. Unshlikht and the chief of the RKKA Staff was M.N. Tukhachevskiy. The most important task of the USSR RVS during this period was a further rise in the combat readiness of the army and navy and completing the reorganization in the entire structure of command and control of the Armed Forces. In carrying out these and other tasks, the USSR RVS did great work in implementing the military reform, in strengthening and developing the RVS of the districts and armies, reorganizing the military headquarters bodies, changing the organization and establishment of the troops, restructuring the system for the training and indoctrination of the personnel, introducing one-man command, improving ideological and political indoctrination and the combat training of the personnel. The range of questions resolved by the USSR RVS grew significantly after the publishing of the Decree of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 15 July 1929 "On the State of National Defense" many of which had to be carried out for the first time. In line with this the number of measures carried out by it grew. While in 1926, there were 22 sessions of the Presidium and 14 plenums of the USSR RVS, in 1927, their numbers were, respectively, 29 and 18.¹⁶ Here they reviewed all in all around 600 various questions related to the strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and the nation's defense capability.

As socialist construction was carried out in the USSR and as the Soviet Armed Forces were strengthened, the Communist Party continued to improve the organizational structure of the central military apparatus, including the USSR RVS. This work was based upon the

decisions of the 17th Party Congress which stated: "In the aims of strengthening personal responsibility on the part of the economic and soviet leaders, the collegiums are to be eliminated in all areas of soviet and economic work, with the exception of the elective soviet bodies."¹⁷ In accord with this decision of 20 June 1934, by a decree of the USSR TsIK the USSR RVS was eliminated and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (NKVM) was renamed the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense. At the same time, the RVS were abolished in the districts, armies, fleets and flotillas. The elimination of the RVS, the collective bodies of the Communist Party and Soviet government in the Soviet Armed Forces had a negative effect upon the over-all state of the troops and contributed to the violating of socialist legality in the Army and Navy.

Footnotes

1. "Dokumenty po istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [Documents on the History of the Civil War in the USSR], Moscow, OGIZ, Vol 1, 1940, p 216.

2. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 4, inv. 3, file 26, sheet 2.

3. E.M. Sklyanskiy became the deputy chairman of the RVSR, K.Kh. Danishevskiy headed the Revolutionary Tribunal while N.P. Podvoyskiy and K.A. Mekhanoshin led the Higher Military Inspectorate. The remaining members of the RVS directed the combat work on the fronts (TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute], folio 17, inv. 2, file 4, sheet 1-2).

4. "Sobraniye uzakoneniye i rasporyazheniy rabocheho i krestyanskogo pravitelstva" [Collection of Rulings and Orders of the Worker and Peasant Government, 28 December 1918], No 97, First Section, Article 978, pp 1237-1238.

5. V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, "O zashchite sotsilisticheskogo Otechestva" [On the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1945, p 69.

6. The RVS of the Southern Front was established on 17 September 1918 consisting of I.V. Stalin, S.K. Mitin (chairman of the Tsaritsyn Provincial Executive Committee), P.P. Sytin and K.Ye. Voroshilov (deputy commander of the front).

7. M.M. Slavin, "Revvoensovety v 1918-1919 gg." [The RVS in 1918-1919], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 71.

8. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 2, file 5, sheet 37.

9. Quite inaccurately a number of works (for example, V.V. Trotskiy, "Khronika sobytiy" [Chronicle of Events], Samara, 1929, p 63; A.Ya. Gorman, "Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo v period inostrannoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny 1918-1920" [Soviet

State and Law in the Period of the Foreign Intervention and Civil War of 1918-1920], Moscow, Yuizdat, 1958, p 174) assert that these documents were worked out by L.D. Trotskiy or with his involvement. In actuality, Trotskiy refused the proposal of Ya.M. Sverdlov to work out these Regulations and they were written by the members of the RVSR, the RVS of the fronts and V.I. Lenin made corrections in the final version (see "Leninskiy sbornik" [Lenin Collection], Moscow, Politizdat, XXXVII, 1975, p 304).

10. See: "Report of the RVSR for 1917-1919," TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 2, file 32, sheets 30-59.

11. S.I. Gusev, "Grazhdanskaya voyna i Krasnaya Armiya: Sbornik statey" [The Civil War and the Red Army: Collections of Articles], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958, pp 184-185.

12. TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 2, file 110, sheet 29.

13. TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 1, files 55, 57, sheets 14, 71, 84; inv. 3, file 2626, sheets 1-2, 47.

14. Ibid., inv. 3, file 2626, sheets 1-2, 47.

15. "KPSS i stroitelstvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [The CPSU and the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, Voenizdat, 2d Revised and Supplemented Edition, 1967, p 137.

16. TsGASA, folio 4, inv. 3, file 3221, sheet 14; file 3251, sheets 41, 81.

17. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Moscow, Politizdat, 9th Edition, Vol 6, 1985, p 131.

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On Number of Guns in Russian Armies by Start of 1812 Patriotic War

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[Article, published under the heading "Chronicle, Facts, Findings," by N.A. Troitskiy, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "On the Number of Guns in the Russian Armies by the Start of the 1812 Patriotic War"]

[Text] It is generally felt that the artillery of the Russian troops, including those fighting against Iran, Turkey and also considering the internal garrisons, in 1812 had 1,600 guns. This figure has been given by Russian prerevolutionary and Soviet historians (M.I. Bogdanovich "Istoriya Otechestvennoy voyny 1812 g. po dostovernym istochnikam" [The History of the 1812 Patriotic War From Reliable Sources], St. Petersburg, 1859, Vol 1,

p 59; "Otechestvennaya voyna i russkoye obshchestvo" [The Patriotic War and Russian Society], Moscow, Vol 3, 1912, p 67; Ye.V. Tarle, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," "Sochineniya" [Works in 12 Volumes], Moscow, Izd-vo AN SSSR, Vol 7, 1959, p 488; I.S. Prochko, "Istoriya razvitiya artillerii" [The History of Artillery Development], Moscow, Izd. Akademii im. Dzerzhinskogo, Vol 1, 1945, p 202; "Istoriya SSSR s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney" [History of the USSR From Ancient Times to the Present], Moscow, Nauka, Vol 4, 1967, p 116. The collection of articles "1812 god" [The Year 1812] (Moscow, 1962, pp 83-84) gives without reference to the sources 1,620 field guns and 180 siege guns. But the question of how many guns were in the troops stationed along the western frontier and receiving the thrust of Napoleon's Army has been treated differently. The Russian prerevolutionary historiography gives a number of figures: A.I. Mikhaylovskiy-Danilevskiy reckoned 942 guns, M.I. Bogdanovich 938 and the authors of the collective "Istoriya russkoy armii i flota" [History of the Russian Army and Navy], 934 (A.I. Mikhaylovskiy-Danilevskiy, "Opisaniye Otechestvennoy voyne v 1812 g." [Description of the Patriotic War in 1812], St. Petersburg, 3d Edition, Vol 1, 1842, p 120; M.I. Bogdanovich, "Istoriya Otechestvennoy voyny 1812 g. po dostovernym istochnikam," St. Petersburg, Vol 1, 1859, pp 114, 116, 117; "Istoriya russkoy armii i flota," Moscow, Vol 3, 1911, pp 94-95). At the same time, D.I. Akhsharumov, D.P. Buturlin, P.A. Nive as well as the authors of the jubilee 7-volume "Otechestvennaya voyna i russkoye obshchestvo," do not contain any data on this. Foreign historians, including such experts on the War of 1812 as G. Chambre, F.P. Segure, K. Clausewitz and R. Wilson, usually do not estimate the number of Russian guns.

Opinions on the essence of this problem in Soviet historiography also differ. N.S. Kinyapin, for example, points out that the Russian troops in the invasion zone of Napoleon's Army had 888 guns, N.A. Levitskiy gives 898, N.F. Garnich 906, M.S. Svechnikov and A.N. Kochetkov 934, L.G. Bestovnyy in one of his works 934 and in another 988, A.A. Stokov gives 942 and S.B. Okun 960 (M.S. Svechnikov, "Voyna 1812 g. Borodino" [The War of 1812. Borodino], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1937, pp 32-33; N.A. Levitskiy, "Voyna 1812 g." [The War of 1812], Moscow, Partizdat, 1938, p 9; N.F. Garnich, "1812 god" [The Year 1812], Moscow, Goskultprosvetizdat, 2d Edition, 1956, p 59; N.S. Kinyapina, "Vneshnyaya politika Rossii pervoy poloviny XIX v." [Foreign Policy of Russia in the First Half of the 19th Century], Moscow, Vysshaya shkola, 1963, pp 66-67; A.A. Stokov, "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva. Kapitalisticheskoye obshchestvo ot frantsuzskoy burzhuanoy revolyutsii do perioda imperializma" [History of Military Art. Capitalist Society From the French Bourgeois Revolution to the Period of Imperialism], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965, p 165; A.N. Kochetkov, "M.B. Barclay-de-Tolli," [Barclay de Tolly] Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1970, p 17; L.G. Beskrovnyy, "Otechestvennaya voyna 1812 g." [The Patriotic War of 1812],

Moscow, Sotsekgiz, 1962, p 178; L.G. Beskrovnyy, "Russkoye voyennoye iskusstvo XIX g." [Russian Military Art in the 19th Century], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 95; S.B. Okun, "Istoriya SSSR. Lektsii" [History of the USSR. Lectures], Leningrad, Izd. LGU, Part 2 (1812-1825), 1978, p 8). Here none of them with the exception of A.A. Stokov refers to any documents. Each of our encyclopedias gives its own figure: Soviet History 888, Great Soviet 934, Soviet Military 942 weapons ("Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya" [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol 10, 1967, p 667; "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 3d Edition, Vol 18, 1974, p 611; "Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 153). In the widely-known monographs of Ye.V. Tarle and P.A. Zhilin as well as in textbooks information generally on this question is not to be found.

At the same time, completely authoritative documents both published and partially remaining in the archives make it possible to clarify all the previously made calculations. The TsGVIA [Central State Military History Archives] contain authentic reports signed by M.B. Barclay de Tolly and P.I. Bagration to the Tsar concerning the size of the 1st and 2d Western Armies at the start of the War of 1812. These give the number of guns as follows: In the 1st Army 556 (TsGVIA, folio 154 (A.A. Arakcheyev), inv. 1, file 84, sheet 6; Report of M.B. Barclay de Tolly to Alexander I of 28 June (10 July) 1812), and in the 2d 264 (ibid., sheet 13 verso; Report of P.I. Bagration to Alexander I of 1 (13) June 1812). However, to the 556 guns of the 1st Army one must also add the 24 guns of the Separate Cossack Corps of M.I. Platov and the III Cavalry Corps of P.P. Palev and which were part of the 1st Army but in the Report of Barclay de Tolly are missing, as they were on the march away from the main forces. Judging from the "Schedule of Russian Armies by the Start of Military Operations in 1812" and published in 1910, these corps each had a horse-artillery company ("Istoriya Otechestvennoy voyny 1812 g. po dostovernym istochnikam" [Materials of the Military Science Archives of the High Staff (below VUA)], St. Petersburg, Vol 17, 1910, p 54), and in each of these there was to be according to the wartime TOE 12 guns ("Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar Brokgauza i Yefrona" [Brokgauz and Yefron Encyclopedic Dictionary], St. Petersburg, Vol 53, 1899, p 152).

As for the 2d Army, of the 264 guns mentioned in the report of P.I. Bagration, it is essential to subtract 84 guns of the VI Infantry Corps of D.S. Dokhturov, since the latter during the first days of the war was incorporated in the 1st Army and given in the report of M.B. Barclay de Tolly. Consequently, the 1st Western Army had 580 guns and the 2d 180.

The report by the Commander of the 3d Western Army, A.P. Tormasov, states that his army at the start of hostilities had 168 guns (VUA, Vol 13, p 162; Report of A.P. Tormasov to Alexander I of 10 (22) June 1812).

In addition to the three armies, on the first line of rebuffing the French invasion near Riga was the separate corps of I.N. Essen and in the second line there were two reserve corps: the I of Ye.I. Meller-Zakomelskiy at Toropets and the II of F.F. Ertel at Mozyr. According to the corps records, by the start of the war Essen had 72 guns (VUA, Vol 12, p 14; Corps Records of I.N. Essen of 1 (13) May 1812) and Ertel had 102 (VUA, Vol 17, p 61; Corps Records of F.F. Ertel of 10 (22) June 1812). The records of the I Reserve Corps have also been published (VUA, Vol 17, p 352) but the number of guns in it is not given.

Thus, in our view, the Russian troops stationed along the Western Frontier by the start of the War of 1812 had a total (not counting the corps of Meller-Zakomelskiy (possibly this reserve corps did not have artillery)) of 1,102 guns against the 1,372 for Napoleon.

The flanks of the Western Russian Troop Grouping were covered as follows: from the north by the Finnish Corps of F.F. Shtengeyl which was positioned on the frontier with Finland and on the south by the Danube Army of P.V. Chichagov located at Walachia. These troops at the start of the war were idle but in September also joined in the fighting against the French. For this reason it is important not to overlook that Chichagov had 202 guns (VUA, Vol 17, p 353; Report of P.V. Chichagov to Alexander I of 5 (17) July 1812). Information on the artillery in the Shtengeyl corps is nowhere to be found, even in the corps records (GPB RO [State Public Library], folio 993 (Archives of P.K. Sukhtelen), stor. unit, A.B. Fok, p 323. The size of the Finnish Corps is given with 19,000 men). However, if it is assumed that the reserve corps of Ye.I. Meller-Zakomelskiy did not have artillery, the figure of 1,102 guns in the Russian armies which received Napoleon's blow at the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812 can be recognized as the most accurate.

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